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During the last decades, we witness the convergence of Islamic banking sector towards 
conventional banking sector, which was more evident after the 1990s with the entrance of 
Islamic Banks (IBs) into competition with conventional banks in the global market. Because of 
such convergence, initial aspirations of Islamic banking sector during the emergence period in 
the 1960s as part of Islamic Moral Economy (IME) have mostly failed resulting in high 
utilisation of debt-financing instruments accompanied with lack of consideration for social 
consequences of everyday practices of IBs. Although it is expected that supervisory role of 
Shari’ah Boards (SBs) should prevent or at least moderate the observed convergence beyond 
merely relying on the legal-rational interpretation of Islamic law or Shari’ah; they are rather 
considered as facilitators of the divergence of IBs from IME norms. 
In order to investigate the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in IBs and the reasons behind the 
lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars to prevent the observed social failures of IBs, it is important 
to identify three main problems; (i) examination of supervisory role of SBs through Shari’ah 
Annual Reports (SARs) within IME framework; (ii) investigation of the process of divergence 
of IBs from initial aspirations of IME within postcolonial framework; and (iii) exploration of 
paradigm shifts in ifta (issuing legal opinion) institution’s reason d’etre with the objective of 
tracing the roots of modern SB as an ifta institution to explore the main reasons behind the 
inability of Shari’ah scholars in SBs to prevent the divergence from the IME objectives. 
This research, therefore, aims at constructing and constituting an Islamic Corporate Governance 
(ICG) system and its constituents through the foundational principles of Islamic ontology by 
framing it on the Islamic Political Economy (IPE) structure and IME substance. In addition, 
research aims to empirically examine SBs disclosure performance through their most effective 
communication channel with stakeholders, namely SARs to determine the performance of 
Shari’ah scholar in Shari’ah compliancy related communication. Furthermore, this study aims 
at examining the theoretical aspects of SBs to identify the process that makes this division as a 
source of legitimacy in terms of Shari’ah compliancy through analysis of the evolution of ifta 
institution in history and its transformation into SB division.  
Referring to the ontological and epistemological sources of Islam, a theoretical ICG system is 
developed in this study in Essay 1. Based on this theoretical foundation and available standards 
on SBs, Essay 2 presents an empirical analysis on the extent of disclosure in SARs as well as 
the factors affecting the level of disclosure in these reports with a sample size of 305 SAR from 
41 IBs of 15 countries for the period of 2007-2014 through statistical and econometrics 
methods. The results of disclosure analysis indicate that SARs do not contain adequate details 
to convince stakeholders in Shari’ah compliancy of IBs. However, Shari’ah scholars’ explicit 
approval of Shari’ah compliancy of the institution in SARs without disclosing details of their 
analysis seems a sufficient condition for the stakeholders considering the high growth rate of 
the Islamic banking sector during last decades. 
This study further examines the SB as modern ifta institution in its historical trajectory to 
explore how such trust has been gained and whether similar conditions are valid for Shari’ah 
scholars employed in modern Islamic banking sector today. However, before investigating 
historical trajectory of ifta institution, this study analyses the relationship between IBs and 
conventional banks which especially became a matter of concern as with the entrance of IBs to 
the global financial market, they have to compete with conventional banking sector in terms of 
performance, efficiency, minimisation of cost and increased shareholder value. 
The aim of Essay 3 is to analyse the sources of observed convergence in IBs towards 
conventional banks through the phases that IBs have evolved, for which the development of 
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modern Islamic banking sector is analysed in three stages and explored separately: (i) 
Establishment of first Islamic bank as a hybrid institution until the entrance of Islamic banking 
sector into competition at global scale; (ii) Convergence of Islamic banking institutions to 
conventional banking due to competition at the global scale; (iii) Co-optation and adoption of 
Islamic banking structure and instruments by conventional banks. As the current trajectory in 
Islamic banking sector demonstrates, IBs and conventional banks with Islamic windows follow 
a pragmatist approach to achieve growth and lacks the adherence to the initial goals of Islamic 
economics movement, which aimed at establishing an alternative sector based on Islamic 
ontological and epistemological sources. Considering the convergence of IBs towards their 
conventional counterparts during the last decades and insufficient disclosure in SARs by SB 
members, we claim that the source of an ‘Islamic’ identity in IBs is not due the practical success 
of SBs alone, but also the role and status of Shari’ah scholars (and indirectly SBs) in the sight 
of stakeholders. This requires the investigation of SB division from a theoretical perspective to 
understand its emergence and evolvement, for which the ifta institution and its evaluation is 
examined through its historical trajectory.  
Essay 4, therefore, critically explores and explains the evolution of ifta institution and the role 
and status of Shari’ah scholars in pre-modern period so that their ‘legitimacy source role’ in 
IBs can critically be explored and understood. Essay 5, by building on the fourth essay, aims at 
critically exploring the transformation of ifta institution and the role and status of Shari’ah 
scholars in the modern period through the conceptual framework of institutional logics. Our 
research revealed that there are three important transformations between pre-modern and 
modern period in terms of the role and status of Shari’ah scholars. These are embeddedness of 
Shari’ah scholars into the financial sector in modern period rather than the society as in the 
pre-modern period; transformation of the source of legitimacy of Shari’ah scholars from 
society to ‘being assigned to a SB by the management of IB’; and lastly, complexity of products 
and services in the modern period compared to the pre-modern period.  
In order to overcome the social failure of Islamic finance sector and prevent the convergence 
towards conventional sector as a result of these transformations, this study offers a civil society 
based control mechanism that goes beyond ‘halal’ and Shari’ah compliant product and 
services, and investigate the products and services with IME based dimensions through a fuzzy 
logic approach. In the conclusion, we discuss the reasons behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
While the textual sources and practice of Islamic economics and finance is as old as 
Islam as a religion, Islamic economics movement in modern times emerged in the 
postcolonial period in organising the economic life in Muslim societies in line with the 
social formation of Islam with an Islamically authenticated meaning of life. While it is 
termed as Islamic ‘economics’, its reference through Islamic normativeness refers to 
moral economy in Polanyian (1957) sense, and therefore, as a disruptive and 
counterhegemonic movement, it has aimed at rescuing land, labour, capital and human 
among other stakeholders from the hegemony of self-regulated market economy or 
capitalism as expressed by neo-classical form of economics. In its alternative paradigm, 
therefore, Islamic moral economy (IME) is expressed through embeddedness, sharing 
economy, cooperative and collaborative economy, non-fictitiousness, de-
commodification and fair and just economy with re-distributive objectives.  
Since capitalist hegemony has not given an opportunity space for the development and 
expansion of IME as a paradigmatic system within Islamic ontology, emerging petro-
dollars in the post oil-shocks in the 1970s paved the way for the partial realisation of 
Islamic economics with the emergence of Islamic commercial banking in the form of 
Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975, despite the fact that the very first Islamic bank was a social 
bank, Mith Ghamr Bank, in lower Egypt established in 1963 but was closed down by 
the regime due to its positive impact in capacity building.  
The commercial banking model has been prevailing in the Islamic banking sector since 
the first Islamic bank, which has been constructed with the Qur’anic verse (2:275) that 
‘riba (interest) is prohibited, while trade is made halal or lawful’. In ensuring Shari’ah 
compliancy, in addition to the prohibition of interest or riba, gharar or excessive 
uncertainty, maysir or gambling and speculation is prohibited along with the prohibition 
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of dealing with certain sectors such as those are considered harmful for human well-
being. Alongside such fiqh or Islamic law injunctions relating to negative screening 
process, IME principles expects financing activities should be conducted in line with 
profit-and-loss sharing and risk sharing forms so that sharing, participatory, 
collaborative and co-operative nature of economy should be achieved, and that Islamic 
banking and finance should be conducted in an embedded social formation. As part of 
IME paradigm, Islamic banking and finance is also expected to work within real 
economy by avoiding fictitious commodities, prevent commodification and also 
discourage debt culture through profit-and-loss sharing schemes. A number of historical 
Islamic financing instruments are available for Islamic banks and financial institutions 
in the form of asset-backed, asset-based and debt-based instruments, while asset-
backed instruments are essentialised by IME. The IME paradigm also suggests an 
extended stakeholding governance system in line with the ontological nature of Islam. 
Despite such aspirational world, Islamic banking and finance paradigm is relegated to 
Shari’ah compliancy in the form of prohibition of riba, gharar and maysir by giving 
up the transformational expectations identified by IME. In making sure that Islamic 
banks and financial institutions work within these negative screening conditions, 
Shari’ah compliancy is essentialised, which, as a role, is fulfilled by Shari’ah Board 
(SB) as a modern institution. 
SB is one of the most important and distinguishing characteristics of Islamic banks 
(IBs) as part of Shari’ah governance. The role of SB is to assure that operations of IBs 
comply with Shari’ah rules and principles through directing, reviewing and supervising 
activities of IBs. It can, therefore, be claimed that the ‘Islamic’ nature of IBs is derived 
from the effectiveness of this division to achieve its role as a Shari’ah compliancy 
related supervisory unit in practice and by providing and substantiating the ‘Islamic 
identity’. Majority of the stakeholders of IBs, however, trust in Shari’ah compliancy of 
IBs without analysing the existential necessity of this unit or investigating the details 
of the supervisory process; as for them the presence of such a unit is satisfactory 
condition for Shari’ah compliancy. This observation suggests that there is something 
more in the SB division beyond merely practical success of conducting the supervisory 
and auditory task; something exclusively due to the nature of this unit – being composed 
of Shari’ah scholars who represent the religious authority in IBs. Hence, SBs constitute 
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an essential part of Islamic banking and finance activity; however, considering the 
unprecedented increase in the size and nature of such activities over the last two decades 
in particular, the study of SBs have become an important focal point with serious issues 
being raised on the Islamicity of IBs. 
This study, hence, aims to explore both empirical aspects of SB in IBs through their 
most effective communication channel with stakeholders, namely Shari’ah annual 
reports (SAR), to explore whether this important division fulfils its task properly; and 
theoretical aspects of SBs to identify the process that makes this division as a source of 
legitimacy in terms of Shari’ah compliancy through analysis of the evolution of ifta 
(issuing a legal opinion) institution in history and its transformation into SB division in 
IBs. It should be noted that ifta institution can, originally, be described as a civil society 
based non-enforcing legal opinion institution, while in the evolution of history it moved 
between civil society and state incorporating the commercial sector interest in current 
times. Thus, the significance of this study lies in its empirical as well as theoretical 
contribution. 
The SBs are expected to issue an annual report, Shari’ah Annual Report (SAR) to 
disclose the necessary information to ensure stakeholders that the operations of IBs are 
conducted per Shari’ah rules and principles. Although such annual reports are the most 
important intermediary between SBs and stakeholders, the extent of disclosure of SBs 
vary among the IBs considerably despite the fact that AAOIFI (The Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions), being the essential 
independent standard setting body, has provided sets of standards for the contents and 
disclosure of SAR in Islamic banks. 
The empirical analysis of SB division in this study, hence, aims to explore the extent of 
disclosure in SBs’ annual reports with the objective of identifying the factors affecting 
the level of disclosure in these reports. This analysis aims to explore the extent of 
disclosure in SARs of 41 IBs from 15 different countries for the period of 2007-2014. 
In addition, it examines the factors determining such disclosure through bank level and 
country level factors. 
Most of the studies regarding the extent of disclosure of IBs neglect to analyse SAR 
issued by SBs and focus on social responsibility or other aspects of corporate 
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governance of IBs. Literature focusing on the components of SARs of IBs, therefore, 
is very limited. However, review of the available literature highlights the lack of 
uniformity in SARs. We argue that, therefore, a detailed analysis of SARs across 
countries to reveal the level of disclosure and factors affecting it will fill an important 
gap in the literature.  
Although SARs provide an insight for the level of success of supervision of SB and 
tangible evidence for ‘Islamic’ identity of IBs, we claim that the source of such identity 
in IBs is not due the practical success of SBs alone, but also the role and status of 
Shari’ah scholars (and indirectly SBs) in the sight of stakeholders. This requires the 
investigation of SB division from a theoretical perspective to understand its emergence 
and evolvement, for which we need to explore the ifta institution and its evolution after 
the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  
As a civil movement, mujtahids (Islamic scholars), the original institutional form of 
presenting Shari’ah scholarship, were ordinary ‘people’ without any elite power or 
official status in the legal system. However, due to their deep understanding of Islam 
and knowledge in Shari’ah (everyday articulation of Islam including legal aspects), 
they attracted people to their circles. Their source of legitimacy was their knowledge 
regarding the Shari’ah and their students and followers who made them centre of 
attraction, which is the historically registered process.  Thus, individually they emerged 
with the ‘acceptance’ of public around them. 
After the period of rightly guided caliphates, dynasties, who rose to the power from the 
end of 7th century, needed legitimacy in the sight of the populace. The lack of legitimacy 
of the ruling elite led the powerful elite, who usurped the power, to approach mujtahids 
in the pursuit of legitimacy to overcome the religious legitimacy under the ‘Sultanate 
Rule’.1 Through co-opting prominent Shari’ah scholars within their rule or negotiating 
with them, they could attain the legitimacy in the eyes of the people as a ruling 
authority.  
                                                 
1 After the dead of Prophet Muhammad, Rightly Guided Caliphate system had emerged. They were 
nominated among the public to be given consent (bay’a) for the leadership/caliphate of the society; and 
they were the companions of the Prophet and, therefore, they had Islamic legitimacy. However, this 
governance mechanism had been changed from the end of 7th century with the Sultanate system, in which 
the leadership was transferred from father-to-son leading to the creation of dynasties.  
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With the fall of Shari’ah-based dynasties and establishment of nation-states in the 20th 
century, Shari’ah-based law systems were replaced by Western-based law systems 
either through colonisation or revolutionary process aiming to Westernise the Muslim 
societies. After the establishment of nation-states, states and governments have no 
longer needed Shari’ah legitimacy which moved most of the mujtahids to ‘state-
independent’ status. Nevertheless, the re-emergence of Islam as part of identity search 
in nation states since the 1950s, brought Islam to the centre in everydayness in majority 
of the Muslim societies. In particular, with the emergence of Islamic finance during 
1960s, the need for Shari’ah legitimacy has taken a new turn with the need for 
institutional legitimacy. In other words, instead of dynasties or political authorities, 
commercial companies have come to pursue Shari’ah legitimacy to prove that their 
business is legitimate per Shari’ah. Hence, they accommodated Shari’ah scholars in 
their corporate identity, as a member of SB, as Shari’ah compliancy is a dynamic 
process and cannot be completed, for example, with having a certificate at one point in 
identifying it. Therefore, although ifta institution started as a civil movement at the 
initial period of Islam, it has now become part of corporate governance in modern 
Islamic banking sector.  
This study, hence, locates the results of the empirical attempt in this study within the 
larger context of ifta institution or Shari’ah scholarship with the objective reflecting on 
SBs performance in relation to SAR within the evolutionary nature of this institution. 
This is important; as Shari’ah scholars have been heavily criticised for their role in the 
observed social failure of IBs; and this study, therefore, examines the historical root of 
the issue in an evolutionary manner to identify the inability of Shari’ah scholars to 
make the necessary turn in IBs towards Islamic Moral Economy (IME) expectations, 
which is considered as the foundational claims of Islamic normative world. 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
During the last decades, one of the main debates in Islamic finance circle is the observed 
convergence of Islamic finance and banking sector towards conventional finance and 
banking sector, which was more evident after the 1990s with the entrance of IBs into 
competition with conventional banks in the global market. Because of such 
convergence, initial aspirations of Islamic banking sector during the emergence period 
in the 1960s as part of IME have mostly failed resulting in high utilisation of debt-
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financing instruments accompanied with lack of consideration for social consequences 
of everyday practices of IBs. Although it is expected that supervisory role of SBs should 
prevent, or at least moderate the observed social failure of IBs in not being able to meet 
IME expectations, Shari’ah scholars’ strategy of relegating Islamic morality to mere 
legal-rational objectives of Shari’ah has facilitated the increased pace of convergence. 
This debate is summarised as ‘form-over-substance’ approach in everyday practice of 
IBs. Thus, by focusing intentionalist approach through form-based legalism, Shari’ah 
scholars are blamed for not essentialising the substantial morality through 
consequentialism.  
In order to investigate the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in IBs and the reasons 
behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars to prevent the divergence of IBs from 
IME, it is important to identify three main problems; (i) examination of supervisory 
role of SBs through SARs within IME framework; (ii) investigation of the process of 
divergence of IBs from initial aspirations of IME within postcolonial framework; and 
(iii) exploration of paradigm shifts in ifta institution’s reason d’etre after the rightly 
guided caliphate period with the objective of tracing the roots of SB as a modern ifta 
institution to reveal the main reasons behind the inability of Shari’ah scholars in SBs 
to prevent the divergence. 
1.3. AIMS, OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND BRIEF 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Based on the identified problems above, this research is structured to develop five main 
essays with several objectives; and therefore, an attempt is made to identify their 
respective aims, objectives, research questions, and theoretical frameworks as follows: 
1.3.1. Essay 1: Constructing an Islamic Corporate Governance System: A 
Theoretical Attempt  
Aim: 
This chapter aims at constructing and constituting a theoretical frame of Islamic 
Corporate Governance (ICG) System and its constituents through the foundational 
principles of Islamic ontology by basing it on the Islamic Political Economy (IPE) 




This essay, therefore, has the following objective:  
(i) developing a critical and advanced understanding of Islamic substantive 
morality based Islamic corporate governance system for Islamic banks and 
financial institutions;  
Research questions:  
The articulated aim and objective are explored through the following research question: 
(i) What is the nature, constituents and articulations of Islamic Corporate 
Governance Model? 
Theoretical framework: 
In developing ICG system for Islamic banks and financial institutions, a theoretical 
framework of IPE structure with the underlying norm and moral requirements of IME 
is employed. This essay argues that the nature of Islamic banking sector and its 
substance requires a particular theoretical framework to capture the underlying 
ontological realities of knowledge (or Islamic ontology) that offers Islamic banking 
sector as an alternative sector to the conventional banking rather than mere mimicry of 
it. To achieve this goal, we employ, therefore, Islamic Political Economy (IPE) as the 
theoretical framework, through which, we attempt to construct ICG as a system of 
governance of corporates within an Islamic order through the substance derived from 
IME, which integrates substantive morality into the equation in addition to the fiqh or 
Islamic law construct.   
Research Method: 
In this chapter discursive method is utilised through interpretivism to construct and 




1.3.2 Essay 2: The State and the Determinants of Islamic Governance 
Disclosure in Islamic Banks: Analysis of Shari’ah Annual Reports 
Aim: 
This essay aims at analysing the disclosure practices of SBs shared with stakeholders 
of IBs through SARs to ensure ‘Islamic’ identity of IBs intact, which is expected to 
locate the articulation level of Shari’ah compliancy in the form of Shari’ah scholars’ 
performance.  
Objectives: 
This essay, therefore, has three main objectives:  
(i) exploring the extent of disclosure in SARs through a Shari’ah disclosure 
index developed based on AAOIFI guidelines for SAR, namely SDIAAOIFI; 
(ii) exploring the extent of disclosure in SARs through a Shari’ah disclosure 
index developed based on IME framework which extends SDIAAOIFI; 
(iii) identifying the determinants affecting the level of disclosures in SARs. 
Research questions:  
The articulated aims and objectives are explored through the following research 
questions: 
(i) To what extend Shari’ah scholars fulfil disclosure expectations of AAOIFI 
guidelines in SARs? 
(ii) To what extend Shari’ah scholars fulfil disclosure expectations of IME 
framework in SARs? 
(iii)Which factors have an impact in disclosure level of SARs? 
Theoretical framework: 
This essay is constructed as a disclosure analysis to identify the nature and level of 
communicated information in SARs. It, therefore, employs two indices to measure the 
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extent of disclosure in SARs which are constructed through AAOIFI guidelines for a 
SAR and IME framework. The IME frame, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a larger concept 
than AAOIFI standards in essentialising the substantive morality of Islam; as AAOIFI 
guidelines have been constructed based on Islamisation of knowledge framework and 
also through legal maxims.  
Since the requirements and expectations of IME based theoretical framework 
essentialise ‘morality’ as a ‘consequence’ not only as an ‘intention’, second index was 
developed for this essay to assess the disclosure performance exhibited in SARs, which 
goes beyond the available guidelines of AAOIFI, as it expects the disclosure of further 
details of Shari’ah compliancy, particularly in relation to substance of practices.  
Research Method: 
In responding to the aims and objectives of his study, this study explores the extent of 
disclosure in the Shari’ah Boards’ annual reports of 41 IBs from 15 countries for the 
period of 2007-2014, making in total a collection of 305 SARs. It should be noted that 
due to the unavailability of 23 Shari’ah annual reports within the sample period, this 
study has a sample of 305 instead of 328 SARs. 
As for the sampled Islamic banks, the sampling is based on criteria that they were 
established in 2007 or before and have published SARs, which are available online and 
should be in English or Arabic language for the period of 2007-2014.  
As for the estimation method, in determining the factors affecting disclosure level of 
SBs, one-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) approach is utilised. 
One-step GMM is selected over two-step GMM due to the small sample size which 
leads to problem of over-fitting in two-step GMM and makes asymptotic standards 
errors not suitable for hypothesis testing (Beck and Levine, 2004). System GMM 
approach also resolves the endogeneity of regressors while avoiding dynamic panel bias 




1.3.3 Essay 3: Exploring Institutional and Product Emergence in Islamic 
Banking Sector: A Postcolonial Perspective 
Aim: 
The aim of this essay is to analyse the sources of observed convergence in IBs towards 
conventional banks through the phases that IBs have evolved. In order to fulfil this aim, 
development of modern Islamic banking sector is divided into three stages and explored 
separately:  
(i) Establishment of the first Islamic bank as a hybrid institution until the 
entrance of Islamic banking sector into competition at the global scale;  
(ii) Convergence of Islamic banking institutions to conventional banking due to 
competition at the global scale;  
(iii) Co-optation adoption of Islamic banking instruments and structures into 
conventional banking framework. 
Objectives: 
In line with the identified aim, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) Exploring the emergence of Islamic banking sector;  
(ii) Exploring the process and means of convergence of Islamic banking sector 
towards conventional banking sector;  
(iii) Exploring the process of convergence of conventional banking sector 
towards Islamic banking sector;  
Research questions:  
In fulfilling the above aim and objectives, the following research questions are 
developed: 




(ii) Through which means Islamic banking sector managed to mimic conventional 
banking sector resulting in convergence towards conventional banking 
sector?; 
(iii) What is the motivation that leads to the convergence of conventional banking 
sector towards Islamic banking sector through reverse mimicry? 
Theoretical framework: 
This study aims to locate the emergence and the development of Islamic banking sector 
within the theoretical framework of multiple modernities with the help of postcolonial 
concepts of ‘hybridity’, ‘mimicry’, ‘menace’ and ‘reverse mimicry’. The existing 
debate in the literature demonstrates that multiple modernities framework is proposed 
as a result of observed failure of the imposed modernity as one and the only universal 
truth. Although the claim of universal truth has failed, due to the hegemonic domination 
of Eurocentricity, the experience has proven that modern is still produced by reference 
of various (non-European) cognitive rationalities leading to multiple modernities 
(Eisenstadt, 2000). Consequently, instead of accepting the project of the Western 
modernity as it is, every society, which has been imposed with the principles and 
institutions of modernity, adopted them in many cases according to local characteristics 
of the society leading to multiple modernities through a particular ‘blending process’ 
(Eisenstadt, 2000). 
While locating Islamic banking sector within the multiple modernities framework, we 
also utilise four postcolonial concepts to define the relationship between Islamic 
banking and conventional banking within convergence process. We argue that the first 
Islamic bank emerged as a ‘hybrid’ institution, while the following relationship between 
Islamic banking and conventional banking continued as the ‘mimicry’ of conventional 
banking which has facilitated the convergence. The response of conventional banking 
to hybridity and mimicry of Islamic banking is captured as menace and reverse 
mimicry. Thus, the convergence and resemblance of Islamic banking led conventional 
banking to ‘menace’, which resulted in a ‘reverse mimicry’, while Islamic banking had 
to compromise with its own value proposition to fit into neoclassical operational 




Research Method:  
In responding to the research questions, critical discourse analysis will be utilised to 
reveal the power relationship between IBs and conventional banking. In doing so, 
historical discourses and texts are utilised. 
1.3.4 Essay 4: An Inquiry into Public Policy and Shari’ah Scholarship in 
the Making: Historical Perspectives  
Aim: 
The aim of this paper is to critically explore and explain the evolution of ifta institution 
and the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in the pre-modern period so that their 
‘legitimacy source in IBs can critically be explored and understood. 
Objectives: 
In responding to the aim of this essay, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) to trace the evolution of ifta institution from the emergence until the modern 
period; 
(ii) to critically examine the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in the society 
over the centuries to locate the transformation has taken place.  
Research questions:  
The following research questions are developed in articulation of the defined aim and 
objectives:  
(i) What was the impact of embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars into the society 
on ifta institution during pre-modern period? 
(ii) What is the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in the society as a result of 
their embeddedness? 
(iii) What is the relationship between Shari’ah scholars and ruling authority as 




This essay aims to answer how everyday practice of Muslims affected the evolution of 
the ifta institution through the concept of embeddedness. In other words, we explore 
the role and status of jurist-consults through the nature of their embeddedness into the 
society. In this essay, to encompass both economic and non-economic relationships 
between Shari’ah scholars and their surroundings, namely society, we prefer to use the 
definition of embeddedness as Beckert (2003: 769) defined: “indissoluble connection 
of the actor with his or her social surrounding”, which relates to social formation. Every 
society has its own unique social formation, which leads to different degrees and ways 
to articulate the connection of social actors with their surroundings. In this regard, this 
essay explores relationship of Shari’ah scholars with their surroundings shaped by 
(various degrees) of Islamic social formation during the early periods of Islam. 
Research Method:  
In responding to the research questions, discursive analysis constitutes the method of 
analysis of the existing textual material. In doing so, historical discourses and texts are 
utilised. 
1.3.5 Essay 5: Reflecting on the Role of Shari’ah Scholars in Islamic 
Finance Industry: Transformation of Ifta Institution in Modern 
Period 
Aim: 
In building on the previous essay, this essay aims at critically exploring the 
transformation of ifta institution and the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in modern 
period as experienced in Islamic banking sector. 
Objectives: 
To fulfil the defined aim, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) to trace the transformation of ifta institution from pre-modern period to 
modern period to understand the nature of evolution; 
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(ii) to explore and critically examine the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in 
modern Islamic banking sector.  
Research questions:  
The following research questions are developed in responding to the defined aim and 
objectives: 
(i) What are the social and legal impacts of replacement of Islamic law with the 
Western based secular law vis-à-vis ifta institution resulting in modern SBs? 
(ii) To what extent do SBs have power to influence operations and everyday 
actions of IBs? 
(iii) What are the reasons behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars to promote 
objectives of Shari’ah in IBs? 
Conceptual framework: 
Since historical contingency suggests a shift towards market capitalism in Muslim 
societies, the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in IBs in modern period can be 
explored through the use of the concept of ‘institutional logics’, particularly its 
assumption of embedded agency, since contemporary IBs are established with a 
Western-style modern corporate model with an additional claim of Shari’ah 
compliancy legitimised by SBs under capitalist market system. It is important to note 
that the corresponding institutional form of Shari’ah compliancy in market system is 
SBs, which is the organisational form of individual Shari’ah scholars fitting into the 
corporate nature of market system.  
Institutional logics is defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to 
their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804). As the definition suggests, 




As a result of the emergence of the capitalist market order with its own institutional 
logics such as its unique organisation of time, creation of fictitious commodities and 
prioritisation of instrumental reasoning in shaping everyday life of the individuals as 
well as organisations, we can observe the transformation of ifta institutions under the 
influence of this prevalent institutional logics. This is due to embeddedness of Shari’ah 
scholars as individuals and IBs as organisations into the capitalist market.  
Embedded agency assumption claims that “the interests, identities, values, and 
assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded within prevailing 
institutional logics” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 103). In this, by ‘prevailing 
institutional logics’ in the case of IBs, we refer to the institutional logics of the capitalist 
market order.  
We do not argue that institutional logics of capitalist  market system is the only logic in 
IBs since embedded agency assumption acknowledges that actions of individuals are 
shaped by different societal sectors (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Society as the inter-
institutional system allows logics of different societal sectors to be influential in a 
context (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In the context of IBs, therefore, Islam as a 
religion and its institutional logic is also influential. Existence of Shari’ah scholars by 
itself is an indication of impact of Islam on IBs. Nevertheless, the dominant nature of 
the capitalist markets causes religion to have only partial impact on the everyday 
practice of IBs. In other words, rather than having IBs as articulation of Islamic morality 
and fulfilment of ‘the objectives of Shari’ah’ in society, we observe, in majority of the 
cases, replication of conventional banks in everyday operations with the same 
institutional logics with an excess of fulfilment of ‘the form of Shari’ah’ to keep the 
‘Islamic’ identity intact in the eyes of the stakeholders. Although we do not claim that 
every Shari’ah scholar in SBs has such embeddedness, it is a useful concept to explain 
part of social failure in Islamic banks (Asutay, 2007; 2012) along with other two 
explanations, namely transformation of source of legitimacy of Shari’ah scholars and 
complexity of the modern period. We, therefore, claim that under the high impact of the 
capitalist markets, some Shari’ah scholars have been influenced by the values and 
norms of the capitalist markets in their fatwa (legal ruling) process in IBs, since these 
IBs themselves have also been shaped by the very same norms and values beyond any 




In responding to the research questions, discursive analysis constitutes the method of 
analysis by utilising legal opinions of and the interviews conducted with Shari’ah 
scholars. However, it is important to state that this study utilises interviews conducted 
with Shari’ah scholars by other studies as available in various sources. As an analysis 
method, the interpretative method enables to give further meaning to data and material 
through meaning-making exercise. 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this research, both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies are used. 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA), as part of qualitative research methodology within 
explanatory research design, however, constitutes the main research method since the 
nature of the research in all chapters except for Chapter 3 is theoretical and discursive.  
In Chapter 3, as part of quantitative methodology, content analysis and econometric 
methods are used to explore and analyse the level of disclosure in Shari’ah annual 
reports and the factors determining the level the disclosure scores. Further details of 
these research methods are presented in Chapter 3.    
Since critical discourse analysis (CDA) constitutes the main base of the remaining 
chapters, it is useful to discuss here, which mainly relates to revealing the meaning from 
the textual documents (Morris, 1994). A discourse reflects a way of understanding and 
communicating the world under the influence of an ideology. Textual analysis, thus, is 
utilised to identify the content and structure of a textual material and, then, interpret the 
available material (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  However, it is important to note that 
CDA explores “all levels and dimensions of discourse” such as grammar, rhetoric and 
speech acts among others (Van Dijk, 1995:18). The focus of CDA is to reveal the power 
structures and relations of dominance among various groups and how these are 
articulated in everyday practice and resisted by the members of these groups through 
discourse, in which ideology plays a central role in establishing the relations of power 
and dominance as well as resisting against it (Van Dijk, 1995).  
In developing a system of Islamic corporate governance, we conduct an exploratory 
analysis in the epistemological sources of Islam, namely the Qur’an and Sunnah, which 
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reflects a worldview shaped by the ontology of Islam. Existing corporate governance 
systems, on the other hand, are also explored through CDA to reveal how it is also 
shaped by the dominant ideology, namely positivist ontology, and through power 
relations, dominate the existing IBs resulting into a social and moral failure in these 
institutions. It is important to note that Tawhidi ontology is a priori in shaping the 
everyday behaviours of Muslim individuals, which, therefore, constitutes the 
underlying structure of this research. Tawhidi ontology, as explored further in Chapter 
3, constitutes the essentialist part of an Islamic order in which the principles and values 
of an order extracted from the epistemological sources through discourse analysis to 
shape the moral substance of relationships and reflects the objectives of the Shari’ah. 
Socially constructed part of Islamic order, on the other hand, represents the everyday 
practice of individuals and institutions through the way they socially construct the 
Islamic norms derived from its ontology. Thus, they are socially constructed as subjects 
and institutions as a result of the relations of power and dominance within the society. 
Thus, while Chapter 2 aims to reveal the principles and values through discourse 
analysis from the epistemological sources to establish tawhidi ontology, Chapters 4-6 
utilises CDA to explore IBs and discourses around it to reveal the power structures in 
the everyday practice.     
In constructing and constituting the ICG in Chapter 2, therefore, discursive method is 
utilised. This method is used to explore the axiomatic framework that constitutes the 
substance of ICG derived from ontology and epistemology of Islam, to offer an 
alternative paradigm in a holistic manner. With the use of multi-disciplinary research 
approach, therefore, this study brings together the ‘context of discovery’ through 
identifying the ontological base by subjecting it to interpretivist analysis through 
hermeneutics. As part of social constructivist process, the ‘context of justification’ is 
developed to explore the epistemology in line with the ideas suggested by the ‘context 
of discovery’. In this, heuristics side helps to develop the constituents of the aimed ICG 
by, for example, defining the axioms of IME through subjecting the ‘text’ to 
interpretation through deduction from the revealed knowledge. Thus, it provides with 
the fundamental propositions through which a construction process can be initiated in 
a later stage. This is, naturally, followed by utilising inductive method which is utilised 
bringing together the deconstructed and interpreted material to formulate and structure 
an ICG. In other words, ‘context of discovery’ or heuristics approach takes place within 
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exploratory research method, while ‘context of justification’ is conducted through 
formulative approach by constituting a new model and a new way of looking at the 
social reality, which, here is an ICG system. 
In Chapter 4, critical discourse analysis is applied to explore the emergence and 
development of IB institutions with the objective of revealing the power relations 
between IBs and conventional banks. In this power relationship, as part of the critical 
discourse analysis, IBs are located as colonised subjects, while capitalist system and 
conventional banking sector as an articulation of this system are considered as 
colonisers. A post-structural discourse analysis is instrumental in conducting a macro 
level analysis (Diaz-Bone et al., 2007). This method is particularly considered suitable 
for the analysis of the postcolonial relationship between IBs and conventional banks, 
since post-structural theory explores “the relation of the enlightenment, its grand 
projects and universal truth-claims, to the history of European colonialism” (Young, 
2004: 41).  
In examining the discourse of IBs and conventional banks as an articulation of 
colonised-coloniser relationship at a macro level, this research focuses on the power 
relations and transformations of both institutional structures, particularly in terms of 
corporate structure and available products and services. The development of efficient 
and low-cost product and services as well as adoption of Shari’ah governance structure 
by conventional banking sector are essential in conducting discourse analysis on the 
power relationship between these two sectors.  
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 benefits also from critical discourse analysis as the research 
method. In addition to analysis of power relations between various parties, a text-based 
discourse analysis is utilised to develop a micro level analysis of the discourse 
developed and maintained by Shari’ah scholars obtained from written and spoken text 
to reveal their role and status in this power struggle (MacLure, 2003).  
We can argue that this study can be considered as a post-Washington Consensus 
approach in developing new structure for knowledge development and practice and 
rendering a novel reading for societal transformation through the ethical and spiritual 
principles of Islam. Hence, it fits into disruptive nature of knowledge development, and 
therefore, as a research frame, it should be located within ‘reconstructive post-
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colonialism’. It is also important to note that this research benefits from the literature 
on the construction of an axiomatic framework based on ontology and epistemology of 
Islam extensively. 
1.5. RESEARCH RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 
Experience of IBs during the last decades have demonstrated that their growth is 
achieved through convergence of IBs towards conventional finance system at the 
expense of articulation of IME that should be inherent in these institutions. Capitalistic 
view of development justified such a trade-off by prioritising the growth over IME. 
However, despite the social failure of IBs in relation to IME, they are still considered 
by the majority of customers as ‘Islamic’, which, as this research claim, is due to the 
existence of SBs. This leads us to critically explore the functionality and 
accomplishment of SBs in substantiating ‘Islamic’ identity of IBs. To achieve that, 
firstly, we examine the most important communication channel of SBs with 
stakeholders, namely Shari’ah annual reports.  
SARs are used to convey the practical success of SB to the stakeholders. The 
information provided in these reports and the level of disclosure show the practical 
success or failure in terms of supervisory and auditing of SB members and how much 
SB members willing to share the success or failure with stakeholders. In either case, 
whether they disclose the information or not, as the most important channel between 
SB members and customers, the annual reports are the most efficient way to claim 
‘Islamic’ identity of a financial institution. However, considering the literature, which 
proves the inadequacy of these annual reports, there should be something else beyond 
the current and even the historical reality to establish and sustain ‘Islamic’ identity of 
these institutions.  
By tracing the roots of SB as a modern ifta institution to the early periods, a comparison 
between the two will be beneficial to reveal ‘the thing’ inside the SB beyond the 
practical accomplishment, which keeps ‘Islamic’ identity of IBs intact despite the social 
and IME failure of many IBs. Thus, this research is motivated through the observed 
convergence of IBs towards conventional banks and the role played by Shari’ah 
scholars in not preventing but rather facilitating this process.  
20 
 
The experience that IBs are operating with the capitalist logic rather than Islamic moral 
norms demonstrate that capitalist hegemony rather than Islamic legitimacy determines 
the operations of IBs and Shari’ah scholars essentialise the capitalist legitimacy in their 
role as SB members in IBs in providing Shari’ah compliancy. Thus, such observations 
in the everyday practice of IBs constitutes the rationale for this research. 
1.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Convergence of Islamic banking sector towards conventional banking under the market 
conditions and pressures in recent years led SBs mainly involving in the task of 
inventing ‘Islamic’ alternatives of the conventional products. This, in return, occupied 
the literature with legal disputes and literal discussions of fiqhi rulings about 
transformation of conventional instruments into Shari’ah-compliant counterparts 
without taking IME perspective and impacts of such instruments in the society into 
account. It is important to note that despite the minimisation of embeddedness of IBs 
and opposing legal rulings declared by reliable scholars and institutions such as 
International Council of Fiqh Academy (ICFA), ‘Islamic’ identity of IBs through 
Shari’ah compliancy is kept intact which is evidenced by the growth of share of Islamic 
banking sector in the financial system implying the increased demand for Islamic 
banking as part of Islamic identity.  
To investigate the success of IBs in establishing and sustaining an ‘Islamic’ identity, 
this study approaches the SB division of corporate governance of IBs from different 
perspectives. Firstly, by analysing the level of disclosure in Shari’ah annual reports as 
a means of providing trust in Shari’ah compliancy instead of merely an accounting 
point of view, we measure the impact of efficiency of SB division (at least efficiency 
of SB as it is presented to the stakeholder through these annual reports) on providing 
trust in Shari’ah compliancy of IBs. In addition, a broad analysis of disclosure of 
Shari’ah annual reports reveals key features to compose a comprehensive Shari’ah 
annual report. To achieve this, we extend AAOIFI guidelines with an IME based index 
to contribute to the critical accounting research. Especially, examination of the 
characteristics of SB members will fill a gap in the literature by exploring the impact 
of Shari’ah scholars on compilation of these reports.  
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However, inadequacy of Shari’ah annual reports for convincing stakeholders in 
Shari’ah compliancy of IBs leads us searching beyond the empirical success of SBs to 
find the source of legitimacy and ‘Islamic’ identity and further analyse the concept of 
SB as an ifta institution at a theoretical level. By exploring the evolution of ifta 
institution, we trace the roots of SB in Islamic law tradition to reveal how SB as an ifta 
institution provide legitimacy and trust in Shari’ah compliancy at an abstract level. This 
exploration will guide us to provide a discourse for how SBs should be located in 
Islamic banking sector and which strategies SB should follow to play a key role in 
establishing IME and re-embedding the IBs into the society.  
In overall, this research makes an important contribution in each of these problematised 
areas by providing an extensive empirical as well as discourse and narrative method 
related research, which makes this research an original piece as it critically explores 
and examines topical issues which have not been undertaken in the literature before. 
1.7. CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
Contribution of the research presented in this thesis to the literature can be explained 
through three particular areas.  
Firstly, in terms of theoretical contribution, this study attempts to theoretically construct 
an IME-based Islamic corporate governance system for the existing IBs and other 
Islamic financial institutions. Such a governance system is aimed to sustain IBs as an 
alternative structure due to their peculiar ontological and epistemological sources.  
Secondly, in terms of empirical contribution, this study conducts a content analysis 
study to explore the level of disclosure in SARs with a large sample covering from 2007 
to 2014 by sampling 41 IBs. By constructing two disclosure indices, namely AAOIFI-
based and IME-based disclosure index, this study examines to what degree SBs 
communicate with the stakeholders through SARs and fulfil the expectation of AAOIFI 
standards and IME expectations. Considering the large sample size and construction of 
IME-based disclosure index, this chapter contributes to elaborate the level of disclosure 
in SAR further. It should, therefore, be noted that developing an IME aspiration index 
is a contribution in terms of expanding the material and attempt in the literature. In 
addition, having 41 IBs for the 2007-2014 to generate empirically based analysis for 
two indices should be considered as a contribution.  
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Thirdly, in terms of policy making, this study explores the emergence and development 
of Islamic banking as an institution and investigate the historical transformation of ifta 
institution as the underlying institution of Shari’ah supervisory structure of IBs. 
Revealing the significant transformation points in the historical development of ifta 
institution through critical discourse analysis, this investigation helps to shed light on 
how to develop appropriate policies to prevent the convergence of IBs towards 
conventional banking system and instrumentalisation of Shari’ah scholars in the 
process. Particularly, in the conclusion chapter, this study aimed at developing such a 
policy suggestion to overcome the existing problems in the industry.        
1.8. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
After this introductory chapter, the rest of the research is organised as follows:  
Chapter 2 – ‘Constructing an Islamic Corporate Governance System: A Theoretical 
Attempt’ attempts to develop an IME based ICG system within the theoretical 
framework of IPE. Although there are various corporate governance approaches 
developed from a conventional perspective, due to difference in approaches towards 
the human nature, source of legitimacy and stakeholders, they do not necessarily fit into 
Islamic CG frame which emerges from a different ontology, namely ontology of Islam. 
Therefore, a distinctive ICG system is required so that the CG of IBs should articulate 
the Islamic ethics and morality in their everyday practice which is attempted in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 3 – ‘The State and The Determinants of Islamic Governance Disclosure in 
Islamic Banks: Analysis of Shari’ah Annual Reports’ presents an empirical analysis by 
examining the extent of disclosure in the SBs’ annual reports in the case of 41 Islamic 
banks from 15 different countries for the period of 2007-2014. It also examines the 
factors affecting the disclosure level through bank level and country level variables. 
Furthermore, this study constructs two different indices; an index based on AAOIFI 
guidelines and its extended version based on IME framework. By critically approaching 
AAOIFI guidelines and extending it with a more substantive framework, namely IME, 




Chapter 4 – ‘Exploring Institutional and Product Emergence in Islamic Banking Sector: 
A Postcolonial Perspective’ explores the emergence of Islamic banking sector as a 
result of colonial process by locating prototype of Islamic banking sector as a hybrid 
institution through the combination of the Western saving bank and Islamic principles 
within the multiple modernities framework. This essay argues that colonial process has 
not ceased by the formation of Islamic banking as a hybrid institution but ongoing 
relationship between colonised and coloniser led to alterations in both. Mimicry of 
Islamic banks to conventional banks as a result of globalisation and competition under 
the pressure of market mechanism led to a convergence towards former colonial power, 
namely conventional banking sector. This mimicry of Islamic banking, in return, caused 
a ‘menace’ for conventional banking, due to the fear of customer loss. As a response, 
conventional banks have started to mimic Islamic banks. This mimicking resulted in 
another hybrid structure: a banking institution which is established in a modern 
framework and shaped by positivist ontology, and at the same time, through a window, 
acting in compliance with Islamic law and is bound by Shari’ah scholars’ rulings 
instead of ‘enlightenment’s rationalism’ to fulfil the requirements of operationalising 
Islamic finance. This essay, hence, argues that the emergence and development 
trajectory of modern Islamic banking sector can be understood within the context of its 
relationship with ‘hegemony’ or conventional finance in the form of convergence, 
hybridity and mimicry in product, instrument and institutional offerings under different 
historical settings. 
Chapter 5 – ‘An Inquiry into Public Policy and Shari’ah Scholarship in the Making: 
Historical Perspectives’ explores the role and status of Shari’ah scholars within the pre-
modern context, particularly first five centuries after the emergence of Islam. Thus, this 
essay explores the embeddedness of jurist-consults into the society during pre-modern 
period and outcome of such embeddedness in terms of their role and status in the society 
and influence of this embeddedness on legal rulings. In order to substantiate 
embeddedness of these scholars and how it influenced their legal and non-legal affairs, 
we first explain the concept of embeddedness and explore the nature of jurist-consults’ 
embeddedness. Then, we show how such embeddedness influenced their evaluation of 
judicial cases. In order to substantiate this point, books of legal opinion of jurists-
consults are examined with the intention of revealing how these scholars; (i) 
incorporated the realities of society into the decision process of law making; (ii) used 
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legal tools to find a solution/cure for the emerging problems; (iii) and considered the 
outcomes of their rulings for the society before issuing any legal decision. After 
investigating the embeddedness of these prominent scholars in the early period of Islam 
and its impact on legal process, we explore the relationship between ruling authority 
and scholars and ruling class’ strive for legitimacy through these scholars. 
Chapter 6 - ‘Reflecting on the Role of Shari’ah Scholars in Islamic Finance Industry: 
Transformation of Ifta Institution in Modern Period’ critically explores the 
transformation of ifta institution and the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in the 
Muslim societies during the modern period.  
The emergence of Islamic banks (IBs) in a secular governance structure, however, 
posed the question of Islamic legitimacy of these institutions. These IBs, by definition, 
claim that they comply with Shari’ah principles, which requires evidencing this claim. 
As a result of such pursuit of legitimacy (in such post-modern times), IBs aimed to 
employ Shari’ah scholars, especially those specialised in economics and finance (fiqh 
al-muamalat) to attain legitimacy in the eyes of the stakeholders, particularly, the 
customers (El-Gamal, 2006). However, three major transformations have taken place 
in terms of role and status of Shari’ah scholars between pre-modern period and modern 
period, as follows: 
Firstly, in the pre-modern period, ulama were submerged into the society whereas 
Shari’ah scholars in SBs submerged into the IB sector more due to the nature of their 
profession compared to their submergence into the society.  
Secondly, in pre-modern period, ulama attained their ‘civil leader’ status through their 
deep knowledge in Shari’ah, sustaining an exemplary way of life and having an 
embedded relationship with the society, which bestowed upon them individually rather 
than as a class of ‘learned people’, the power to negotiate on behalf of people with the 
elite-ruling class. Therefore, replacing these local leaders was not a viable option with 
the intention of increasing negotiation power of ruling authority. However, negotiation 
power of the Shari’ah scholars in SBs, compared to the pre-modern period, has 
lessened, since Shari’ah scholars in SBs attain their source of legitimacy by being 
appointed to a specific SB rather than deriving their negotiation power directly from 
the society.  
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Thirdly, complexity of the society and everyday practices of people changed drastically 
compared to the pre-modern era in the Muslim world. Therefore, while foreseeing the 
consequences of legal rulings were easier during the pre-modern period and could be 
undertaken by individual scholars, interdependent and complex nature of the modern 
world obliges Shari’ah scholars to work in collaboration with other disciplines such as 
sociology, economics, politics, etc.  
Through investigating three transformations between pre-modern and modern period 
in terms of the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in detail, this essay aims to explore 
the sources of the observed current tension in the operation of IBs in relation to Shari’ah 
compliancy and the role of Shari’ah scholar, as the latter has become a constant debate 
in Islamic banking related discussions. 
Chapter 7 - ‘An Interpretative Discussion and Conclusion’ presents an integrated and 
interpretative discussion by bringing together all the findings from each essay whereby 
it presents the role of SBs as a part of ICG in IBs and its importance on assuring 
Shari’ah compliancy in IBs. In doing so, a grand narrative is developed to locate the 
findings established in the earlier chapters within a meaning-making exercise. Our 
research revealed that there are three important transformations between pre-modern 
and modern period in terms of the role and status of Shari’ah scholars. Rather than 
being embedded into the society, Shari’ah scholars are embedded into the financial 
sector in modern period; the source of legitimacy of Shari’ah scholars has changed 
from society to ‘being assigned to a SB by the management of IB’; and lastly, products 
and services in particular, and everyday life in general became more complex in the 
modern period compared to the pre-modern period. In order to overcome the social 
failure of Islamic finance sector and prevent the convergence towards conventional 
sector as a result of these transformations, this study offers a civil society-based control 
mechanism that goes beyond ‘halal’ and Shari’ah compliant product and services and 






CONSTRUCTING AN ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 





2.1. INTRODUCTION  
Corporate governance (CG) has been an emerging topic in accounting and finance 
related research with an increased interest during the last decade mainly due to its 
essential role in the financial system and the globalisation of the economy. Since CG 
has a crucial role in the working mechanism of economy, explorations and analyses of 
CG from different perspectives have emerged, such as types of corporate governance 
systems – outsider and insider systems - (Dignam and Galanis, 2016), information 
disclosure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) and the role of CG in bank failures (Berger 
et al., 2016).  
With the emergence of the Islamic banks (IBs) after the 1970s, CG models in 
conventional system has been studied from an Islamic perspective to explore its 
conformity with Islamic principles and viability in IBs with the objective of locating 
and/or developing a distinctive GC structure for these institutions in line with Islamic 
operational principles (see: Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). 
Although IBs’ CG is similar to the conventional CG in terms of its structural and 
functional nature, essentialisation of Islamic norms, values and forms, as part of its 
construct, makes Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG) distinct, particularly in terms of 
Shari’ah governance and accounting practices with a particular emphasis on the holistic 
as well as moral paradigm of Islam articulated through transparency, environmental 
concerns, the rights of the stakeholders and social justice  (see: Choudhury and Hoque, 




Implementation of Islamic norms and values in the IBs essentialises and fulfils the 
‘Islamic identity’ of these institutions, which distinguishes them as a separate sector, 
namely the Islamic banking sector, within the existing capitalist financial system. 
However, convincing the customers of Shari’ah compliancy of a company is more 
important than providing Shari’ah compliant products and services. In order to assure 
Shari’ah compliancy of an IB as well as its products, services and operations, and 
ensure trust in the customers for Shari’ah compliancy, ICG incorporates Shari’ah 
Board (SB) in various forms and titles, as a distinct division compared to conventional 
CG (Malkawi, 2013). Being one of the most distinguishing feature of ICG in IBs, 
Shari’ah scholars in the SBs aim at ensuring the Shari’ah compliance of financial 
transactions, which provides the confidence to the customers of the Islamicity of their 
transactions. In operationalising SBs, as piecemeal solution, AAOIFI (the Accounting 
and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions) developed standards for 
Shari’ah governance identifying the working mechanism of SBs along with developing 
standards for various operational aspects of Islamic banking and finance. However, 
their efforts have not extended to develop the operational base of a holistic ICG System, 
which is theoretically attempted in this research. 
Although conventional CG theories have been instrumental in explaining the practice 
in the conventional sector, they do not necessarily fit into Islamic CG frame due to 
difference in approaches towards human nature, source of legitimacy and stakeholders 
emerging from the ontological differences. Therefore, a distinctive ICG developed 
within substantive morality articulation of Islamic Moral Economy (IME) within 
Islamic Political Economy (IPE) theoretical framework is required so that the CG of 
IBs should articulate the Islamic ethics and morality in their everyday practice which is 
attempted in this section. 
As in the current practice, the focus has only been on the financial transactions related 
compliancy, while Islamic impact on the rest of running the organisations, namely IBs, 
are not considered nor is conceptualised. The existing Shari’ah compliancy in IBs 
hence relates only to ‘form’ in the muamalat or financial transactions, while Islamic 
ethics or substance by definition is expected to prevail in the transactions and also in 
the running of organisations in the form of corporate governance. This can overcome 
the inconsistency observed in the IB industry in the sense that if the financial operations 
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of an IB is made Shari’ah compliant, by definition and nature of its structure, its 
governance and operations should also comply with Islamic norms. In other words, 
‘Islamic’ in IB should also have governance implications beyond financial transactions 
in articulating Islam’s comprehensive normative world encompassing every aspect of 
life. Such a critical perspective, hence, rationalises the necessity and emergence of ICG 
as a sub-theme.   
In order to achieve this goal, there is a need for a theoretical frame which can deliver 
an integrated and interactive system understanding within Islamic normative world. 
Thus, Islamic Political Economy (IPE) provides the comprehensive theoretical 
framework (Asutay, 2007a), which produces ICG as a system of governance of 
organisations and corporates within an Islamic order through the substance derived 
from IME, which integrates substantive morality into the equation in addition to the 
fiqh or Islamic law construct. This is due to the fact that the current Shari’ah 
compliancy-oriented paradigm reflects the partial reality of Islamic norm by merely 
essentialising fiqh, while issues such as CG goes beyond the form and requires the 
incorporation of morality and public interest.  
As explained in detail in Chapter 1, this study aims at constructing and constituting a 
theoretical frame of ICG System and its constituents through the foundational 
principles of Islamic ontology in relation to economy, finance and political economy 
related behaviour and articulated knowledge by basing it on the IPE structure and IME 
substance. In contrast to the available material in CG in IBs, which treats IBs within 
the existing market system and neo-classical terms, the requirements and expectations 
of IME based theoretical frame is more substantial and more demanding than the 
available models due to essentialising ‘morality’ as a ‘consequence’ not only as 
‘intention’, as the latter is attempted by ‘fiqh (Islamic law) only’ dominant approach. In 
other words, for an IME based theoretical frame, morality of the process is necessary 
but not sufficient condition, and, therefore, consequences of a process are expected to 
be moral as well. Such a model is attempted to bring up a critical perspective in 
developing a particular and peculiar theoretical frame, namely ICG, for the evaluation 
of CG issues in IBs. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses CG through a 
conceptual articulation and critically reflects upon the existing conventional CG 
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theories. In section 2.3, it is attempted to construct a theoretical framework of ICG. In 
section 2.4, moral foundations of constructed theoretical framework is further 
elaborated. In the last section, the concluding remarks are presented. 
2.2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL SURVEY  
Since the mid-eighties, CG has drawn attention from many disciplines which resulted 
in development of the codes of good corporate governance such as Treadway 
Commission (1987) in the U.S and the Cadbury Code (1992) in the U.K which led to 
similar developments in other countries as well (Berghe, 2002). The need for such a 
governance system, in theory, was emerged because of the separation of the ownership 
of a company and its management leading to the emergence of corporation as another 
class of entity. Based on the premise that the executive managers are self-interested 
individuals, they might exploit such separation to take opportunistic actions for their 
self-interest at the expense of shareholders and stakeholders (Larcker and Tayan, 2011).  
Although there is no agreed upon definition for ‘corporate governance’, it is useful to 
provide some working definitions to develop an idea about the concept. On its widely 
quoted definition, Cadbury (1992, at para 2.5) defines the corporate governance as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. In a more comprehensive 
definition, which details Cadbury’s (1992) reference to system, Blair (1995: 19) defines 
CG as “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine 
what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is 
exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
allocated”. Thus, Blair (1995) elaborates ‘the system’ of Cadbury (1992) by replacing 
it with ‘the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements’ and adding ‘who’ 
and ‘how’ questions in the definition.  
With the emergence of ‘institutional approach’, some contenders define CG from an 
institutionalist perspective. Considering the institution as “the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3–4), CG, in this context, could 
be represented as “the set of organizational and institutional mechanisms that define the 
powers and influence the managers’ decisions” (Charreaux, 2008: 19). In a recent 
definition, accepting the separation of ownership and management of self-interested 
managers as the main point of the concept, Larcker and Tayan (2011:8) defines CG as 
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“the collection of control mechanisms that an organization adopts to prevent or dissuade 
potentially self-interested managers from engaging in activities detrimental to the 
welfare of shareholders and stakeholders”.  
As indicated by the diversity of the definitions, CG is a subjective concept and the 
background, and the field of the author influence the approach. Lack of universality on 
the definition of CG reveals itself as different approaches to the CG. There are currently 
two dominant approaches in the CG, namely ‘shareholder-oriented approach’, of 
Anglo-Saxon origin, and ‘stakeholder or socially oriented European approach’. First 
approach prioritises the property right, in other words, maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth. The defenders of this approach provide several reasons in rationalising this 
approach: (i) there exists other mechanism of protection for the other stakeholders such 
as trade unions for employees and specific contractual provisions for long-term 
creditors, unlike shareholders who are unprotected against the misuse of power by 
managers; (ii) the objectives of each stakeholders are different, and it is impossible to 
satisfy them all. On the other hand, stakeholder approach defends that organization 
should play a social role in community and be accountable for its social responsibilities 
by responding to various stakeholders. Thus, for this approach, the corporate, hence, 
should combine the interest of different stakeholders and try to satisfy them, beyond 
solely maximising shareholders’ interest (Charreaux, 2008). 
Different assumptions and approaches towards human nature and CG led to the 
emergence of different theories of CG. Following section explores some major theories 
of CG within the conventional realm of knowledge. 
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory in corporate governance is utilised to explore the relationship between 
managers and shareholders, which emerge as a result of separation of ownership and 
management. Agency relationship originates from a contract signed between principal 
(owner) and agent (manager) in order to delegate some authority to the manager to 
operate the businesses of principal on behalf of them. The problem arises, however, if 
there is a conflict of interest between the agent and principal if both are self-interested 
and utility maximiser individuals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In such a case, agents often exploit their authority for decision making by taking actions 
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considering their own interest instead of the interest of principles (Barnea et al., 1985). 
In order to minimise the negative effect of conflict of interest between principal and 
agent, Jensen (1983) acknowledges two steps:  
(i) the first step, also named as formal agency literature, explores the risk-return balance 
of each party, namely principal and agent. Accordingly, the risk-bearing mechanism 
between principal and agent, hence, must be monitored through the relationship 
between organisation and contracts;  
(ii) the second step, also named as positive agency theory, explores the structure 
established in the first step and aim to produce solutions to the agency problems 
(Agarwal et al., 2014). 
Although it is a useful theory for explaining important dynamics relating to the nature 
of corporations, contenders in this area suggested some limitations for the agency 
theory, which are as follows (Agarwal et al., 2014):  
(i) assumption of complete contracts despite to bounded rationality, information 
asymmetries, transaction costs, etc.;  
(ii) assumption of elimination of agency costs through contracting, while it is invalid 
due to imperfections in the market;  
(iii) lack of recognition of parties who are not part of the contract, namely third party, 
which may lead to undesirable social welfare problems;  
(iv) assumption of interest of shareholders in financial performance alone;  
(v) assumption of opportunistic and self-interested managers although there can be 
managers loyal to their company as well. 
2.2.2. Stewardship Theory 
An alternative theory for self-interested agents suggested by agency theory is 
‘stewardship theory’, which considers managers as trustworthy individuals and good 
stewards. Instead of being motivated by only self-interest, these managers are assumed 
to be motivated to work for the good of the firm (Davis et al., 1997), in other words, 
their aim is to serve their organisations in a way to maximise the performance (Fox and 
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Hamilton, 1994). Although these two theories are mutually exclusive, they can both be 
valid in different circumstances. In cases where there is a persisted coalition between 
managers and owners, stewardship theory can be correct whereas such coalition does 
not exist, such as by a takeover threat, agency theory can be valid, where each party 
pursue their self-interests (Donaldson, 1990).    
2.2.3. Stakeholder Theory 
Through expanding the scope of the firm more than shareholders, ‘stakeholder theory’ 
increase the number of the parties involved in the entire operations of organisations and 
corporations by “taking into account all of those groups and individuals that can affect, 
or are affected by, the accomplishment of organizational purpose” (Freeman, 1984: 25). 
By expanding the role of the firm and its responsibilities, stakeholder theory does not 
oppose to shareholder theories, but provide a more efficient way to increase the 
shareholder wealth. In other words, by taking all stakeholders into account as defined 
above, they contend, the firm has a competitive advantage which leads to higher 
shareholder value of the firm (Pfarrer, 2010: 88).  
A topic of debate in this theory is whether the firm can accomplish to satisfy the 
interests of all stakeholders, since the stakeholders usually have different interests 
which may conflict with each other (Jensen, 2002). Jones et al. (2002), for instance, 
suggest that not all stakeholder should be considered as equal, and, therefore, only the 
relevant stakeholders should be prioritised. Nevertheless, “the impact of the firm on the 
rights and legitimate interests of its stakeholders” (de Ven and Jeurissen, 2005: 299) is 
crucial from the business ethic perspective and should be considered. 
2.2.4. Transaction Cost Economics  
Long before transaction cost as a concept became an area of research in the economic 
science, it is discussed in the literature by scholars such as Hicks (1935) and Coase 
(1937) as a study of the effects and outcomes of exchange which involves cost (Hardt, 
2009) and as a study of investigating the reasons of the existence of firms. However, it 
emerged as a concept in economics in the 1970s to explore the impact of governance 
of institutions on economic value (Tadelis and Williamson, 2012).  
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As a corporate governance related theory, similar to the ‘agency theory’, ‘transaction 
cost economics’ (TCE) is a shareholder theory that prioritises the maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth and shares common premises regarding the nature of the managers 
such as being opportunistic, self-interested individuals who consider their interest 
before the interest of the firm (Pfarrer, 2010: 88). Thus, TCE utilises a contractual 
approach to explore the firms (Williamson, 1996). By expanding the theory of firm 
suggested by pioneering contenders such as Coase (1937) who claims that firms exist 
to avoid transaction cost, Williamson (1996) explores the firm in the context of potential 
opportunistic behaviour in the market. In other words, Williamson (1996) suggests, it 
could be possible to carry out the same productive activity both in a firm and through 
autonomous contracts in the market as long as there is no problem of opportunistic 
behaviour of the actors (Conner, 1991). The central concepts of his theory, hence, are 
the existence of opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality in the framework of 
bilateral monopoly and uncertainty (Hardt, 2009). 
Although TCE has almost four decades of history as a science, important criticisms 
have emerged in the literature. To begin with, Williamson (1995: 33), himself criticize 
the lack of a clear definition for ‘transaction cost’ and ‘power’ by stating that “There is 
nonetheless a grave problem with broad, elastic and plausible concepts – of which 
‘transaction costs’ is one and ‘power’ is another – in that they lend themselves to ex 
post rationalization. Concepts that explain everything explain nothing”. 
Another important critique is the existence of opportunistic behaviour of the agents 
which constitutes one of the central concepts of Williamson’s theory. Although 
Williamson established his theory on the assumption of opportunistic behaviour, some 
researches (such as Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Håkansson and Snehota, 1989) suggest 
the contrary. In addition to the theoretical critiques, researchers, among others, David 
and Han (2004) and Carter and Hodgson (2006) also investigated the empirical 
evidences and suggested that evidences are equivocal rather than triumphs the TCE. 
Although there are other strands of the theory contributed by prominent scholars such 
as North (1990) and Coase (1988), we limit this section with the Williamson’s theory 
of TCE due to being a well- developed theory and predominant usage by the researchers 
in the field of economics (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
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2.2.5. Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate with some socially constructed systems 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). This implies that 
organisations aims to gain approval from society for the transactions and operations of 
an organisation in order to be accepted by the society (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991). Such 
a requirement stems from underlying assumption of a social contract between society 
and organisations. In other words, society grants permission to the organisation to 
operate in the society, which in turn renders it as accountable towards society (Deegan, 
2004). The most salient feature of legitimacy theory, hence, accountability of an 
organisation towards society, which makes it subjective to general norms of a society 
and, therefore, relative from time to time and place to place. By considering the society 
in the operations of an organisation, legitimacy theory could be considered as a 
stakeholder approach. 
It is important to note that although ICG system suggests an alternative corporate 
governance to conventional theories discussed above, it is still in the same paradigm 
due to the acceptance of the corporate or legal personality as a construct since that is 
the nature of existing IBs. Therefore, conventional corporate governance theories and 
their tools to overcome some of the problems within the governance structure of a 
corporate could be useful in ICG system as well. Furthermore, as ICG system assumes 
a dynamic human nature through tazkiyah process rather than a static one as agency or 
stewardship theories assume, in different stages of tazkiyah process, different theories 
might be useful. Agency theory, for instance, which assumes that people are self-
interested, proposes certain governance strategies such as monitoring the managers and 
limiting their power to overcome a potential conflict of interest in the governance 
structure between the agent and principal. Such tools of monitoring and limiting might 
be of use for ICG system as well considering that at the initial period of tazkiyah 
process, a manager might be self-interested as well as in later stages. On the other hand, 
a manager might consider the interest of a company instead of his or her self-interest as 
stewardship theory suggests. In such cases, the tools and governance strategies of the 
theories identified above might be utilised. However, it should be noted that the tools 
and strategies of these theories might be utilised in the transition period, since the aim 
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of tazkiyah process, as discussed in below, is to develop individuals achieving the level 
of khalifah of the God in this world.    
In concluding this section, it should be noted that some critical reflections on these 
theories are presented in a later section where their usefulness and proximity to ICG is 
discussed by mainly identifying the ontological difference and the way the 
stakeholders’ relationship is perceived in ICG in contrast to CG. 
2.3. CONSTITUTING ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The above discussed theories are instrumental in substantiating CG system within a 
conventional framework based on the ontology derived from the enlightenment 
process. Since Islamic ontology has its peculiar nature, the knowledge constituting 
process in relation also to CG in Islam has to reflect upon such distinctiveness. 
However, in responding to the Islamic ontology, a theoretical framework of IPE 
structure with the underlying norm and moral requirements of IME can provide a 
consistent approach in developing ICG for IBs and other Islamically claimed 
corporations, as their operations must be Shari’ah compliant, which, therefore, requires 
that their structure should be shaped by the Islamic ontological positioning. Therefore, 
in the following sections, we aim to develop an IPE framework in which ICG as a 
system could be located in examining IBs. 
2.3.1. Islamic Order: Locating the Ontological Foundation of Islamic 
Corporate Governance 
Before exploring ICG as an alternative governance theory, in this section, we discuss 
Islamic order in which ICG is located as a system and connected to other systems 
through IME within IPE as the theoretical framework.  
A ‘system’ is defined as the “functional components that together make certain sectors 
of the ethico-economic order work” (Choudhury and Malik, 1992: 15). In other words, 
a system refers to a complete and functional structure which operates along with other 
systems as part of an order. “An ‘order’ is, hence, a totality of several systems integrated 
together through the bond of ethical[ly defined normative world]” (Choudhury and 
Malik, 1992: 15), which implies that economic, social, political, sociological etc. 
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systems together constitute ‘a system’ of  a particular order, in this case Islamic order. 
In constituting order, the individual systems are connected through moral economy of 
relationships defined by the abstract nature of ethicality. Political economy within an 
‘order’ represents the theoretical framework of various systems relating to different 
spheres of everyday life. The ‘economy’ in political economy (and for that matter in 
moral economy) relates to social formation of a particular society, which can be 
expressed as the relationships and the normative world of that particular society in the 
sense as to how the society is organised. Thus, ontology shapes those relationships and 
hence the social formation which define the nature of political economy peculiar for 
that society (Nomani and Rahnema, 1994). Thus, political economy in a macro level 
identifies how the systems of an order are connected in normative and positive term. 
This implies that political economy reflects on the social formation of the society 
through macro and micro relationships to provide a frame through which the 
functioning of the society is defined and determined. 
The underlying value system through which the actions of individuals are produced 
plays a vital role in social construction of the life and leads to differences in social life 
among different value systems (Asutay, 2007a); and such relationships in macro level 
leads to peculiar social formations. For instance, a market based social structure and 
social formation would be different than socialist social structure in terms of definition 
of modes pf production, distribution of wealth and concept of just wage among other 
things. Economic systems are not an exception of socially constructed life, since 
“economic systems … do not function within a vacuum [either]. They are significantly 
affected and shaped by a set of ‘influential factors’: the level of economic development; 
social and cultural factors; and the environment” (Bornstein, 1979: 7). As the discussion 
indicates, in referring to social construction, Islamic political and moral economy is 
constructed in a deductive manner through the ontological sources of Islam as well as 
by the articulation of Islamic epistemology, social constructivism of the historical 
knowledge, practice and institutions, and the contemporary needs and realities (Asutay, 
2007a).  
Islam, therefore, should be considered as an order in which several systems function 
such as economic system, legal system, political system, system of religious practice, 
etc. As mentioned, all these systems within Islamic political economy are connected to 
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each other through IME, which constitutes the substance of the order. Although 
Choudhury and Malik (1992) consider IPE as the study of the relationships between 
policy, economics and politics along with integration of ethical and philosophical 
concerns, the authentic notion of Islamicness cannot be limited with the ‘economy’ and 
‘polity’, as the tawhidi (God’s unity and sovereignty) or unitary and complementarity 
nature of Islamic knowledge, and hence order, through tawhid requires analysing 
systems as an integrated whole to reflect the everyday construction of life. Despite the 
fact that Choudhury and Malik’s (1992) definition of IPE relegates it to the relationship 
between economics and politics in the sense of Virginia School of Public Choice, this 
study opts for the 1960s and 1970s conceptualization of political economy aiming to 
discover and understand social formation as constituted by Islamic order of 
normativeness.   
The interconnectedness of each system in Islamic order stems from the tawhid axiom 
of IME. This axiom suggests that every system of the order should work in a 
complimentary manner and should be subservient to God’s rulings alone. In other 
words, IME demands harmony in the everyday operation of the society. Reciprocal 
relationship of the systems leads to mutual exchange between the systems, which in 
turn leads to extraction and contraction of each system depending on the nature of 
exchange. The systems, hence, are not static in nature, but adopt dynamically to the 
changes and aims to converge towards expanded nature of each of the system in 
realising the maximised notion of aspirational and normative worldview of Islam, 
which is the objective of Shari’ah, namely to achieve falah or salvation in individual 
level and ihsan or beneficence, as a social capital, as an outcome, in the society level. 
Many contributors in the field of Islamic economics have attempted to establish the 
philosophical and conceptual foundations of IME to provide a coherent theoretical 
framework for an IPE such as Ahmad (1994, 2004; 1979), Chapra (1992, 2000), Naqvi 
(1981, 2013), Siddiqi (1981), Sirageldin (2000) and Asutay (2007a; 2007b; 2013). IME 
is articulated through a number of foundational axioms in constituting the Islamic 
knowledge, which can help to define and determine the norms, nature and structure of 
ICG. Building on such literature, we define these foundational axioms as follows: 
First axiom is Tawhid (God’s unity and sovereignty), which constitutes the core of 
Islamic teaching and “expresses the concept that there is no deity except God Almighty 
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and that He alone is the Creator, Cherisher and Sustainer of the Universe. It also implies 
that none deserves to be worshipped and glorified apart from God” (Khan, 2012: 9). As 
a consequence of submission to ‘the one God’, individual emancipates from 
worshipping or serving things other than God and derive all the ethical principles and 
social norms from the epistemological sources that God provides, i.e. Quran and 
Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet of Islam) (Khan, 2012). In addition to ‘submission to 
the One true God’ by emancipating individuals from ‘submission to worldly things’, 
tawhid also lays the foundation for a “comprehensive worldview of life” (Choudhury 
and Harahap, 2009: 2), which leads to ‘complementarities’ among the parts and systems 
of ‘Islamic order’ (Choudhury and Harahap, 2009: 6). Tawhid, hence, represents a 
relationship of ‘vertical ethicality’ between individuals and God through which 
individuals have equal opportunity for access ‘to enjoy the bounties on Earth created 
by God’ (Asutay, 2012a: 95). As a result of being the One True God, He is the only 
sovereign which means God alone has the power to decide exceptions (Hallaq, 2012). 
Individuals, therefore, has no authority to suspend the rulings of God in His realm, even 
if he/she believes (delusionally) something is for the benefit of people. It is also 
important to state that complementarity nature of tawhid indicates, within Islamic order 
and system relationship, that everything in the world is connected and integrated and is 
part of an integrated whole. Such an approach has macro level and micro level 
consequences: as for the macro level consequence, it implies that every stakeholder 
should be considered in decision making process in constituting IPE at macro level such 
as nature and animals along with the direct stakeholders. Furthermore, a balance should 
be observed between their rights and responsibilities as well as considering the 
priorities among them as derived from the ontological and epistemological sources. 
Accordingly, capital cannot have priority over labour and vice versa, and, therefore, 
their interest should equally be represented in the operations. Tawhid, hence, constitutes 
the essence of shaping the ICG, which is further substantiated through other axioms, 
such as rububiyah and tazkiyah as discussed below. 
As for the micro level articulation of complementarity of tawhid axiom, it refers to the 
necessity of superseding authority of principles derived from the ontological and 
epistemological sources of Islam over the rules and logic of a field. Following 
Bourdieu, a field could be defined as “a structured system of social positions—occupied 
either by individuals or institutions—the nature of which defines the situation for their 
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occupants” (Jenkins, 1992: 53). Individuals, therefore, constantly enter different fields 
such as ‘school’, ‘family’ and ‘work’, and each one of these fields, “by virtue of its 
defining content, has a different logic and taken for granted structure of necessity and 
relevance” (Jenkins, 1992: 52). Tawhid axiom, thus, suggest that if there is a 
contradiction between a logic or structure of a field and principles of Islam, the 
individual should not follow the logic of that field at the expense of ignoring the 
principles of Islam. In other words, tawhid axiom at micro level suggest that all the 
fields an individual enters should be considered as complementary of each other and 
should be guided by certain principles extracted from sources of Islam and articulated 
in practice by the Prophet Mohammad. Such universal principles of Islam are in a 
negotiation with particulars of fields to adopt these universals for different fields. For 
instance, a business person might be strict follower of capitalist principles and values 
at his or her firm in terms of time management or utilisation of resources, while at home 
in the field of family, as a father or husband, time management and utilisation of 
resources might be influenced by the rules of that particular field rather than capitalist 
principles. However, as an articulation of complementarity at micro level, tawhid axiom 
suggests that these different fields should be coherent and guided by Islamic principles. 
This dialectic inconsistency can perhaps be explained in the following example; for 
instance, if a business person is involved in the meat business, he or she should not rear 
the animal in unacceptable conditions and filling with hormones with the intention of 
efficiency and more profit while feeding a pet dog at home with the best possible dog 
food. Rather, this business person should consider the animals as a stakeholder which 
have certain rights bestowed upon them by the God and should act accordingly even at 
the expense of profit loss at the business which is dictated by the tawhid’s implications 
of recognising the rights of each stakeholders in a just manner. Hence, tawhid as the 
core normative principle at micro level aims to ensure the consistency between various 
fields one has to live through in everyday practice.  
Second axiom is rububiyyah, which means “divine arrangements for nourishments, 
sustenance and directing things towards their perfection” (Ahmad, 1979: 12), namely 
divinely development path. This within tawhid implies that everything is created with 
a potential development path towards their individually defined perfection (Arif, 1985) 
or fitrah. Consequently, necessary opportunity space should be provided as a right for 
all the stakeholders to reach such perfection (Asutay, 2007a). The use of modern 
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concept of sustainable development relates to Islamic development path of rububiyah 
as an articulation of complementarity axiom in a proactive manner. Although this axiom 
implies potential for development and presents the ways and means to realise that 
potential, it provides only guidelines to reach a higher development stage. In order to 
accomplish development, concrete actions and establishment of institutions should be 
achieved which necessitate the tazkiyah axiom.  
Tazkiyah (purification and harmony), being the third axiom of IME’s substantive 
morality articulation, is “concerned with growth towards perfection through 
purification of attitudes and relationships” (Ahmad, 1994: 20) implying growth in 
harmony. Thus, individuals and other stakeholders are expected to grow according to 
their perfection in fitrah as identified through rububiyah axiom. However, the scope of 
tazkiyah is not limited to individuals but encompasses organizations and society as well. 
Thus, the growth and progress process, due to the complementarity axiom, has to be 
purified and therefore should be in harmony with the interests of all the stakeholders. 
Such as the case that economic growth cannot be at the expense of natural environment, 
as environment is considered as amanah or trust from the God and therefore its growth 
path in reaching its own perfection has to be recognised in the same way, zakah or 
Islamic alms or tax is an instrument to purify the wealth by returning the right of the 
society to society. Tazkiyah axiom is, hence, crucial for realising the objectives of other 
axioms such as al-‘adl (justice) and ihsan (beneficence) and constitutes the theoretical 
foundations for these axioms. Non-obligatory charity, for instance, is a sign of going 
beyond what is ‘just’ and being beneficence towards others. To achieve such a high 
rank, the process of tazkiyah occupies an important place. 
Fourth axiom is al-’adl (justice), which provides the practical guidelines for sustenance 
of all the things based on the ontological sources of Islam, which means granting the 
right to whom it belongs, and the rights of all entities are defined in Islam. Tawhid, 
hence, is a precondition of being ‘just’, through its vertical ethicality and 
complementarity, in the IPE’s order. While tawhid provides the vertical dimension of 
Islamic ethicality, al-‘adl provides the horizontal dimension of equality; equality 
among the individuals on earth in the sense that individuals by creation are equal to 
each other in terms of their access to the resources created by God (Asutay, 2007a; 
2007b; 2012a; 2013). Thus, al-‘adl al-waajeb (obligatory justice) refers to the 
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minimum level of social relationships in a society where Islamic order prevails. In the 
path of perfection, hence, al-adl is only the first step and next axiom, al-ihsan or 
delivering beneficence takes the individual beyond that point through tazkiyah axiom. 
Thus, corporations and organisations are expected to establish their relationships with 
all the stakeholders within justice by definition of the IPE. 
Fifth axiom, al-ihsan (beneficence), hence, complements al-adl (justice) to achieve 
higher goals in terms of moral values through which every system in the Islamic order 
connects to one another. Al-ihsan means treatment with the best manner from the one 
who is not obliged to do so towards the one who deserves that treatment. Therefore, 
individuals who reach their salvation or falah is expected to support others to reach to 
the same level implying that ihsan is to be expanded in the society in the form of social 
capital so that the falah reaching path as part of rububiyah can be established. This 
implies that organisations including corporations should also ensure the expansion of 
ihsani social capital through their direct engagement with the society in which they 
operate. 
Khilkiyya (affirmed behaviour), the sixth axiom, refers to the characteristic features that 
becomes inseparable from an individual. In other words, what we term as khilkiyya is 
not calculated actions of an individual but rather actions which became part of his or 
her nature so that the aspirations of religion and the practice should be as equal as 
possible. There are two main sources which establish khilkiyye for an individual which 
could be classified as macro and micro level. First one which is at macro level is related 
to the society or community an individual is part of. As soon as an individual becomes 
a subject within a society, his or her character is shaped to a certain extent with the 
norms and values that society bears, which includes way of talking with others and how 
to act in various fields. These norms and values, as stated earlier, is expected to be 
derived from ontological sources of Islam within an Islamic order. If existing norms 
and values are not compatible with Islamic order, then, individuals are expected to 
strive to bring existing social formation closer to the norms and values of an Islamic 
order. Such process requires individuals, who, through individual tazkiyah process, 
have internalised such norms and values in their life and proactively interact with the 
existing structures to develop them. Development of such individuals necessitates the 
second source which is the individual tazkiyah process at micro level. As a result of 
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tazkiyah process, within Islamic order, being ‘just’ to other stakeholders becomes the 
minimum level of moral character that an individual should attain, which is a necessary 
condition for being vicegerent of the God on earth. Furthermore, through the process 
of tazkiyah, ihsan becomes an affirmed behaviour of the individual as well by going 
beyond being ‘just’ alone. The negotiation process between the prevailed norms and 
values in the society as a source of tazkiyah at macro level and individual tazkiyah 
process at micro level is crucial within the tawhidi framework, since such negotiation 
process provides the dynamic nature of rububiyyah axiom. In other words, individuals 
as active agents within the society strive to reshape the existing norms and values 
whether they are physical institutions for implementation of norms and values or 
abstract concepts. In order to get the norms and values prevailing in a society closer to 
the objectives of Shari’ah and converge towards an Islamic order, individuals should 
go through a correct tazkiyah process and engage with the existing structures to correct 
them while keeping and attaining the compatible norms and values. Topcu (2011) calls 
such a process as ‘ethics of revolt’ and it does not cease to operate until Islamic order 
is articulated at society level suggesting a dynamic and permeated process. However, 
the ultimate aim in such framework is not the goal but the process, which is defined as 
struggle for establishing Islamic order with its systems as a whole. 
Seventh axiom is ikhtiyar (free-will), which as an axiom separates human-beings from 
other creatures, which is also the necessary condition for all the practical axioms such 
as al-‘adl and al-ihsan. Because without the choice of being ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, the 
individual could not be responsible for the outcome. Furthermore, freedom of 
individuals against the structures of the society, or the ability of actively engaging with 
the existing structures of a society, is also part of this axiom, which is important for 
sustaining the dynamic process of negotiation. For example, in the history of Islam, 
distance of some Shari’ah scholars to the rulers might stem from such fear of lack of 
freedom in practice in engaging with the existing structures of the society, as explored 
in a later chapter. Therefore, by freedom, we do not only refer to the theoretical free-
will of human-being but also the necessity of having freedom of individuals 
intellectually and financially to engage freely with the existing structures.  
The following axiom, khilafah (man’s role as God’s vicegerent on earth) defines the 
position of individual on earth. In other words, this axiom states the role and 
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responsibilities of individual in relation to others and other things (Ahmad, 1979: 12). 
“His (or her) role, position and mission is described as istikhlaf, that is fulfilling God’s 
will on earth, promoting what is good, forbidding what is wrong, establishing justice 
(’adl) and promoting beneficence (ihsan), resulting in attaining high levels of good life 
(hayat al-tayyebah), both individual and collective” (Ahmad, 2004: 193). With the 
guidance of God as a result of rububiyyah axiom, khilafah axiom provides “the unique 
Islamic concept of individual’s trusteeship, moral, political and economic, and the 
principals of social organisation” (Ahmad, 1979: 12). In other words, khalifah axiom 
refers to individual capacity of achieving the normative world of Islam in everyday life 
as described by Islamic moral economy. In addition, it directly refers to moral and social 
accountability as a response to the identified khalifah responsibility; such as indicating 
‘solidarity among people’ by articulating the complementarity of tawhid and 
beneficence of ihsan. 
Based on the discussion above, in constituting ICG, IME, namely the substance of IPE, 
which constitutes the nature of the relationship between and within the systems of IPE, 
is the articulation of these axioms, which aim at realising the maqasid al-Shari’ah or 
the objectives of Shari’ah. In this, ‘the objective of Shari’ah’ is defined as human well-
being at the individual and society level, which produces falah or salvation and ihsan 
or beneficence as the outcome of the process. Therefore, IME constitutes the nature and 
regulates the practice of ICG, being one of the systems under IPE, in line with other 
systems of IPE. IME, hence, is the substance which differentiate ICG from 
conventional CG theories. While IPE provides the tawhidi ontological paradigm and 
frame, IME’s substance nature determines the nature of CG by leading to ICG, such as 
suggesting an extended stake-holding, in which each stakeholder’s interest should be 
considered equally as growth has to be within harmony so that justice and beneficence 
can be achieved as an affirmed behaviour as it is the duty of individual to act according 




2.3.2. Constituting Islamic Political Economy Frame and Islamic Moral 
Economy’s Substance for Islamic Corporate Governance 
The preceding section has laid the foundation for the emergence of ICG through IPE as 
a frame and IME providing the substance through the Islamic values and norms 
developed from Islamic ontology. Based on this, this section, therefore, presents the 
process of constituting the ICG as a process. 













Source: Portes (2010a: 54) 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the roles are combination of normative part (obtained from 
norms in the society) and cognitive part (a cognitive repertoire of skills and ‘scripts’) 
(Portes, 2010a: 52) and “Institutions are the symbolic blueprint for organizations. They 
comprise the set of rules, written or informal, governing relationships among role 
occupants in organizations” (Portes, 2010a: 55). Among such institutions, we can 










one-directional influence, Portes (2010b) emphasise the interaction between active 
agents as the occupants of the roles and institutions. These interactions take place at the 
surface level rather than a deep level, therefore, change at the society level is not 
effective. However, a change in the society which drastically affects the underlying 
values such as the emergence of a prophet may have long-lasting and more fundamental 
transformation in the society (Portes, 2010b). 
Utilisation of such axiomatic framework facilitates to construct Islamic systems as the 
articulation of IPE, which are composed of roles and institutions with the underlying 
IME, which is norms and cognitive repertoires with underlying Islamic values. It is, 
therefore, important to explore the elements of social life and underlying foundations 
of roles and institutions in a society. It is important to note that the elements of social 
life displayed in Figure 2.1 are not differentiated from one another, as they 
simultaneously exist in the society (Portes, 2010b). 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, values underlie the foundations of the norms and cognitive 
repertoires in a society. Based on these norms and cognitive repertoires, roles are 
constituted, which are the key analytical elements for individuals to become a member 
of the society. In addition, roles are part of the institutional framework (Portes, 2010a). 
Values are “concealed below everyday social life but fundamental for its organisation 
to ‘surface’ phenomena, more mutable and more readily perceived” (Portes, 2010a: 51). 
In other words, “values represent general moral principles, while norms embody 
concrete directives for action” (Portes, 2010a: 52). An individual must have a role in a 
society to enter ‘the social world’. This role, however, while offering the possibility to 
join ‘the social world’ on the one hand, it also limits individual’s behaviours in this 
social world as well as encouraging him or her to act in a certain way, on the other hand 
(Portes, 2010a: 52).  
Figure 2.2, therefore, presents how emergence of a prophet and a new religion with its 

















































































































Foundations of dynamic 





























As depicted in Figure 2.2, it integrates elements of social life within IPE framework 
with the objective of representing how IME with its axioms is utilised to construct an 
Islamic order within the society to achieve falah and ihsan and also restore the society 
to achieve the objectives of Shari’ah, namely human well-being. In order to show the 
influence of institutions on the values, we added an arrow showing that institutions 
influence the values as well which suggest a direct interaction with the surface level of 
the society and deep level. 
In an Islamic order, ‘general moral principles’ are extracted directly by positing new 
principals or transforming the existing ones into compatible with Islamic principles, or 
indirectly by confirming an existing value in the society as culture either through 
explicitly stating or being silent about it, from the ontological sources of Islam, namely 
the Qur’an and Sunnah. In an Islamic order, therefore, values (‘as general moral 
principles’), norms (‘concrete directives for action’) and cognitive repertoire of skills 
constitute the IME which underlies the guiding principles of a system and organise the 
relationship of each system with one another. In other words, IME, being extracted from 
epistemological sources of Islam, presents the guidelines for relationships of systems 
within itself and with one another. Since the actions of Prophet Mohammad, namely 
Sunnah, are considered as an epistemological source of Islamic values and realisation 
of general principals in practice, it affects cultural capital both through general 
principals, namely values, derived from Sunnah and through norms which is the 
embodiment of these values in practice in Sunnah due to its dogmatic nature. The reason 
for such a relationship is that Islam does not only set the general principals, but also 
posit the implementation of these values through the Prophet which are the part of 
norms of Islamic order. Language, whose role is self-evident in the cognitive 
framework, is an example of the effect of Sunnah as part of the norm on cognitive 
repertoires. An analysis of the language used by the Prophet in different circumstances 
such as in case of a trouble clearly shows how Sunnah through the realisation of general 
principles in practice shape the cognitive framework of individuals.     
Each system, based on these guiding principles, creates the roles and institutions to 
fulfil its task in the society and communicate with other systems. For example, 
economic and financial system of an Islamic order should establish the roles and 
institutions in accordance with values such as justice, minimisation of uncertainty, etc. 
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and norms such as invalidity of interest (riba) and stating every clause of the contract 
as clearly as possible without leaving space for any dispute. Any financial institution in 
this system, for instance, should offer only interest-free products and services which 
necessitate roles such as entrepreneurs to establish such institutions, product innovators 
to produce interest-free alternatives, field researchers to reveal the needs of customers, 
etc. Educational system as another system in Islamic order, should establish institutions 
based on the values and norms of Islamic order with the purpose of providing educated 
individuals to fulfil the roles within the order without treating human only as an input 
in a production process, namely human capital. A vital role, therefore, in this order is 
to sustain the consistency and harmony of all systems working together which is 
undertaken by IPE theoretical framework. 
As depicted in Figure 2.2, tawhid is the primer axiom which is derived from the 
epistemological and ontological sources of Islam. Tawhid provides the values, which 
are general moral principles of the society. It is important to note that such values are 
articulation of tawhid axiom and derived from Islamic ontological and epistemological 
resources. Utilisation of Islamic values within the frame of tawhid axiom has macro 
level and micro level consequences. As for macro level consequence, these values 
should be implemented for all stakeholders rather than for a specific group, due to its 
complementary nature. As for the micro level, these values are valid and have priority 
over other values for all roles and institutions in all fields of social life. A financial 
institution within this framework, for instance, cannot utilise capitalist principles over 
Islamic principles claiming that one is business and should not be interfered with 
Islamic principles. Tawhid, furthermore, constitutes underlying foundation of the 
dynamic nature of society through the normative guidelines as provided by rububiyyah 
axiom, which suggests that God created everything with a potential for development. 
Rububiyyah axiom, therefore, provides the underlying foundation of the dynamic 
nature of the society through the guidelines for the development path. The ultimate aim 
of rububiyyah axiom is to establish roles and institutions in the society to realise the 
objectives of Shari’ah. Since the passing of time and expansion of space leads to 
emerging needs within the society, existing roles and institutions might not be sufficient 
to respond realisation of objectives of Shari’ah. In such cases, in order to respond the 
dynamic nature of the society, rububiyyah axiom along with tazkiyah axiom as its 
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articulation produce the necessary roles and institution as a result of a negotiation 
process with ‘norms’ and ‘cultural repertoires’. 
Although rububiyyah with the objective of providing guidelines for a sustainable 
development to achieve the objectives of Shari’ah is an important axiom to respond the 
changing time and place, it is also instrumental to restore Islamic values in a society to 
establish an Islamic order as a result of a drastic change in core values due to an external 
influence. Imposition of principles of modernity along with its roles and institutions to 
the colonial world which includes Muslim societies as well, had such an impact on 
societies. Colonial process, as claimed, aimed to transform ‘irrational’ values of those 
Muslim societies with ‘rational’ values through a top-down approach of modernity 
project with the help of imposed roles and institutions in those societies, which 
eventually, influenced the underlying values of the society. For instance, when 
institutions of modernity such as bank have been established in non-modern societies, 
underlying values regarding money and time have changed. As Giddens (2013) 
suggests, ‘time’ became a concept which could be wasted in such modern societies. 
Islamic bank as an institution, therefore, might be considered as an outcome of tazkiyah 
axiom in response to the modern institutions of capitalism with the objective of 
restoring Islamic values in the society. 
As an articulation of rububiyyah axiom, roles and institutions emerging as an outcome 
of tazkiyah axiom leads to establishment of new roles and institutions as a result of 
negotiation with existing norms and cognitive repertoires to respond to changes in 
society and restore Islamic principles. Such a dynamic process is sustained through 
negotiation of the individual as an active agent in the society and structures and 
institutions as the articulations of norms and values (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Tazkiyah axiom, therefore aims to realise the potential of development within every 
member of the society to elevate each individual to a status of khalifah or reaching to 
the quality of being vicegerent of God on earth. To realise this objective, teaching of 
justice and benevolence is crucial to achieve IME, since justice and benevolence 
towards every creature has different forms and needs to be learned. For instance, the 
highest level of benevolence towards Allah stated in the hadith (sayings of the Prophet 
Mohammad) as “That you worship Allah as if you see Him, for if you don’t see Him 
then truly He sees you” (Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Abd al-Baqi, and Nawawi, 1995). 
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However, towards a neighbour, ihsan might be considered as sharing a plate of food 
one prepares for his or her family. However, an abstract knowledge without 
implementation does not develop a society based on IME, which is why tazkiyah axiom 
for the purification of individual and realisation of potential of development path in the 
sense of establishing justice and attaining ihsan  requires at least two institutions: (i) 
institutions for teaching justice and ihsan towards others, and (ii) institutions for 
implementation of theoretical knowledge in society. Both of these institution groups 
ensure development through theoretical and practical progress at individual level. 
However, to provide progress at society level and conservation of individual progress, 
Islamic principles should become underlying values of the society. This development 
process of individuals from injustice towards benevolence and negotiation of individual 
with the structures and institutions of the society is a dynamic and never-ending 
process. Realisation of objectives of Shari’ah as an outcome of this dynamic process, 
hence, also fluctuate. Therefore, the existence of roles and institutions, therefore, to 
evaluate the realisation of objectives of Shari’ah with the objective of providing 
necessary feedback to tazkiyah process to bring the society closer to the ideal state is 
also a crucial component of IPE. However, it is important to note that IPE may not 
achieve such an ideal state. The goal, indeed, is not only to achieve a high level of 
development, but also to struggle to achieve such level as a ‘becoming process’ in the 
form of an ongoing journey. Therefore, as long as IPE system works properly and aims 
to establish the objectives of Shari’ah in an Islamic order, the goal, at least partially, is 
being achieved. 
In the next section, ICG based on the aforementioned axioms, narrative and the 
illustrations is discussed. Then, current situation due to the paradigm shift at the very 
foundation of Islamic order will be discussed.  
2.3.3. Constituting Islamic Corporate Governance  
As it is explored above, CG, briefly, is a system which is responsible from directing 
and controlling corporates. ICG, therefore, is also a system. However, as a result of 
being part of an ‘Islamic order’, it is located in IPE and having IME as the underlying 
value structure. In other words, by definition, ethical norms and principles derived from 
the epistemological sources of Islam should be embedded in ICG system. The 
controlling and directing mechanisms of ICG, hence, are based on the axiomatic 
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framework of IME. Through these foundational axioms, a primarily human-focused, 
complementary CG system is aimed (Asutay, 2007a; 2007b). 
This section attempts to develop an ICG system within Islamic order by locating it as a 
system, which is connected to the other systems of Islamic order through IME within 
IPE as the theoretical framework. 
As a direct result of having IME as underlying value norms and cognitive repertoires 
in its aspirational and theoretical frame, ICG aims at fulfilling ethical norms of Islam 
in all human affairs whether they are economic or non-economic matters that are related 
to corporate governance. In order to achieve morally-embedded ICG so that it can 
function effectively and in harmony with other systems, it is crucial to locate ICG 
within the axiomatic framework of Islamic order. Thus, in terms of the roles and 
institutions constructed through Islamic values, ICG is an alternative for mainstream 
CG approaches (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). Next section, therefore, presents the 
implementation of axiomatic framework to ICG.  
2.3.3.1. Implementation of axiomatic framework to ICG 
Tawhid axiom (Oneness of God), as it is stated above, lay the foundation for other 
axioms and play a decisive role regarding the relationships of systems within Islamic 
order as well as parts of systems in each system through complementarity within 
unitarity. As a direct result of tawhid, each and every part of a system functions as 
complimentary to each other by working in harmony to permeate the Islamic order. 
ICG, hence, as a system within the Islamic order, and as composed of various roles and 
institutions, necessitates that all stakeholders should be included in consideration in 
governance structure. In ICG system, hence, there should be roles to ensure such 
inclusion of stakeholders such as experts to report impact of decisions on various 
stakeholders such as environmental impacts and social impacts. There should also be 
institutions, for instance, to ensure that IME is articulated in everyday practice of the 
corporates. Consequences of such an approach at macro level is, therefore, 
consideration of other stakeholders, such as nature, workers and even raw materials. 
Workers, hence, should not be considered only as a means to produce product or a cost 
for the company, but should be treated as a human-being who has been bestowed rights 
by Islam and articulated through IME. Accordingly, nature is not considered as a raw 
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material that corporates can process without considering the consequences for the 
system, even for the order, but it is considered as a stakeholder and corporates have a 
certain limit to utilise and benefit from it according to IME. As for the systems, it is 
more evident that such relationship between various systems is crucial for any order. 
For example, while education system produces skilled workers for the corporates, legal 
system aims to keep corporates under control within the current capitalist order. 
However, within the Islamic order, these systems should be utilised to articulate the 
Islamic principles such as keeping the corporates operating within the constraints of 
Islamic ethical order, which is based on the objectives of Shari’ah as well as educating 
the individuals with the aim of their emancipation, not only as skilled workers as an 
input to a production process.  
Complementarity or tawhidi nature of Islamic order also has micro level consequences 
for ICG. Although a corporate has a legal personality, it still enters different fields. 
Through training programs within the corporate for the employees, for instance, it 
enters into the field of education. In addition, due to its physical location in various 
places, it becomes a resident in a neighbourhood. Based on the tawhid axiom, it is 
expected that a corporate governed by ICG should be guided by the objectives of 
Shari’ah in all these fields rather than following other principles or rules alone such as 
capitalist principles. As a neighbour, for instance, certain rights and responsibilities 
should be undertaken as a resident of a neighbourhood in terms of environmental issues 
or respecting local customs rather than following a profit-maximising approach 
whatever the cost is or undertaking certain social responsibilities with pure intention of 
profit-making instead of considering these initiatives as a responsibility in return of 
being a resident within that neighbourhood.   
Second axiom, rububiyyah, which as mentioned, is defined as divine arrangements for 
nourishments, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection, requires ICG to 
develop itself towards perfection, as it grows as a legal personality similar to real 
personalities. As it develops, due to the complementarity nature of the system, all the 
parts of ICG develops as well. Relationship of the board with management, 
management with employees, employees with customers are all interrelated and should 
develop and direct toward perfection in all sense such as moral values and principles of 
Islamic order as well as every day operations of the corporate, where the perfection 
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means the internalisation of the highest level of ihsan, implying Islamic ethical values 
and principles which leads to embeddedness of moral values in everyday lives. Through 
tazkiyah process, individuals and corporates have the potential of traversing from 
injustice towards ihsan level which produce the objectives of Shari’ah at the society 
level. 
Third axiom, tazkiyah, is the key axiom through which individual (or legal personality) 
can internalise the IME and realise his potential for being the khalifah, God’s vicegerent 
on earth. In order to achieve tazkiyah, training and auditing process should be followed 
to achieve a perfect state of morality. Through training, such as learning the moral 
values and principles of Islamic order and auditing, namely monitoring the 
implementation of these principles in practice, corporates can internalise IME in 
everyday operations of company. Thus, since tazkiyah suggests growth in harmony, the 
growth of each stakeholder within the rububiyah has to be facilitated by the 
corporations. As a result of this axiom, al-adl and al-ihsan become one of the corporate 
characteristics. Required roles and institutions to achieve such level should be 
developed and integrated based on this axiom. Social investment or green investment, 
for instance, could be considered to a certain extent outcome of such a process. Those 
companies, through research and training attained a character, namely ‘social’ or 
‘green’. Based on this character, they shaped all their operations and product and 
services. Similarly, a company governed by ICG implying that it has character of being 
‘Islamic’ and should organise and operate the company accordingly which includes 
‘social’ and ‘green’ characters and go beyond that.   
Al-adl (justice) is the minimum level of morality that an individual (legal personality) 
should implement, as below justice, there is injustice. That is why, secular or Islamic 
law, in most cases, enforce justice. However, what is ‘just’ may differ from one order 
to another. Just wage, for instance, can be interpreted differently in a communist order 
and Islamic order. This axiom, therefore, requires the implementation of justice based 
on the ethical norms and principles derived from the ontological sources of Islam, 
namely Qur’an and Sunnah. Based on this axiom, corporations within ICG system 
should be just towards each and every part of the system described by Islamic moral 
economy. Environment, for instance, should be treated justly. This might be achieved 
through taking necessary precautions to minimise the adverse effects of a production 
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process. In the same manner, for example, shareholders might be treated justly by 
utilising their investment in the best possible way. Although being just is the minimum 
level, since most of the ICG operate under capitalist order rather than an Islamic order, 
to be ‘just’ means going beyond obligatory regulations and taking voluntary steps to 
operate justly according to IME.  
Fifth axiom is ihsan (beneficence) which means ‘going beyond just’ and ‘giving more 
than necessary’ to the one who deserves that. As the meaning of ihsan suggest, it is a 
voluntary act. As a good and morally acceptable practice, ICG, hence, could realise 
ihsan in its everyday practice. However, lack of ihsan also means the lack of perfection 
or disembeddedness of IME and incompletion of rububiyyah. The axiom of ihsan, 
hence, is an advanced level of development, especially compared to the 
homoeconomicus individual of capitalist order. Hence, IME considers 
homoeconomicus as deficient and inadequate due to not being embedded in the moral 
values and principles of Islam; as homoeconomicus produces performing individual 
whose rational solution would not stretch to ihsani level.  
Sixth axiom is the khilafah, implying individual’s role as God’s vicegerent on earth. 
This axiom describes the potential of individual (in the case of ICG, legal personality) 
to fulfil his or her role as khalifah or God’s vicegerent on earth by achieving the 
normative world of Islam in everyday life (in the case of ICG, in everyday practice of 
corporate). In this frame, tawhid axiom provides the relationship of parts within a 
system in the form of complementarity relationship, rububiyyah and khilafah provides 
the theoretical and abstract framework for individuals or legal personalities. As a direct 
result, khalifah assumes that all the stakeholders are amanah or trust from God and, 
therefore, they have to be treated in the given normative world of Islam. ICG, therefore, 
should aim to function in harmony with all the ‘trusted’ stakeholders and entities while 
moving towards perfection in every direction to fulfil its potential as God’s vicegerent 
on earth in the form of achieving the normative world of Islam in everyday life.       
Seventh axiom is khilkiyyah, which is defined as affirmative action and behaviour. 
Through tazkiyah process in the path of rububiyyah, ethical norms and values are 
internalised and became part of the corporate culture. In other words, social 
responsibilities towards the community and other stakeholders of a company governed 
by ICG becomes part of the nature of the company rather than actions performed as a 
55 
 
result of calculation of profit or other motives. Protecting the environment within ICG, 
for instance, is not as a result of subsidies, but due to the moral values derived from 
Islamic principles. It is important to distinguish internal and external forces in the 
formation of khilkiyyah for a company. By external forces, we refer to the norms and 
values prevailing in a society whether they are derived out of Islamic principles or not. 
For instance, embracing ‘multiculturalism’ and valuing equally all human beings 
regardless of their religion, ethnicity, nationality, gender, class, disability and cultural 
background might be a norm in a society such as the experience in the UK. As a result 
of such norm, companies attain these attitudes as part of their main characteristics. Such 
principles, if they are in compliance with the IME, should be internalised as it is a 
requirement of IME as well. However, if there is a contradiction, methods to overcome 
such contradiction to sustain IME character should be developed. As for the internal 
sources, these might be different than prevailing norms within a society and may 
represent even further articulations of benevolence through research and training within 
a corporation. As a result, through internal development mechanisms as an articulation 
of rububiyyah axiom, corporations within ICG can transform Islamic principles as part 
of their affirmative action and behaviour, namely their corporate code.   
As regards to the articulation of ikhtiyar (free-will) axiom in producing ICG, it is the 
necessary condition to achieve perfection and internalisation of IME in the operations 
of a corporation. If there is no free-will, tazkiyah process would not be accomplished, 
since every voluntary act would be regulated or there would not be any chance to choose 
tazkiyah in the path for ihsan, due to the lack of free-will. Free-will, hence is the 
condition of possibility to internalise IME and develop towards becoming khalifah or 
God’s vicegerent on earth through actualising khilkiyah process. 
As a result of implementation of this axiomatic framework by ICG system, maqasid al-
Shari’ah or objectives of Shari’ah, which is defined as human well-being in whatever 
is done, would be achieved in corporates at micro level and through their effect at the 
macro scale, in a wider level for all stakeholders. In practice, however, ICG is failed to 
achieve such aspirational goals as it is evident from the current convergence of Islamic 
banking sector towards conventional banking which led to the observed social failure 
of Islamic banking (Asutay, 2007a; 2012a) as a result of share-holder oriented entities 
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in their CG structure (Hasan, 2011), whereas they should internalise ICG approach as 
a result of IPE framework since it is ethical and moral value oriented (Hasan, 2009).  
This study argues that such failure is first and foremost due to the paradigm shift in 
ontological sources which led to a change in the values and norms of societies. As a 
result of this shift, IBs, albeit being Islamically oriented in terms of their financial 
transactions being Shari’ah complaint, conduct their operations mostly based on values 
and norms derived from neoclassical axioms, which is a product of modernity, and 
Islamic sources are utilised to provide legitimacy, not to channel the way these 
institutions operate their everyday transactions. In other words, instead of being located 
in an Islamic order, ICG is located within a capitalist order which causes a convergence 
in terms of roles and institutions which is a result of lack of fulfilment of axioms of 
IME.  
Failure of Mit Ghamr Bank of Egypt, the first Islamic (social) bank established in 1963, 
in the long run could be considered as an example of such paradigm shift. Mit Ghamr 
Bank, a hybrid saving bank which aimed to combine structure of a modern banking 
institute, namely saving banking, with values of an Islamic order, failed to last long 
enough to provide an alternative banking system due to the pervasive norms of 
modernity in the society and business sectors; yet it led to the emergence of modern 
IBs which operate according to the neoclassical economic axioms, yet seek for 
legitimacy from Islamic sources through utilisation of Shari’ah scholars.  
2.3.4. Convergence and Divergence between Islamic Conception of 
Corporate Governance and Conventional Corporate Governance 
Although conventional CG theories have been instrumental in explaining the practice 
in the conventional sector, they do not fit into Islamic CG frame due to difference in 
approaches towards human nature, source of legitimacy and stakeholders emerging 
from ontological differences. Therefore, in the preceding section an attempt is made to 
construct a distinctive ICG to develop within IPE theoretical framework.  
In comparison, agency and stewardship theory, for instance, are different in their 
appeal, yet they share a common feature: making judgements regarding the human 
nature and assuming that these judgements are stable and do not change. However, as 
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an articulation of tazkiyah (purification and harmony) axiom, IME is “concerned with 
growth towards perfection through purification of attitudes and relationships” (Ahmad 
1994: 20), which suggests a dynamic process in the sense that Islam suggests ‘a 
becoming process’ in reaching falah and ihsan. An agent may be a self-interested 
individual, and agency theory, hence, could be useful to explain behaviour in such a 
case. Nevertheless, through training, education and other forms of tazkiyah 
(purification) process such an individual should develop and internalise IME principles 
in an embedded manner and act accordingly. Such a dynamic process requires training 
in multiple dimensions, not limited to training for professional life but also includes 
ethics. Stewardship theory, on the other hand, represents the other side of the spectrum; 
instead of a self-interested manager, it relates to a manager type who works for the good 
of a corporation. Hence, it might be suitable in explaining the later stage or the 
consequence of progress, followed by the successful application of tazkiyah process in 
one’s life in the initial stage. Nevertheless, both of these conventional theories suggest 
that managers do not consider the stakeholders of the corporation in the decision-
making process: in agency theory, agency consider him/herself, while in stewardship 
theory, agent considers the company. On the other hand, IME suggests that ICG should 
take all the stakeholder into account with the objective of maximising the overall well-
being of stakeholders without compromising the interest of one for another, as an 
articulation of tawhid or the complementarity and unitary axiom within a holistic 
approach. In other words, it suggests the optimisation of the interests of all stakeholders 
in a process.   
TCE theory shares the similar problems with agency theory since the underlying theory 
is similar, yet TCE looks at the firm from a contractual perspective which makes it 
different. As for legitimacy theory, the most important difference between legitimacy 
theory and ICG is mainly ontological. According to legitimacy theory, firms strive to 
gain legitimacy from the public. In ICG, however, by definition, firms should have 
Islamic legitimacy by conducting business according to Shari’ah as an articulation of 
tawhid axiom. In other words, in both ICG and legitimacy theory, gaining legitimacy 
has a crucial role. However, the direction of causality is different: in legitimacy theory, 
it goes from public to firm, while in the case of Islamic ontology, legitimacy deductively 
provided by Shari’ah in form and substance. Therefore, Shari’ah governance plays a 
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crucial role in IBs since they testify Shari’ah legitimacy of products and services which 
is communicated to the stakeholders by Shari’ah annual reports or SAR.  
We can argue that the closest CG theory to ICG is stakeholder theory due to its 
comprehensive nature in taking into account the interest of all the stakeholders within 
the surrounding (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004). However, despite the observed proximity, 
there are still ontological differences. First and foremost, the cause of 
comprehensiveness is different: stakeholder theory takes stakeholders into account in 
order to gain competitive advantage. Since the motive behind such a comprehensive 
approach is competition, a stakeholder which does not contribute to the shareholder 
value might be excluded. However, comprehensive nature of ICG stems from IME as 
an articulation of tawhid axiom, which, as mentioned, suggests that all the stakeholders 
complement each other implying that exclusion of one or another stakeholder would 
violate the running of the whole system (Choudhury, 1986). For example, climate 
change and other environmental problems stem from, we argue, from the lack of such 
a complementarity approach; as they are not included as a stakeholder until the damage 
given to environment bounced back and start to influence capitalist system. In ICG, 
such comprehensiveness is not due to the pragmatic nature of ICG, but complementary 
nature of the governance.  
In sum, there might be convergence in the practice of conventional CG and ICG, and 
therefore we might benefit from the existing theories. However, the issue is the 
ontological nature of how we perceive, understand and conceptualise CG and place of 
Shari’ah governance in the CG. Therefore, an Islamic based CG or ICG understanding 
is crucial for IBs so that consistency can be achieved within these institutions since by 
definition, the working mechanism of these institutions, namely IBs, should be 
determined by the same ontological paradigm. In other words, having their financial 
instruments being subjected to Shari’ah compliancy is not enough with IPE, as IME 
has to determine the nature of their existence and governance so that tawhid’s 




2.3.5. Shari’ah Governance: A Piecemeal Approach to ICG 
A crucial component of ICG is Shari’ah governance which is expected to be determined 
by IPE frame and IME’s substantive morality, through which IBs secure that the 
operations within IBs are in line with the objectives of Shari’ah. Existing Shari’ah 
governance structure, however, ensures a piecemeal approach in ICG, as it relegates 
ICG solely to Shari’ah compliancy in financial aspects of the operations and hence 
prevents an integrated approach in as essentialised by ICG.  
The most important unit in Shari’ah governance is SB, which is composed of Shari’ah 
scholars who are knowledgeable in Islamic law and mechanism of economics and 
finance charged with the duty for achieving form and substance requirement of IME. 
Main responsibilities of SB are (Banaga et al., 1994; Hassan, 2012):  
(i) provision of legal opinions based on Islamic law;  
(ii) control and review of the operations within the company to monitor Shari’ah 
compliancy of the firm;  
(iii) preparation of contracts.  
SB, hence, is the core department which renders the Islamic identity of these 
institutions. As Ibrahim et al. (2009: 233) also evidence, demand for IB institutions 
stem from offering halal or Islamically legitimate products and services as more than 
95% of the respondents suggested that “compliance with Shari’ah law is a fundamental 
requirement in terms of ‘halal’ type of investment and investment structure”.  
The role of Shari’ah scholars in IBs within ICG framework is to ensure and demonstrate 
that IBs are legitimate institutions according to Shari’ah frame and operate within IPE 
framework with the objective of fulfilling the ethical expectations of IME. Therefore, 
ICG system demands that SARs of SBs should provide the necessary disclosure to 
convince all the stakeholders, particularly disclosure of not only form oriented partial 
compliancy but also moral compliancy.  
In practice, however, SBs mostly follow the Shari’ah standards issued by AAOIFI 
rather than pursuing a more comprehensive and holistic approach in terms of 
supervision within the framework of IPE. Considering that AAOIFI Shari’ah standards 
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were issued, as it is stated by the Chairman of Shari’ah Board of AAOIFI, “in order to 
provide a reference for Islamic banks and financial institutions to comply with Shari’ah 
in their transactions and products and to harmonize various Fatwas issued by different 
Shari’ah Supervisory Boards (SSBs)” (AAOIFI, 2015: 10), it is clear that AAOIFI 
Shari’ah standards do not provide the necessary means to achieve articulation of IME 
in IBs. As part of the Shari’ah governance standards of AAOIFI, standards for SAR 
suffer from a similar shortcoming as guidelines for SAR suggest a form-oriented and 
summary disclosure which reveals that essentialisation of the morality of Shari’ah in 
IBs is not a ‘standard’. 
Although it is a fact that AAOIFI based CG and Shari’ah governance is an important 
step in the right direction in shaping the operations of Islamic banks, as this study has 
argued so far, Shari’ah compliancy should not be relegated to form oriented 
understanding in mimicking the conventional practice as the practice of IBs so far 
suggests. Instead, IBs must also develop their operations and governance within 
theoretical ICG as developed in this study to ensure that they have macro level 
compliance as well in the sense that the entire operations of IBs fulfils form oriented 
Shari’ah and moral expectations of IME and structure dynamics of IPE. 
In an attempt to identify the distinctions between form oriented ICG that prevails in the 
IB industry and IME enhanced theoretical ICG developed in this study, this study 
identifies two sets of indices in examining the communicated information in the SAR 
of IBs. The first one relates to AAOIFI’s expectations, while the second one relates to 
further ethical compliancy required by ICG so that a consistent and integrated approach 
should be developed, as the latter aims to articulate the normative requirements of IME 
in the operations of IBs. Such a frame is expected to reveal the ‘Islamic’ in IBs 
operations. Next chapter, hence, explores an analysis of SARs published as part of the 
annual reports of the sampled IBs with the intention of revealing to what extend 
Shari’ah scholars fulfil this mission.  
2.4. ISLAMIC MORAL ECONOMY FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
The preceding section presents an ICG system constituted through IPE’s theoretical 
paradigm and its moral substance articulation in the form of IME. Since this study 
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relates to application of CG or ICG in particular the performance of SBs and Shari’ah 
scholars, it is also important to identify the IME foundations of Islamic finance and 
banking beyond its fiqhi or form-based practice. This is important as this study argues 
that IBs have diverged from their original objective function as expressed by IME by 
converging towards conventional finance and banks under the hegemony of market 
system which pre-empts the roles of Shari’ah scholars. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the Islamic normative constructs of IBs in understanding the observed 
divergence and the role played by Shari’ah scholar, as one of the main thrust of this 
research is on the changed role of Shari’ah scholars in relation to the historical 
experiment. 
While in its modern version, IBs and IFIs emerged in first as a social bank in the case 
of Mith Ghamr bank, the model adopted from 1975 onward is the commercial banking 
model based on shareholder value paradigm within neo-classical economics objectives. 
Within the dual banking system, with the initial capital and liquidity provided by the 
emerging wealth from petro-dollars, IBs and IFIs have become important financial 
players all over the world due to the financial liberalisation policies pursued in the 
1990s in most of the Muslim countries in particular and in world economies in general. 
In addition, the authentic Islamic identity search and construction has played an 
important role in the emergence of Islamic economics movement in the post-colonial 
period (Asutay, 2013). The Banker (2017) indicates that the assets size of IBs has 
passed USD 2 trillion, while Thomson Reuter (2017) states that the entire halal markets 
(the Shari’ah compliant goods and services markets) including IBs and IFIs has already 
passed the USD 5 billion. As both of the sources indicate, it seems that most of the 
countries in the world, now, have one way or another affected and involved in IBs and 
IFIs or halal industries. 
The dual banking paradigm has facilitated the diffusion of IBs along with other 
macroeconomic and policy factors (Imam and Kpodar, 2010; 2013). However, with the 
internationalisation of IBs and IFIs since the 1990s, the industry has experienced a 
convergence towards conventional financial sector in its instruments, products and 
operations, which has received criticism in many academic and professional circles 
(among others see: El-Gamal, 2007; Khan, 2010; Asutay, 2007b; 2012a). This criticism 
is based on the fact that Islamic banking and finance industry essentialises forms of 
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Shari’ah in responding to market requirements in increasing efficiency, cost 
minimisation and increasing the shareholders’ value in contrast to Islamic ideals of 
contributing to social good and social justice as identified through IME. 
As identified in Chapter 1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the modern IBs and IFIs 
work within the parameters of negative screening imposed by Shari’ah, namely 
prohibition of riba (interest), gharar or excessive uncertainty, gambling or maysir, 
speculation, limited debt in business (as debt of a business should not exceed 33%), and 
avoidance of certain business sectors which are considered harmful to human well-
being. While IBs and IFIs operations in contemporary times is shaped by these forms 
based negative screenings developed from Shari’ah, SBs in these institutions are 
expected to ensure such screening process is robustly implemented.  
The IBs and IFIs are expected to utilise certain financial instruments historically 
available to ensure the Shari’ah compliancy, while these instruments and the new 
product developments have to fulfil the Shari’ah conditions stated above. While 
literature provides detailed understandings of these instruments, they are mainly 
classified as Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS) instruments which are mainly equity-based 
financing (such as musharakah and mudarabah) and Fixed Income or Debt-Based 
instruments, which are mainly mark-up priced and deferred payment-based instruments 
(such as murabahah, ijarah, salam, istisna) can be mentioned in the most traditional 
forms of Islamic financing2. In recent years, as discussed in detail in the following 
chapters, tawarruq, a short-term liquidity instrument, is heavily utilised in its organised 
tawarruq form (rather than the traditional tawarruq) in the operations of IBs and IFIs. 
The expansion of Islamic finance sector has also witnessed the emergence of Islamic 
                                                 
2 The following definitions are developed from Asutay (2015a: 13–14), Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) and 
Ayub (2007). 
Musharakah: A profit and loss sharing contract whereby two or more partners contribute capital to set 
up a company/project with the intention of generating profit.  
Mudarabah: A special type of partnership whereby one party provides the capital while the other party 
provides the expertise. 
Murabahah: A sale contract whereby the seller discloses to the buyer both the cost of the subject matter 
and the profit margin realised by the seller through the sale transaction. 
Ijarah: A lease contract whereby the usufruct of a subject matter is let from the lessor to the lessee for an 
agreed period and consideration. 
Salam: A sale contract involving spot payment of the sale price and deferred delivery of subject matter. 
Istisna: A sale contract whereby the seller, based on the request of the buyer, makes, manufactures or 
constructs a subject matter according to agreed specifications to be delivered on future date. 
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capital markets, and therefore sukuk or Islamic bond have become an essential 
instrument for project and infrastructure financing.  
As discussed above, however, Islamic economy including banking and finance should 
be formed within IME as structured by IPE. As discussed in detail, IME paradigm 
within IPE framework emerged as a counter hegemonic movement and a double 
movement as articulated by Polanyi (1957) to overcome the hegemony of capital by 
rescuing land, labour and capital and essentialising human well-being or maqasid al-
Shari’ah with the objective of reaching ihsani (beneficence) society so that the aim of 
emancipating and empowering individual can be achieved (Asutay, 2017a). Therefore, 
through its own system (Asutay, 2007a), it requires not only the form or fiqh related 
matters to be essentialised in the operations of IBs and IFIs but also the substance of 
IME as an essential condition to be fulfilled. Thus, Islamic banking and finance should 
not only be governed and regulated by fiqh and also by the moral economy conditions 
and requirements of Islam. 
Since IME’s substantive morality and its constituents and articulations are discussed 
above, it is not repeated here. However, their implications for Islamic financing is 
important to state. Thus, Islamic financing and hence IBs and IFIs are expected to 
perform with the social formation of Islam as identified by IME, which suggests that 
they should be embedded in the social formation of societies in which they are 
operating, as and hence should be organically linked to the value system of Islam in 
their construct and operations. Therefore, IME suggests that economic and financial 
activity should also be determined by non-economic factors alongside their economic 
and financial rationale. With such a feature, they are expected to contribute to the social 
good in developing the ihsani social capital as a social formation of societies as detailed 
above. Thus, IME suggests a sharing and collaborative economy (Asutay, 2017a).  
IBs and IFIs, thus, in an aspirational sense, are expected to articulate the axiomatic 
consequences in their operations in serving interest of all the stakeholders defined by 
tawhid. Such embeddedness also requires IBs and IFIs directly relate to real economy 
by avoiding financialisation; and hence each transaction, by definition, should be 
backed by an asset to prevent financialisation. Therefore, equity-based financing in the 
form of PLS is considered as the main thrust of Islamic financing with the objective of 
limiting the debt-based financial system, as debt is discouraged.   
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In shaping Islamic financing, IME relates the prohibition of riba, gharar and maysir to 
define a particular modes of production in the society through a sharing economy so 
that the domination of one factor of production, such as capital, should be overcome as 
complementarity within unitarity of tawhid suggests that the interests of all the 
stakeholders should be considered (Asutay, 2017b). As a consequence of such a mode 
of production based on sharing-economy, an important feature of Islamic financing is 
the essentialisation of ‘risk-sharing’. Therefore, takaful or mutuality is essentialised in 
IME, and Islamic financing is expected to essentialise takaful as a property of IME, too; 
and this should not be limited to Islamic insurance or takaful. Furthermore, in line with 
the IME principles, Islamic financing is expected to prevent commodification and 
fictitious commodities in the sense that one cannot sell what he/she does not have. 
Moreover, IME essentialises the distributive mechanism as part of its search for good 
society as identified by ihsani society objective. Therefore, not zakat (mandatory alms 
giving) is essentialised as a fiqhi duty, but individuals are expected to contribute to the 
ihsani society with their proactive participation. Such a sharing economy as well as 
PLS and risk sharing nature refers to the development of ‘participatory society’ project. 
While IME’s aspirational principles provides a moral economy base for IBs and IFIs in 
their operations, such principles are in contrasts with the hegemonic and prevailing 
economic stricture and capitalist modes of production and its political economy. IBs 
and IFIs, as a result, should be considered as solutions towards fulfilling certain aspects 
of Islamic economy so that finance related Islamic behaviours can be authenticated in 
the modern capitalist economy, as they, by definition, cannot operate under IME while 
regulated and operating within capitalist economy, as the hegemony (capitalist political 
economy), by definition, does not allow a counter hegemony (IPE and IME) to emerge. 
Therefore, as a solution, IBs and IFIs in the form of commercial banking and financial 
institutions model have been encouraged to work within dual banking system by 
convergence process as discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
As part of the convergence, Islamic banking and finance industry is marked with 
financialisation and increased use of debt-based instrument and financing, and hence 
equity financing in the form of PLS has been withered away (Nagaoka, 2007; Asutay, 
2012a; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Avdukic, 2016). As a consequence, risk sharing 
paradigm has been replaced by risk-shifting strategies as we see in conventional finance 
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and banking. Furthermore, commodification and creation of fictitious commodities has 
become important part of IBs and IFIs (Aksak and Asutay, 2015). Moreover, as stated 
in Chapter 1, in CG of IBs rather than ICG as theorised in this study, CG is structured 
through shareholder value.  
In conclusion, IBs ad IFIs are considered as hybrid institutions of the prevailing 
economic order rather than working within their IPE structure and IME foundations 
through the convergence process leading to ‘social failure’ (Asutay, 2007b; 2012a). One 
of the important sources of the converge is attributed to Shari’ah scholars and their 
faciliatory role in legitimising the mimicry and convergence through their ‘rational-
legalistic and form-based’ approach to Shari’ah compliancy by ignoring that substance 
and moral foundation of Islam as described by IME, which should also be part of the 
Shari’ah compliancy process. The rest of this research, hence, focuses on the role of 
Shari’ah scholars in IBs and how their role has evolved throughout history, which 
seems to end with being signified by modern IBs and IFIs (rather than Shari’ah scholars 
signifying them). The next chapter, thus, aims to provide an empirical analysis on the 
SBs to identify how Shari’ah scholars relinquish their Shari’ah compliancy duty in IBs 
by disclosing information on the nature of Shari’ah compliancy in their respective IBs. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter is an attempt to develop a theoretical framework to locate systems 
including but not limited to corporate governance within an Islamic order, namely IPE 
which is interlinked with IME as its substance. Existence of roles and institutions 
emerging as articulation of IPE and values, norms and cognitive repertoires as IME is 
essential to sustain consistency and harmony within Islamic order.  
Since, by definition, Islamic banking sector suggests a particular ontology and 
epistemology, namely Islamic, constructing an ICG system within IPE framework with 
IME as the underlying substance is crucial for the everyday practice of IBs and their 
compliancy with Islamic order. In IPE, tawhid axiom requires a complementary 
approach for each stakeholder at macro level and articulation and prioritisation of 
values of IME in each and every field of actors within the society. Tawhid axiom, 
therefore, requires ICG system to develop roles and institutions to ensure its macro and 
micro level articulations with the objective of producing individual falah and ihsan at 
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societal level as an outcome. Shari’ah governance as an institution and Shari’ah 
scholarship as a role serves for such a goal in IBs.  
Since society is a dynamic entity, new problems might emerge due to the internal or 
external factors. In terms of Shari’ah governance, for instance, due to the 
transformations between pre-modern and modern period, role and status of Shari’ah 
scholars have changed in the society, which, in some cases, leads to inadequacy of SBs 
in terms of protecting objectives of Shari’ah in IBs. Rububiyyah and tazkiyah axioms, 
in such cases, sustain the dynamic nature of IPE by responding to such emerging 
problems through constructing new roles and institutions in compliance with the 
existing norms and cognitive repertoires in the society.  
Introduction of national Shari’ah boards to oversee the operations of IBs in some 
countries due to the inadequacy of firm level Shari’ah governance, for instance, could 
be considered as articulation of these axioms. However, despite the amendments and 
introduction of roles and institutions to locate IBs within ICG system, due to the 
underlying capitalist values at the society level in majority of Muslim societies, IBs are 
stuck in a conflict between ICG as their governance system and having IME as the 
underlying value system derived from Islamic ontological and epistemological sources 
and hegemony of conventional banking sector having modern and capitalist values as 
the foundation which are derived from a positivist ontology.  
Since the role of Shari’ah scholars in IBs within ICG framework is to ensure and 
demonstrate that IBs are legitimate institutions according to Shari’ah frame and operate 
within such framework in the sense of following a tawhidi axiom, which requires 
approaching all the stakeholders as a complementary part of corporate, it is expected 
that their SARs should reflect such an approach and provide necessary disclosure to 
convince stakeholders, particularly customers to this. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3), therefore, explores and examines the level of disclosure 
in SARs through two indices one reflecting the general practice through AAOIFI 
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Islamic banks (IBs), as discussed in Chapter 2, have emerged to provide Shari’ah 
compliant financing products to overcome the observed financial exclusion due to 
religious reasons. In its origin, IBs are expected to fulfil IME objectives of serving an 
extended stakeholding interest, as the model developed in Chapter 2 identifies. 
However, due to piecemeal strategy of introducing IBs within the existing financial 
systems as hybrid institutions as part of the dual banking system, the Shari’ah 
compliancy of the financial instruments and products provided by IBs should be 
ensured, as they are not embedded in Islamic value system and Islamic Corporate 
Governance (ICG) System essentialised in Chapter 2. As part of such a contemporary 
need, as discussed in Chapter 2, Shari’ah Board (SB) as an institution has been 
innovated and constructed to operate within IBs. 
SB is one of the most important and distinguishing features of ICG in IBs. The role of 
SB is to assure that operations of IBs are in compliance with Shari’ah rules and 
principles through directing, reviewing and supervising financial transactions and 
activities within an IB (Malkawi, 2013). Alongside with providing customers with 
confidence in Shari’ah compliancy of products and services of IBs in their 
everydayness, as AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions) standards identify, SBs are expected to issue an annual report, 
Shari’ah Annual Report or SAR to communicate and disclose the necessary 
information to ensure stakeholders that the operations of IBs are conducted according 
to Shari’ah rules and principles. Although SB’s annual report is the most important 
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intermediary between SB and stakeholders, the extent of disclosure of SBs vary among 
the IBs considerably as it is determined by individual SB’s efforts and transparency.  
Although SB is the most crucial division of CG in IBs in terms of securing the ‘Islamic’ 
identity of these institutions, their most important communication instrument, namely 
SAR has not been explored sufficiently. As discussed in the literature review section in 
the following section, there are two important gaps in the literature in terms of exploring 
and examining SARs: small sample size and inadequate index construction. As for the 
small sample size, the studies conducted so far contended mostly with one or two years 
of analysis, which hinder the opportunity of observing the change in level of disclosure 
in SARs throughout the sampled years. Furthermore, the sampled IBs have been 
selected from a small number of countries apart from El-Halaby and Hussainey’s 
(2016) study, which extends the study to eight countries, but considering, however, only 
one year. The second important gap in the empirical literature relates to index 
construction due to being disclosure analysis-based studies. As discussed in the 
following section, the empirical studies available in the literature either explored SARs 
with a small number of index items, or at best, with extended index items but limited 
to the AAOIFI guidelines. In other words, the indices have been constructed on the 
assumption that AAOIFI guidelines regarding the SARs are the best practice, since it is 
assumed that AAOIFI represents the main standard setting body.  
This study, however, takes a critical approach towards AAOIFI guidelines and construct 
a more demanding and extended index based on IME’s substantive morality derived 
from theoretical framework of IPE, which is developed in the preceding chapter 
(Chapter 2). This is rationalised on the ground that IBs’ Islamic compliancy should not 
be limited with ‘legal and form’ matters but also with ‘substance’, as Islam suggests a 
comprehensive and integrated view of the world (Naqvi, 1994; Asutay, 2007a; 2007b). 
This research, consequently, employs two different indices; first index is constructed 
based on AAOIFI guidelines for preparing SAR and second index extends AAOIFI 
guidelines according to the theoretical framework of IPE as it is articulated through 
substance of IME, which essentialises more detailed level of disclosure due to its 
emphasize on ethical outcomes such as transparency along with other features based on 
the substantive morality argument of IME. This constitutes a significant and critical 
conceptual contribution of this study in relation to the existing body of knowledge. 
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In order to fill the identified gap in the literature, as the aims, objectives and research 
questions identified in Chapter 1, this empirical study aims at examining the extent of 
disclosure in the SBs’ annual reports or SARs in the case of 41 Islamic banks from 15 
different countries for the period of 2007-2014 by employing two different indices in 
capturing form as well as form and substance related disclosure. In addition, this study 
also examines the determining factors of disclosure performance through bank level 
and country level variables. The empirical contribution is also significant as this study 
provides the largest sample size for SAR based disclosure analysis. 
The rest of the chapter is developed as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of empirical 
literature; while Section 3 discusses methodology of the study and data. In section 4, 
we present the empirical findings of disclosure analysis. Section 5 provides the 
concluding remarks.  
3.2. SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL      
LITERATURE  
In recent years, we have witnessed the burgeoning research and publication in Islamic 
finance and also in Islamic accounting related areas including CG in IBs. However, as 
indicated by the literature, the available studies within disclosure related research in 
IBs neglect to analyse Shari’ah annual reports (SARs) issued by SBs, and, they mostly 
focus on the level and determinants of disclosure of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) or other aspects of CG in IBs (see: Al-Baluchi 2006; Darmadi 2013; Farook et 
al.,  2011; Hameed and Sigit, 2005; Rahman et al., 2010; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Aribi and Gao, 2010; Mallin et al., 2014). Therefore, literature focusing on the level of 
disclosure in SARs is scarce and rudimentary, if any. For instance, Md Rahin (2009) 
analyses disclosures on the SBs by only investigating their existence without examining 
contents of the SARs. Nonetheless, there were researchers who aimed to fulfil this gap: 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), for instance, incorporated SB related disclosures in annual 
reports of IBs including but not limited to some SAR components as further dimensions 
into their ethical identity index with a sample of seven IBs over a three-year period.  
Although Shari’ah Board dimension of their study includes only 11 index items, only 
three out of seven SBs were found to be communicative with an average above 50%.   
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In country level study, Hameed (2009) conducted a research on SARs of IBs with a 
sample of IBs from Malaysia, Bahrain and Pakistan in 2005 and 2006. Even though this 
study does not employ a disclosure index, it provides some insights regarding SARs. 
As Hameed (2009) reports that there is a big gap in the disclosure level between SARs 
of Pakistani and Malaysian IBs, Pakistani IBs being the most comprehensive in contrast 
to Malaysia.  
In a more detailed analysis of SARs compared to Hameed (2009), Abdullah et al. (2013) 
investigated disclosures of the SBs of 23 IBs from Malaysia and Indonesia by 
employing a modified version of disclosure index proposed by Maali et al. (2006). 
Although Abdullah et al.’s (2013) study is more detailed compared to the Hameed 
(2009), their study was limited to only two countries. Their results demonstrate that 
SB-related disclosure performance of the sampled banks is very limited, which is even 
true for the disclosure of sensitive and highly necessary information. As for the factors 
affecting disclosure related SBs, cross-membership with other SBs and the expertise of 
SB members in finance related subjects are found to be influential (Abdullah et al., 
2013).  
In his detailed analysis of the Shari’ah governance in Malaysia, GCC and the UK, 
Hasan (2012) also examined SARs as part of Shari’ah governance framework with a 
sample of SARs published in annual reports of 2007 and 2008 of several Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), albeit not in depth. In his questionnaire based study, 
Hasan’s (2012) study demonstrates drastically low scores regarding the disclosure of 
duties and services of the SB: 45% of IFIs in Malaysia and 11.1% of IFIs in GCC 
countries disclosed information about duties and services. In addition, these scores 
decrease further when the disclosure of the SB activities are concerned (5% of IFIs in 
Malaysia and 7.4% of IFIs in GCC countries and none of the IFIs in the UK). Based on 
these scores, Hasan (2012) concludes that majority of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC countries 
and the UK did not operate according to AAOIFI format of the SARs.  
In a recent and comprehensive study, El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) examined the 
disclosure practice of 43 IBs that adopted AAOIFI standards for the year 2013. They 
explored the Shari’ah Supervisory Board disclosure in addition to corporate social 
responsibility and financial disclosures. Although their study is not exclusively for 
SARs, as the authors claim, it is the most comprehensive analysis of SARs based on 
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AAOIFI guidelines. El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) found a relatively high disclosure 
level (68%) based on their index in which age, size and existence of internal Shari’ah 
department were found to have significant impact on such level of disclosure along with 
SB characteristics.  
3.2.1. Econometric Specifications for Measuring the Determinacy of 
Disclosure in SARs 
As mentioned above, in addition to identifying the level of disclosure in IBs, this study 
also aims at empirically testing the factors determining the disclosure in SARs. As 
detailed above, two disclosure indices are developed and calculated, namely SDIGeneral 
and SDIAAOIFI indices, to fulfil the initial aim. The former is based on the index elements 
defined in Table 3.2 representing a larger number of items based on more stringent 
definition of disclosure, while the latter is defined through AAOIFI standards and 
composed of items 1-18 in Table 3.2. As responding to the second aim, in order to 
determine the factors affecting SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI indices calculated through the 
data generated by disclosure analysis, the following two econometric model 
specifications are estimated: 
SDIGenerali,t = α0 + α1 x SDIGenerali,t-1 + α2 x Crisis2009i,t+ α3 x NoofMembersi,t 
+α4 x PopularityofMembersi,t+ α5 x AverageEducationi,t + α6 x InternalSADi,t  
+ α7 x AgeofShariahi,t + α8 x IsCountryAAOIFIi,t + α9 x Leveragei,t 
+ α10 x IndependentAuditori,t+ α11 x   LogSizei,t+ α12 x ROAi,t           + α13 x 
CPIi,t + α14 x GDPGrowthi,t+ α15 x RegularityQualityi,t + α16 x 
VoiceandAccountabilityi,t + α17 x CEODuality,t + α18 x BoardSize,t + εi,t  
 
SDIAAOIFIi,t = α0 + α1 x SDIAAOIFIi,t-1 + α2 x Crisis2009i,t+ α3 xNoofMembersi,t 
+α4 x PopularityofMembersi,t+ α5 x AverageEducationi,t + α6 x InternalSADi,t  
+ α7 x AgeofShariahi,t + α8 x IsCountryAAOIFIi,t + + α9 x Leveragei,t 
+ α10 x IndependentAuditori,t+ α11 x   LogSizei,t+ α12 x ROAi,t           + α13 x 
CPIi,t + α14 x GDPGrowthi,t+ α15 x RegularityQualityi,t + α16 x 
VoiceandAccountabilityi,t + α17 x CEODuality,t + α18 x BoardSize,t + εi,t 
where i denotes individual banks and t denotes the time dimension. While the first 
equation uses 17 explanatory variables to explain the variation in SDIGeneral, the second 





3.2.2. Hypothesis Development  
In order to determine the factors affecting the level of disclosure in SARs, SDIGeneral 
and SDIAAOIFI are used as dependent variables to assess the impact of country-level and 
bank-level factors.   
In modelling, 5 country-level and 12 bank-level independent variables were utilised to 
measure the variation in the level of disclosure of SBs. In determining the independent 
variables, the existing empirical papers, among others, Mollah and Zaman (2015), 
Abedifar et al. (2013) and El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) were consulted. Table 3.1 
provides a list of all independent variables.  
As it can be seen in Table 3.1, first set of indicators are themed as ‘Regulatory Quality 
and Voice and Accountability’, for which data were obtained from The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) Project which is available online. In the literature, it is 
argued that a higher regulatory quality requires a greater transparency (Ernstberger and 
Grüning, 2013; Leuz et al., 2003), therefore, it is expected that there should be a 
positive relationship between regulatory quality and the level of disclosure.  
As for the ‘voice and accountability dimension’ of WGI, it is suggested that a high level 
of voice and accountability leads to ability to pressurise public administrations to 
prevent corruption (Apaza, 2009), which is related to the level of disclosure as a method 
of preventing the corruption through transparency (Wang et al., 2004). A high level of 
voice and accountability, thus, is expected to have a positive impact on disclosure level 
of SBs. We hypothesise, therefore: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between regulatory quality of the country and level 
of disclosure in SAR. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between voice and accountability of the country 
and level of disclosure in SAR. 
‘Corruption Index’ which is calculated and provided online by Transparency 
International is also included as an independent variable for the disclosure level of SBs. 
This is because, as mentioned above, it is suggested that transparency through 
disclosure of information is a way to tackle the problem of corruption (Wang et al., 
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2004), and, therefore, a higher score of corruption index, meaning the cleaner the 
country is in terms of corruption, is expected to be related with a high level of 
disclosure. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between corruption index score of the country and 
level of disclosure in SAR. 
Table 3.1: List of Independent Variables 
Country Level Independent Variables Definition Source 
1 Regulatory Quality  
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of 
the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
WGI Project 
2 Voice and Accountability  
Voice and accountability captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
WGI Project 
3 Corruption Index Corruption is defined as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.  
Transparency International 
4 Adoption of AAOIFI   Adoption of AAOIFI Governance 
Standards at the country level.  
AAOIFI 
5 GDP Growth Rate The growth rate of GDP of a country. World Bank online system 
Bank Level Independent Variables 
6 Size 
Logarithm of total assets which is used as a 
proxy for size. 
The Banker Special Issue 
7 Profitability  Return on assets as a proxy for profitability. The Banker Special Issue 
8 Leverage 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets which 
is used as a proxy for leverage. 
The Banker Special Issue 
9 Type of Auditor 
Dummy variable is used to measure the 
impact if external auditor is one of Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte, Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
and KPMG. 
Annual Report 
10 Existence of Sharia auditing department 
Dummy variable is used to measure the 
impact if IB has an internal Shari’ah 
auditing department. 
Annual Report 
11 Crisis Dummy  
Dummy variable to locate year 2009 as a 
break point to measure the impact of the 
financial crisis of 2007. 
Year 2009 
12 Age from Shari’ah Compliancy 
Number of years passed since the Shari’ah 
compliant activities has started.  
Annual Report 
13 Number of SB members 
Number of Shari’ah scholars in a SB in a 
particular year.  
Annual Report 
14 Average level of education in SB 
The variable is calculated by giving a score 
to each Shari’ah scholar in a SB (1 for 
undergraduate; 2 for master; and 3 for a 
PhD degree), and then calculating the 
average of the scores. 
Annual Report and  
Thomson Reuters Database  
15 Popularity of SB 
If a Shari’ah scholar in a SB has a place in 
the list provided by Unal (2010), we give a 
score of 1, and 0 otherwise. Then, calculate 
the average of all scholars in a SB. 
Unal (2010)  
16 Board Size 
Number of members in the Board of 
Directors. 
Annual Report 
17 CEO Duality 
Dummy variable is used to measure the 
impact of CEO duality which is the case 





‘Adoption of AAOIFI standards at country level’ is another independent variable 
included in this study. As El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) argued, a formal adoption 
of AAOIFI standards increases the level of disclosure in SAR. Since adoption of these 
standards for IBs at country level are expected to have a positive impact on the 
disclosure of SBs at firm-level. Currently, there are four countries in our sampled 
dataset which adopted AAOIFI Governance Standards at national level: Bahrain, Qatar, 
Jordan and Sudan.  
H4: The level of disclosure of SAR is expected to be higher in IBs located in countries which 
adopts AAOIFI standards than in countries that do not adopt AAOIFI. 
The last country level variable is macro-economic factors, namely ‘GDP growth’ which 
is provided by World Bank online system. Based on the empirical evidence from El-
Halaby and Hussainey (2015b) and Wong (2012), we expect that GDP growth has a 
positive relationship with level of disclosure since growth of the country should have a 
facilitator role in terms of disclosure practices. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between GDP growth of the country and level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
As for the bank-level independent variables, 12 determinants are selected, which are 
explained below:  
First bank-level indicator is the ‘logarithm of total assets’, which is used as a proxy for 
size. Size of the banks is included in the study, since it is expected that as the size of 
bank increases, the number of shareholders increases as well, who are concerned with 
the activities of the company (Cormier et al., 2005). In addition, larger firms would 
require to further legitimise their activities which leads better disclosure practices 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H6: SAR of large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs. 
Although agency theory expects a positive relationship between the profitability and 
corporate disclosure with the objective of revealing the good performance of the agent 
with the shareholders (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016), the empirical findings in the 
literature on the impact of profitability of a firm on social disclosure is indecisive (Aras 
et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2001). We, therefore, included return on assets as a proxy for 
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profitability to see if there is any relation between level of disclosure of SB and 
profitability. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H7: There is an association between profitability and the level of disclosure. 
Leverage is another financial indicator of a company which, according to literature has 
a positive relation with the level of disclosure (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because it is expected that high level of 
disclosure will reduce the monitoring costs (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015b). Hence, 
we test as to whether high leverage in terms of ratio of total liabilities to total assets has 
an impact on disclosure of SBs. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between leverage of IB and level of disclosure in 
SAR. 
Selection of independent audit firm is also expected to have a positive association with 
the level of disclosure (Firth, 1979; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) since it provides 
credibility to the corporate, particularly in terms of financial status (El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2016). For this, dummy variable is used to find out if hiring an auditing firm 
among four big companies, namely Ernst & Young, Deloitte, Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
and KPMG, has any explanatory power on SDI score.   
H9: The level of disclosure of SAR is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 
auditors than in IBs that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors 
We also included existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department or unit in IB as 
an independent variable, since this department is directly related in preparation of SB 
reports. In the literature, it is also empirically shown that there is a positive relationship 
between existence of an internal auditing department and level of disclosure (Gordon 
and Smith, 1992; Schneider and Wilner, 1990). In order to determine the existence of 
an internal Shari’ah auditing unit, we examined the annual reports to find a direct proof 
of existence of such a unit.  
H10: There is a positive relationship between existence of internal Shari’ah Auditing 
Department of IB and level of disclosure in SAR. 
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In order to discern the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the extent of 
disclosure, crisis dummy variable is utilised. Since the impact of the crisis is expected 
to be reflected on the disclosure in a lagged manner not before 2009 annual report, we 
selected 2009 and later as crisis period. As Haji and Ghazali (2012) empirically showed 
that the voluntary disclosure has increased after the global financial crisis. Considering 
the reduced trust to the financial institutions after the crisis, voluntary disclosure 
influence positively on the public image of a corporate.  
H11: SAR of IBs after the crisis are more likely to disclose more information than pre-
crisis period. 
For the effect of experience in terms of Shari’ah compliance, the longevity or age of 
the IB is considered as an independent variable having an impact on the nature of 
corporate and Shari’ah disclosure. It is hypothesised that the old IBs should have a 
better disclosure mechanism due to the expected established practices which is 
developed through the years. Furthermore, the older IBs are expected less to incur a 
competitive disadvantage (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). The positive relationship 
between the age and the level of disclosure also shown in the literature empirically 
(Cormier et al., 2005; Hossain and Hammami, 2009), despite some exceptions 
(Alsaeed, 2006). Since multicollinearity problem may arise in the case of including 
both the age of starting operations and being Shari’ah compliant, we only included age 
calculated from the year of Shari’ah compliancy, as age of the bank must be equal to 
the years elapsed since the beginning of Shari’ah compliancy. 
H12: Older IBs are expected to disclose more information in SAR than younger IBs. 
In our analysis, we also evaluate characteristics of SBs, and further analyse attributes 
of SB members separately in order to identify the effects of these different attributes of 
Shari’ah scholars have on the extent of disclosure of SB’s SARs, rather than using an 
index score for a SB as a whole as Farook and Lanis (2007) did. Three main indicators, 
namely number of members in SB, average level of education of the members and 
average popularity of members of SB, are included. It is expected that if the number of 
members increases, the report should be more detailed since higher size of the board 
might decrease the uncertainty and lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984) as well as 
reduce the asymmetric information problem (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), hence disclose 
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more information (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). This is also true for the level of 
education due to familiarity with preparing written documents. This is because a higher 
level of education might result in a deeper understanding of the working mechanisms 
of IBs and disclosure procedure. As for the popularity of Shari’ah scholars, El-Halaby 
and Hussainey (2016) argued that due to deep comprehension of modern banking and 
disclosure structures, popular Shari’ah scholars might disclose more information in the 
SARs. In order to measure popularity of the members, we use the list published by Unal 
(2011) which provides the top 20 scholars based on their overall positions in terms of 
the number of Shari’ah boards they have been sitting in. Unal (2011) used the data 
available on 31 December 2010, which is the mid-point for the sample period of this 
study, and hence his estimation should be considered as relevant for this study, as 
Shari’ah scholarship in IBs represent a monopoly (Unal, 2011) and therefore there 
would hardly be any change in the identified positions in Unal (2011). If a Shari’ah 
scholar in the sampled banks has a place in this list, we give a score of 1, and 0 
otherwise. Based on this, we hypothesise the followings: 
H13: There is a positive relationship between size of SSB and level of disclosure in SAR. 
H14: There is a positive relationship between average level of education of SB members 
and level of disclosure in SAR. 
H15: There is a positive relationship between popularity of SSB and level of disclosure 
in SAR.  
Size of the board of directors is another variable explored in the literature in terms of 
its impact on level of disclosure. As it is discussed in the size of SB, a higher board size 
is expected to influence the disclosure positively (Birnbaum, 1984; Chen and Jaggi, 
2000). However, the empirical findings are mixed. While some studies suggest that a 
large board size has a positive impact on level of disclosure due to potential availability 
of diversified expertise opinions (Hidalgo et al.,  2011; Gandia, 2008; Abeysekera, 
2010; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), there are also studies which suggest a negative 
impact on level of disclosure due to inefficiency and lack of supervision ability (see: 
Herman et al., 1981; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Furthermore, there are empirical 
studies, such as Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 
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(2010), that find an insignificant association between board size and level of disclosure. 
Following Samaha et al. (2015), therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H16: There is an association between the board size and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Although it is argued that independence of the chairman of the board of directors 
provides a better monitoring experience of the managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
empirical evidence regarding the CEO duality is mixed (Samaha et al., 2015). Although 
some studies evidence a negative relationship between level of disclosure and CEO 
duality (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Li et al.,  2008), there are studies which found either 
an insignificant or positive relationship. Therefore, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H17: There is an association between CEO duality and level of disclosure in SAR. 
After defining the econometric specifications and describing the variables, the next 
section presents the methodological framework and data collection process. 
3.3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
DEVELOPMENT FOR DISCLOSURE ANALYSIS 
Based on the theoretical debate and theory development attempted in the preceding 
chapter, in developing the empirical section of this study, this research utilises SARs 
issued by IBs as secondary data in order to measure the extent of disclosure practice in 
relation to an index which is composed to represent the best Shari’ah governance 
practice. Similar to the other studies on accounting disclosure, this study employs 
content analysis method and is designed as an exploratory case study. In this approach, 
published SARs are subjected to a disclosure index.  
The composed index for SARs can be found in Table 3.2, which implies that the best 
practice of SARs is expected to disclose information about the items listed in the table. 
In utilising the constructed index, the existence of an index item in SARs, irrespective 
of its length, is used to determine disclosure on that particular index item. It should be 
noted that in this analysis, headings in SARs are not included as a unit of analysis. As 
can be seen in Table 3.2, items 1-18 are constructed through AAOIFI standards for 
SARs. In constructing these index items, AAOIFI Governance Standard for Islamic 
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Financial Institutions No. 1: Shari’ah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition 
and Report is referred (AAOIFI, 2010). In this standard, the content of a SAR provided 
by a SB is described. According to this standard, a SAR should be composed of seven 
parts: (i) The title of the report; (ii) The addressee of the report – addresses the intended 
recipients of the report; (iii) Opening paragraph – refers to the purpose of the 
engagement; (iv) Scope paragraph – describes the scope of the work performed, 
clarifies management’s responsibility towards Shari‘ah compliance, and confirms that 
the appropriate tests, procedures, and review were performed; (v) Opinion paragraph – 
states the extent of compliance of the institution with Shari’ah in its activities; (vi) Date 
of report – documents the period covered by the report and the date of issuance; (vii) 
SSB’s signature – presents the approval of members of the SB on contents of the report 
(Ginena and Hamid, 2015: 353). The index items 1-18, therefore, constructed in a way 
to include all requirements of this standard, even if they are trivial items such as ‘Report 
has an appropriate title’ (Item 1). The rest of the items, namely items 19-34, are included 
as part of the ICG best practice to quantify additional information such as details of 
general disclosures including the details of violations of Shari’ah. The additional index 
items are developed through the available theoretical (as above) and empirical literature 
to locate the detailed aspects of the issues beyond the initial general items. In 
construction of the expanded disclosure, disclosure analysis studies in the literature are 
also benefitted such as El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) and Abdullah et al. (2013). 
Methodologically, reliability is one of the most important elements of content analysis 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Regarding ensuring the reliability of the coded data and 
dataset, Milne and Adler (1999: 238) suggest that “the most usual ways in which this 
is achieved is by demonstrating the use of multiple coders and either reporting that the 
discrepancies between the coders are few, or that the discrepancies have been re-
analysed, and the differences resolved”. To ensure the reliability of the content analysis 
conducted in this research, therefore, we employed two methods. Firstly, the coding 
process was repeated after ten months with a sample of randomly selected 10% of the 
dataset (30 SAR). The consistency of two coding process with a delay in time between 
two showed that coding process was not under the influence of external factors of that 
particular time and, therefore, is reliable. Secondly, the same sample was given to an 
independent coder.   
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Table 3.2: Disclosure Index Items 
1 Report has an appropriate title 
2 Report has been appropriately addressed 
3 Report has identified the purpose of the engagement (opening paragraph) 
4 Report has identified the nature of the work performed (scope paragraph) 
5 Report has identified the management's responsibility 
6 Independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is disclosed. 
7 The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed. 
8 
Confirmation that the SB has performed appropriate tests, procedures and review work as 
appropriate 
9 
Confirmation that the transaction and dealings are in compliance with Shari'ah rules and 
principles - scope 
10 
Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to charitable 
causes-opinion 
11 Compliance of zakah calculation with Shari’ah is disclosed. -opinion 
12 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed -Opinion 
13 Distribution of profits and losses comply with Shari’ah is disclosed. 
14 Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 
15 Period covered is disclosed 
16 Date the report as of the completion date of the review is disclosed 
17 Report signed by all members.  
18 The report is published in the annual report 
19 Report signed by chairman 
20 Names of members are disclosed. 
21 Name of the chairman is disclosed 
22 Pictures of members are disclosed 
23 Examination of product development ex ante is provided. 
24 Examination of product development ex post is provided. 
25 Holding meetings during the year is disclosed. 
26 The training information of the employees is disclosed. 
27 The Shari’ah auditing department in the bank is disclosed. 
28 SB adopted one of the standards as guidelines (AAOIFI or IFSB). 
29 
Report discloses that the management supplies the Shari`ah board with complete, accurate and 
adequate information in a timely manner 
30 Holding meeting with BOD 
31 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed. 
32 Details of the training information of the employees is disclosed. 
33 Details of the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 
34 
Details of treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to 
charitable causes is disclosed 
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In doing so, the index items of Shari’ah disclosure index were explained to the 
independent coder and was asked to assess the content of SAR and assign related 
scores. Then, the scores given by the independent coder and the original scores were 
compared. Outcome of the reliability test suggest that discrepancies between the coders 
are insignificant. Consequently, the reliability of the coding process was assured. 
In terms of locating the identified items or sought information in the SARs, by scoring 
them, this study employed dichotomous approach: score ‘1’ is given if the item is 
disclosed and score ‘0’ otherwise. The total score that each SAR earned is calculated 
additively with equal weight (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). If an item is not relevant for 
a specific report, such as if there is no violation of rules, the index item to disclose 
details of violation is considered not valid for that particular report; and hence, that item 
is not considered as part of the disclosure index, and therefore it is removed from both 
numerator and denominator. 
Following the modified version of Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2007) equation, as below, 
this study presents the score of disclosure level in the form of an index, namely the 







where SDIj is the Shari’ah disclosure index for IBj and Xji is 1 if the item i in the SAR 
of IBj is disclosed and 0 otherwise. Each item in the disclosure index has an equal 
weight to avoid subjective interpretations of index items. Total score is, then, divided 
by the number of relevant disclosure items (as mentioned above, irrelevant items 
removed from calculation when the case arose), namely nj, which in this case is 
equivalent to 34 (the total number of index items), as in Table 3.2. After calculating 
index value for each SAR of each IBs, inferential analysis is considered to make sense 
of the results. For example, higher index value means SB report is closer to the best 
possible disclosure practice level. In other words, if the index value is closer to 1, SB 
is successfully and effectively managed to use SAR to communicate with its 




In order to explore the impact of AAOIFI standards for SARs, as mentioned above, 
index items 1-18 in Table 3.2 are constructed in line with the AAOIFI standards. 
SDIAAOIFI score, therefore, indicates to what degree SBs of IBs adopt AAOIFI standards 
in SARs. Such an indicator provides the influence of standardisation on level of 
disclosure in SARs. Especially, considering the fact that 66% of the sampled IBs in this 
study are not obliged to follow AAOIFI standards, SDIAAOIFI score also shows the 
impact of standardisation on voluntary disclosure. 
However, AAOIFI standards for SARs demand the disclosure of information at a 
general level without providing details of activities regarding monitoring or 
supervising, such as number of meetings or training of the staff as well as the details of 
violation of Shari’ah, if there is any. This is the reason why we included an additional 
16 index items to construct a more general disclosure index termed as SDIGeneral to 
explore to what degree SBs disclose voluntary information regarding the details of their 
activities and Shari’ah compliancy of IBs without any standards by AAOIFI. 
Considering transparency as an important ingredient of IME, SDIGeneral score provides 
to what degree IBs proactively achieve such dimension in their SARs. Thus, an attempt 
is made to actualise IME oriented expectations in the measurement albeit in a limited 
manner, as empirical operation of IME oriented ICG may require further development 
of standardisation beyond this study. 
In composing the data, annual reports of 41 Islamic banks from 15 countries are 
examined in relation to the identified SDI to reveal the level of disclosure of SBs which 
are published between 2007 and 2014, making in total a collection of 328 SARs. 
However, due to the unavailability of 23 Shari’ah annual reports within the sample 
period, this study has a sample of 305 instead of 328 SARs.  
As for the sampled Islamic banks, the sampling is based on criteria that they were 
established in 2007 or before and have published SARs, which are available online and 
should be in English or Arabic language for the period of 2007-2014. 2007 is selected 
as the beginning period since the number of established IBs before 2007 decrease 
swiftly; hence, to prevent further decline in the sample size, we opted for 2007. Since 
2007 is also the initial period of global financial crisis, sampling through 2007 can help 
to locate the crisis and post-crisis impact on disclosure practice. Also, we did not select 
a more recent year with the objective of testing the impact of the global financial crisis 
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of 2007 which should have been reflected in the annual reports around 2009 due to lag. 
In addition, only fully fledged IBs with 100% Shari’ah compliant assets were 
considered for the sample. The Banker: Special Issue for Islamic Financial Institutions 
was utilised as a guidance in sampling Islamic banks. If an Islamic bank does not 
provide more than two annual reports between 2007-2014, we exclude that Islamic 
bank from the sample. In the sample selection process, therefore, some major Islamic 
banks are not included in the sample due to lack of available Shari’ah annual reports 
such as Alinma Bank, Albilad Bank and Al-Rajhi Bank. Also, Islamic Bank of Britain 
is located as Al-Rayan Bank since it has changed its name in the sample period. Table 
3.3 lists all the sampled Islamic banks in this study.  
Table 3.3: Sampled Islamic Banks 
No Country Islamic Bank No Country Islamic Bank 
1 Bahrain Al Baraka Bank 22  Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
2  Al Salam Bank 23  
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia 
3  Bahrain Islamic Bank 24  
Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad 
4  KFH Bahrain 25  





26 Pakistan Bank Islami Pakistan 
6  ABC Islamic Bank 27  Burj Bank 




EXIM Bank of 
Bangladesh 
29 Qatar Masraf Al Rayan 
9  
Islami Bank Bangladesh 
Limited 
30  
Qatar International Islamic 
Bank 
10 Egypt Al Baraka Bank Egypt 31  Qatar Islamic Bank 
11 Indonesia Muamalat Indonesia 32 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bank Al Jazira 
12  
PT Bank Syariah 
Mandiri 







Al Baraka South Africa 
14  Jordan Islamic Bank 35 Sudan 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 
 
15 Kuwait Boubyan Bank 36  Faisal Islamic Bank 




38  Emirates Islamic Bank 
18 Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
39 UK Al-Rayan Bank 
19  Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 40  
European Islamic Investment 
Bank 
20  KFH Malaysia 41  
Bank of London and The 
Middle East 
21  




In calculating the SDI, secondary data for disclosure analysis is, hence, gathered from 
online published annual reports of the IBs on their official websites. As for the data for 
regression analysis, The Banker Special Issues for Islamic Financial Institutions and 
Datastream is utilised to obtain independent variables for the regression analysis along 
with annual reports of IBs.  
In general, the cross-sectional aspect and the sampling makes the findings easier to 
accept as results of an explorative effort rather than falsifications of numerous potential 
theoretical claims. Therefore, we prefer an econometric analysis with the available 
dataset. Deciding the most suitable estimation method for the available dataset is a 
crucial part of the analysis. Since constructed disclosure indices as dependent variables 
are determined by more than one independent variable, simple regression is not a 
suitable method. Among the multiple regression methods, one-step system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) approach is utilised in determining the factors affecting 
disclosure level of SBs. One-step GMM is selected over two-step GMM due to the 
small sample size which leads to problem of over-fitting in two-step GMM and makes 
asymptotic standards errors not suitable for hypothesis testing (Beck and Levine, 2004). 
System GMM approach also resolves the endogeneity of regressors while avoiding 
dynamic panel bias (Uddin et al., 2017). In this model, bank level explanatory variables 
are treated as endogenous and their past values are utilised as their instruments. As in 
Mollah and Zaman (2015), country level and macro level independent variables, on the 
other hand, are treated as exogenous. In the next section, we present the empirical 
analysis and findings. 
3.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This section presents the empirical analysis and findings in relations to the disclosure 
performance of the selected IBs and the determining factors of the observed disclosure 
level 
3.4.1. Analysis of Disclosure Index Scores 
In the first part of this section, we examine SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI results of sample 
data. Table 3.4 presents the SDIGeneral scores for each bank between 2007-2014. In terms 
of average score over the eight years, as can be seen in Table 3.4, Bahrain Islamic Bank 
has the highest score with 72%, which is followed by Meezan Bank Limited of Pakistan 
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with 63% disclosure score. ABC Islamic Bank and Bank alKhair are third and forth in 
the rank having 62% and 61% score, respectively. As depicted in Table 3.4, 66% of the 
sampled IBs achieved a disclosure level between 40-59%. At the bottom of the list, a 
Malaysian bank, Al-Rajhi Malaysia is found to have the least disclosure score of 24% 
on average. Relatively high scores of Bahraini IBs might be due to the influence of 
AAOIFI standards which is developed in Bahrain. Furthermore, the relatively low 
scores of Malaysian IBs in average are mostly due to the poor disclosure performance 
in 2007 and 2008, which show a gradual increase throughout the sample period. Even, 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad disclose the highest level along with Bahrain Islamic 
Bank in 2014. It is also interesting that despite close proximity of Qatar to Bahrain and 
adoption of AAOIFI governance standards at country level, all three IBs in our sample 
from Qatar perform very poorly in terms of disclosure. When we examine the individual 
SARs of each IB during the sample period, we observe that the reports were written 
shortly without any detailed information. In the search of possible explanations for such 
similarity among the three IBs, it is noticed that two Shari’ah scholars dominated the 
SBs of three IBs for the majority of the sample period, namely Waleed Bin Hadi and 
Abdul Sattar Abud Ghuddah. Considering the close structures and disclosure levels of 
SARs of each IB, this fact shows how individual scholars might be influential in 
preparation of SAR and the level of disclosure it involves.   
In terms of temporal analysis, we observe an increase in average SDIGeneral score of all 
sampled IBs from 40% disclosure level in 2007 to 50% in 2014. Furthermore, although 
SDIGeneral score of an IB does not change substantially between 2007-2014, in some 
IBs, we notice substantial change in disclosure level.   
Especially IBs in Malaysia exhibit sharp increases in their disclosure level such as Affin 
Islamic Bank Berhad (from 15%  in 2008 to 38% in 2009), Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 
(from 21% in 2012 to 44% in 2013), Asian Finance Bank Berhad (from 15% in 2007 
to 41% in 2008), Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (from 15% in 2007 to 65% in 2008), 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  and Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad (both from 
15% in 2010 to 44% in 2011)  in Malaysia and KFH of Kuwait (from 32% in 2009 to 
50% in 2010), Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (from 29% in 2007 to 56% in 2008) in UAE, 
Bank Al Jazira (from 24% in 2012 to 41% in 2013) in Saudi Arabia.  
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Table 3.4: SDI for General Index for the Sampled Banks  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain          
ABC Islamic 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Al Baraka Bank  0.56 0.53 0.59 - 0.59 0.59 0.59 - 0.57 
Al Salam Bank 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.74 0.77 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 
Bank alKhair  0.58 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 
KFH Bahrain 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.56 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 
Kuwait          
Boubyan Bank 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.38 
KFH 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.47 
Malaysia          
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  - 0.15 0.38 0.41 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.47 
Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.44 0.47 0.24 
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 0.15 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.41 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 0.15 0.65 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.71 0.58 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  - 0.15 - 0.15 0.44 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.40 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad  0.15 0.15 - 0.15 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.32 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad  0.41 0.35 0.35 0.35 - 0.41 0.65 0.65 0.45 
KFH Malaysia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.52 
Pakistan          
Bank Islami Pakistan  0.29 - 0.38 0.44 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.39 
Burj Bank  0.29 - 0.44 0.58 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.49 
Meezan Bank Limited 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.63 
Qatar          
Masraf Al Rayan  - - 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.30 
Qatar International Islamic Bank  - - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.39 
Qatar Islamic Bank 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.32 
Saudi Arabia          
Bank Al Jazira  - 0.24 0.41 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 
Jadwa - Investment Bank - 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 
UAE          
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank  0.29 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.56 
Emirates Islamic Bank 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
UK          
BLME 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42 
EIIB 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 
Islamic Bank of Britain 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.43 
Bangladesh          
EXIM Bank of Bangladesh 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.42 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Egypt           
Al Baraka Bank Egypt - - 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.41 0.29 
Indonesia          
Muamalat Indonesia 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.29 
PT Bank Syariah Mandiri 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.38 0.41 - 0.41 0.41 0.36 
Jordan          
Islamic International Arab Bank - 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.55 
Jordan Islamic Bank - 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 
Lebanon          
BLOM Development Bank - 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.59 - 0.57 
South Africa          
Al Baraka South Africa 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Sudan          
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.40 
Faisal Islamic Bank - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 




On the other hand, in the case of some other IBs, no change is observed in their 
SDIGeneral, such as ABC Islamic Bank of Bahrain (stable at 62% during the sampled 
period) and Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (stable at 44% during the sampled period). 
Table 3.5 presents the SDIAAOIFI scores for each bank between 2007-2014. In terms of 
average score over the eight years, ABC Islamic Bank and Bank alKhair of Bahrain 
shares the highest score with 94%. BLOM Development Bank of Lebanon follows them 
with 92%, while Bahrain Islamic Bank of Bahrain has a 90% score, which also has the 
highest score in SDIGeneral. Muamalat Indonesia is at the bottom of the list with 32% 
score, while Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia with 37% is the second worst performer, which 
has also the worst score in SDIGeneral.  
In the performance over the sample period, we observe an increase on average 
SDIAAOIFI scores from 55% in 2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can argue that although 
there is a general increase in disclosure level of SBs, compliancy with AAOIFI 
guidelines is progressed better throughout the years as compared the results with 
SDIGeneral.  
As can be seen from the results for average SDIGeneral scores at country level in Table 
3.6, Bahraini IB sample has the highest score with 60%, while Egyptian Islamic 
banking sample has the lowest score with 29%. Considering that only sample from 
Egypt is Al-Baraka Egypt which is a foreign subsidy of a Bahrain bank, namely Al-
Baraka, this shows the impact of local factors on SDIGeneral, as the Egyptian subsidiary 
has a considerable lower score despite being part of the same group. Although Al-
Baraka Egypt scores very poor in terms of SDIGeneral, they provide a one-page long 
SAR. However, throughout the sample period, they do not disclose any information 
beyond AAOIFI guideline for SAR. Even though they follow the template prepared by 
AAOIFI for SAR to a certain extent, they do not disclose every item in that template 
either. Some of the items they do not disclose are technical items such as ‘Report signed 
by all members’ or ‘Date the report as of the completion date of the review is disclosed’. 
However, they also skip some of the important parts of the template as well such as 
‘Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to 
charitable causes’, ‘The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed’ or ‘Report 
has identified the management's responsibility’ which are disclosed in SAR of Al-
Baraka of Bahrain. 
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Table 3.5: SDI for AAOIFI Index for the Sampled Banks 
In the performance over the sample 
period, we observe an increase on 
average SDIAAOIFI scores from 55% in 
2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can 
argue that although there is a general 
increase in disclosure level of SBs, 
compliancy with AAOIFI guidelines 
is progressed better throughout the 
years as compared the results with 
SDIGeneral.  
In the performance over the sample 
period, we observe an increase on 
average SDIAAOIFI scores from 55% in 
2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can 
argue that although there is a general 
increase in disclosure level of SBs, 
compliancy with AAOIFI guidelines 
is progressed better throughout the 
years as compared the results with 
SDIGeneral.  
In the performance over the sample 
period, we observe an increase on 
average SDIAAOIFI scores from 55% in 
2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can 
argue that although there is a general 
increase in disclosure level of SBs, 
compliancy with AAOIFI guidelines 
is progressed better throughout the 
years as compared the results with 
SDIGeneral.  
In the performance over the sample 
period, we observe an increase on 
average SDIAAOIFI scores from 55% in 
2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can 
argue that although there is a general 
increase in disclosure level of SBs, 
compliancy with AAOIFI guidelines 
is progressed better throughout the 
years as compared the results with 
SDIGeneral.  
In the performance over the sample 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain          
ABC Islamic 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Al Baraka Bank  0.89 0.83 0.89 - 0.89 0.89 0.89 - 0.88 
Al Salam Bank 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.65 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 
Bank alKha r  0.94 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
KFH Bahrain 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.81 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Kuwait          
Boubyan Bank 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.78 0.50 
KFH 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.56 
Malaysia          
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  - 0.28 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.70 
Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.78 0.78 0.37 
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 0.22 0.67 0.78 0.89 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.68 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 0.28 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.78 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  - 0.28 - 0.28 0.72 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.64 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad  0.28 0.28 - 0.28 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.60 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad  0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 - 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.71 
KFH Malaysia 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.94 0.83 
Pakistan          
Bank Islami Pakistan  0.28 - 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.38 
Burj Bank  0.33 - 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.57 
Meezan Bank Limited 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63 
Qatar          
Masraf Al Rayan  - - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.41 
Qatar Internati nal Islamic Bank  - - 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.52 
Qatar Islamic Bank 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.39 0.47 
Saudi Arabia          
Bank Al Jazira  - 0.33 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.65 
Jadwa - Investment Bank - 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
UAE          
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank  0.44 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.86 
Emirates Islamic Bank 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.73 
UK          
BLME 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 
EIIB 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Islamic Bank of Britain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.63 
Bangladesh          
EXIM Bank of Bangladesh 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
Egypt          
Al Baraka Bank Egypt - - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.56 
Indonesia          
Muamalat Indonesia 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.32 
PT Ba k Syariah Mandiri 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.50 0.50 - 0.50 0.50 0.44 
Jordan          
Islamic International Arab Bank - 0.61 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.78 0.73 
Jordan Islamic Bank - 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Lebanon          
BLOM Development Bank - 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.94 - 0.92 
South Africa          
Al Baraka South Africa 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Sudan          
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.58 
Faisal Islamic Bank - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Average 0.55 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71  
As a summary, it can be seen that Islamic banking sample in 11 out of 15 countries 
scored within 40-59% range which shows that index scores are relatively close to each 
other and indicate rather low performance in disclosure.  
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Table 3.6: SDIGeneral Index by Country Level  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60 
Kuwait 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.43 
Malaysia 0.25 0.31 0.42 0.36 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.42 
Pakistan 0.39 0.62 0.48 0.54 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.52 
Qatar 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.34 
Saudi Arabia - 0.34 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
UAE 0.38 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.54 
UK 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.43 
Bangladesh 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.46 
Egypt - - 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.41 0.29 
Indonesia 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.32 
Jordan - 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.55 
Lebanon - 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.59 - 0.57 
South Africa 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Sudan 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.42 
When we calculated the average SDIGeneral score of the banks over the years in total, we 
clearly observed an increase in SDIGeneral score throughout eight years. However, when 
the average is calculated for each country instead of total average, this pattern is lost. 
Although average score of all banks throughout the sampled years suggest a pattern of 
increasing disclosure in SARs in terms of SDIGeneral score, we cannot claim a similar 
pattern at country level. Kuwait, the UK and Egypt are the only exceptions at country 
level which exhibit an increasing SDI score over the years. Nevertheless, we can argue 
that most of the countries have a higher score in 2014 compared to the 2007 on average 
with the exceptions of Qatar and Bangladesh. When we examine SARs of IBs in Qatar 
closely, we observe a change in the template of the reports in three IBs in 2013 and 
2014 which decreased the number of required disclosed items, as in 2014, items 5-8 
from AAOIFI standards as listed in Table 3.1 were removed resulting into lesser 
disclosure. This result could be attributed to the change in the composition of SB or the 
change in the behaviours of Shari’ ah scholars. However, we observe that the only 
substantial change in SB composition is the addition of Shari’ah scholar Ahmad Ahmin 
in 2012 to Masraf Al Rayan and Qatar International Islamic Bank and in 2013 to Qatar 
International Bank; while Shari’ah scholars Waleed Bin Hadi and Abdul Sattar Abud 
Ghuddah were the permanent members of all three SBs in Qatar between 2010 and 
2014. Such a change in template which decreases the level of disclosure without a 
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substantial transformation in SB bring along questions about the impact of Shari’ah 
scholars on the preparation of SARs. As for Bangladesh, the cause of decrease in the 
level of disclosure is more surprising. Although Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 
exhibited a stable performance throughout the sampled period, in the case of EXIM 
Bank Bangladesh, the level of disclosure decreased between 2012 and 2014, which is 
due to the non-disclosure of items 2 and 31. Although item 31, namely disclosure of 
number of meetings is an important detail, item 2 seems a trivial detail which is the 
report being addressed appropriately. These structural changes without necessarily 
providing a refinement for reporting suggests the existence of bank-level factors 
beyond SB such as internal Shari’ah auditing departments, as it is shown in panel data 
analysis in the next section. Such bank-level impact might also explain the fluctuations 
between 2007 and 2014 in most of the sampled countries, most of the countries could 
not achieve a gradual progress. 
The average SDIAAOIFI scores for the countries where the sampled banks were drawn 
are displayed in Table 3.7. As can be seen from the results, based on average scores, 
Lebanon is the top scoring country with 92% of disclosure score, while South Africa is 
the second with 88% of the AAOIFI required items being disclosed in the SARs. 
Although Bahrain has two IBs with highest SDIAAOIFI score in our sample, namely ABC 
Islamic and Bank Alkhair, at country level, it achieved the highest third SDIAAOIFI score 
with 83% on average. One of the important reasons for such an outcome is the 
difference in the sample size for each country. While Bahrain is represented by seven 
IBs, Lebanon and South Africa are represented with only one IB each. Therefore, 
although Bahrain has two highest scoring IBs in SDI, due to the other IBs in sample, 
its average score is declined by bringing the country level average to third place. 
Indonesia is located at the bottom of the list with a 38% score. In overall, unlike 
SDIGeneral, SDIAAOIFI score of countries is dispersed between 38% and 92% without 
clustering within a small range.  
To further investigate the characteristics of country-level SDI scores, Table 3.8 and 
Table 3.9 presents descriptive statistics for SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI, respectively. 
In terms of mean value, all countries lay in the range of 40-59% score level with the 
exception of Qatar (34%) and Egypt (29%). Bahrain and South Africa have the highest 
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mean values with 59% while Egypt has the lowest mean value with 29%, almost half 
of the highest mean value. 
Table 3.7: SDIAAOIFI Index at Country Level  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 
Kuwait 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.53 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.72 0.53 
Malaysia 0.42 0.50 0.67 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.84 0.66 
Pakistan 0.39 0.61 0.46 0.56 0.52 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.54 
Qatar 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.35 0.35 0.47 
Saudi Arabia - 0.50 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
UAE 0.56 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.80 
UK 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.66 
Bangladesh 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.58 
Egypt - - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.56 
Indonesia 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.38 
Jordan - 0.72 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.81 
Lebanon - 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.94 - 0.92 
South Africa 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Sudan 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.55 
In further analysing the data, as can be seen in Table 3.8, Malaysia has the highest 
standard deviations with 0.17. Although Malaysia has the highest number of 
observations (59 out of 305) which might also play a role in such dispersion, based on 
Table 3.6, we can argue that increase in SDIGeneral throughout the sampled period and 
sharp jumps in SDIGeneral score of individual banks in different years play the most 
important role in the observed high standard deviation. On the other hand, Pakistan 
which is represented by three IBs in this study, owes its relatively high standard 
deviation score mostly to the heterogeneity of sampled IBs among themselves rather 
than a progress within eight years. Although Bahrain has the second highest number of 
observations (54 out of 305), with a 0.07 standard deviation, it exhibits uniformity in 
disclosure practices within IBs in Bahrain and throughout the sampled period, which is 
also evident from the results displayed in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6, which may be 
explained by the fact that AAOIFI is located in Bahrain. As can be seen, the lowest 
standard deviation belongs to Lebanon and South Africa (0.02) which are represented 
in this study by only one IB each. However, while Egypt is also represented by one IB, 
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it has standard deviation of 0.06 which shows that the number of IBs is not the only 
explanation for standard deviation as Bahraini case proves.  
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics by Countries for General Index  
Mean Std Dev. Kurt Skew Range Min Max Observation 
Bahrain 0.59 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.33 0.44 0.77 54 
Kuwait 0.43 0.11 -1.25 0.48 0.32 0.29 0.62 16 
Malaysia 0.43 0.17 -0.95 -0.51 0.56 0.15 0.71 59 
Pakistan 0.51 0.12 -1.19 -0.40 0.35 0.29 0.65 22 
Qatar 0.34 0.06 -0.49 0.68 0.18 0.26 0.44 20 
Saudi Arabia 0.43 0.07 5.09 -1.37 0.29 0.24 0.53 14 
UAE 0.54 0.08 6.23 -2.10 0.32 0.29 0.62 16 
UK 0.44 0.05 -0.29 -0.21 0.18 0.35 0.53 24 
Bangladesh 0.46 0.05 -1.06 -0.44 0.15 0.38 0.53 16 
Egypt 0.29 0.06 5.12 2.25 0.15 0.26 0.41 6 
Indonesia 0.32 0.06 -1.60 0.46 0.15 0.26 0.41 15 
Jordan 0.55 0.03 0.24 -0.53 0.09 0.50 0.59 14 
Lebanon 0.57 0.02 -0.30 -0.86 0.06 0.53 0.59 6 
South Africa 0.59 0.02 3.50 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.62 8 
Sudan 0.42 0.03 -1.55 -0.43 0.06 0.38 0.44 15 
Total 0.47 0.13 -0.16 -0.49 0.63 0.15 0.77 305 
Excess kurtosis statistic shows the peakedness of the data where a normally distributed 
data should have a kurtosis of 0. As depicted in Table 3.8, higher values suggest heavier 
tails for the distribution compared to normal distribution such as the case for Saudi 
Arabia, UAE Egypt and South Africa, while the lower values suggest lighter tails such 
as the case for Indonesia, Sudan, Kuwait and Pakistan. Although rest of the countries 
do not have exactly a kurtosis of 0, they are relatively close to 0.  
As an indicator for the symmetry of the distribution, if the data is symmetric, value of 
skewness should be close to 0, while the degree of skewness increases as it gets further 
away from 0. While a negative value for skewness suggests the data is skewed to the 
left, a positive value suggest the opposite. According to Table 3.8, Egypt is the only 
country with a strong right skewed distribution, while Qatar, with a less than half value 
of skewness, also display a similar picture. As the results depict, the countries with 
strong negative skewness are UAE and Saudi Arabia. Although most of the countries 
are skewed to the left (9 out of 15), the value of skewness of these countries are not far 
away from 0. 
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In further giving meaning to the descriptive statistics, the scores in Table 3.8 depict that 
Malaysia has the highest range with 0.56, which is followed by Pakistan with 0.35. The 
lowest ranges also belong to Lebanon and South Africa. 
Table 3.9 presents descriptive statistics for SDIAAOIFI. In terms of mean value, countries 
are dispersed within a long range of mean values, namely 38-92% score range, while 9 
out of 15 countries are clustered between 53-66% score range. Lebanon has the highest 
mean value with 92% disclosure score, while Indonesia has the lowest mean value with 
38%. As the results show, South Africa, Bahrain, Jordan and UAE achieve a higher 
SDIAAOIFI score by exceeding 80%. In terms of standard deviation, Malaysia has the 
highest value with 0.24, being followed by Kuwait (0.16) and UAE (0.15). The lowest 
standard deviation scores for SDIAAOIFI observed in the case of Lebanon and South 
Africa (0.03), as it is also the case for SDIGeneral.  
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics by Countries for AAOIFI Index  
Mean Std Dev. Kurt Skew Range Min Max Observation 
Bahrain 0.83 0.12 -0.92 -0.74 0.39 0.56 0.94 54 
Kuwait 0.53 0.16 -1.78 0.06 0.44 0.33 0.78 16 
Malaysia 0.66 0.24 -0.67 -1.00 0.72 0.22 0.94 59 
Pakistan 0.53 0.13 -1.36 -0.47 0.39 0.28 0.67 22 
Qatar 0.47 0.10 -0.92 0.12 0.28 0.33 0.61 20 
Saudi Arabia 0.64 0.10 6.09 -1.85 0.44 0.33 0.78 14 
UAE 0.80 0.15 0.25 -0.90 0.50 0.44 0.94 16 
UK 0.66 0.08 0.14 -0.97 0.28 0.50 0.78 24 
Bangladesh 0.58 0.05 -0.76 -0.05 0.17 0.50 0.67 16 
Egypt 0.56 0.11 5.13 2.25 0.28 0.50 0.78 6 
Indonesia 0.38 0.09 -1.59 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.50 15 
Jordan 0.81 0.09 -0.23 -0.72 0.28 0.61 0.89 14 
Lebanon 0.92 0.03 -3.33 0.00 0.06 0.89 0.94 6 
South Africa 0.88 0.03 0.00 -1.44 0.06 0.83 0.89 8 
Sudan 0.54 0.05 -1.55 0.43 0.11 0.50 0.61 15 
Total 0.66 0.20 -0.74 -0.39 0.72 0.22 0.94 305 
 
Unlike SDIGeneral, as descriptive statistics for SDIAAOIFI show, the only countries with 
higher excess kurtosis values are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while Indonesia, Sudan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Pakistan all have excess kurtosis values lower than a normal 
distribution. However, South Africa, which has a high positive excess kurtosis for 
SDIGeneral, has exactly an excess kurtosis of 0 in the case of SDIAAOIFI, while other 
countries are relatively close to 0.  
According to the results for SDIAAOIFI as depicted in Table 3.9, Egypt is the only country 
with a strong right skewed distribution, as it is also the case with SDIGeneral, while Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa and Malaysia has strong negative skewness. Although most of the 
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countries are skewed to the left (9 out of 15), the value of skewness of these countries 
are not far away from 0. 
As the comparative results between Table 3.8 and 3.9 show, range values for SDIAAOIFI 
is similar to SDIGeneral. While Malaysia has the highest difference between minimum 
and maximum values, Lebanon and South Africa have the lowest range. However, 
range of disclosure scores of UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are relatively high for 
SDIAAOIFI as compared to SDIGeneral. This suggests that some IBs in these countries 
achieved a higher compliancy with AAOIFI standards for SARs in terms of level of 
disclosure during the sample period compared to the general index of this study, while 
Malaysia, Lebanon and South Africa follows a stable pattern in both SDIGeneral and 
SDIAAOIFI. 
Table 3.10 displays the annual mean disclosure scores of all sampled IBs for individual 
items as part of SDI. In order to develop a better snapshot, results depicted in Table 
3.10 are classified as scores between 0.71-1.00, 0.50-0.70, and scores less than 0.50. 
These are highlighted in Table 3.10.  
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Table 3.10: SDI by Individual Items 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Report has an appropriate title 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 Report has been appropriately addressed 0.47 0.47 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.54 
3 Report has identified the purpose of the engagement (opening paragraph) 0.37 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.62 
4 Report has identified the nature of the work performed (scope paragraph) 0.60 0.64 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.79 
5 Report has identified the management's responsibility 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.73 0.77 
6 Independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is disclosed. 0.43 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.69 
7 The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed. 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.80 0.73 0.77 
8 Confirmation that the SB has performed appropriate tests, procedures and review work as appropriate 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.72 
9 Confirmation that the transaction and dealings are in compliance with Shari'ah rules and principles  0.47 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.74 
10 Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to charitable causes 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.67 
11 Compliance of zakat calculation with Shari’ah is disclosed. -opinion 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.62 
12 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
13 Distribution of profits and losses comply with Shari’ah is disclosed. 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.69 
14 Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 0.40 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.36 
15 Period covered is disclosed 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
16 Date the report as of the completion date of the review is disclosed 0.47 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.46 
17 Report signed by all members.  0.30 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.54 
18 The report is published in the annual report 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 Report signed by chairman 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 
20 Names of members are disclosed. 0.50 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.64 
21 Name of the chairman is disclosed 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.85 
22 Pictures of members are disclosed 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.15 
23 Examination of product development ex ante is provided. 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.21 
24 Examination of product development ex post is provided. 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
25 Holding meetings during the year is disclosed. 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.26 
26 The training information of the employees is disclosed. 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.18 
27 The Shari’ah auditing department in the bank is disclosed. 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 
28 SB adopted one of the standards as guidelines (AAOIFI or IFSB). 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
29 Report discloses that the management supplies complete, accurate and adequate information in a timely manner 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 
30 Holding meeting with BOD 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 
31 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed. 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 
32 Details of the training information of the employees is disclosed. 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 
33 Details of the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 
34 Details of treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited is disposed to charitable causes is disclosed 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 
 Average 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 
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In general, we observe an increase in item or dimension score from 2007 to 2014, which 
suggests a refinement in each year. Furthermore, the disclosure level of items 
determined by AAOIFI standards is considerably greater than custom items. This 
difference especially evident for the items 22-34. However, considering the fact that 
index items 19-21 are subset of index item 17, we can claim that all index items which 
are not derived from AAOIFI standards for SAR are disclosed considerably low in 
sampled IBs in this study. This suggests that AAOIFI guidelines for SARs have an 
impact on the preparation of the reports, even for the IBs which did not officially adopt 
AAOIFI standards. This further suggests that majority of SBs do not prefer to disclose 
detailed information regarding their activities and monitoring processes.  
Index item or dimensions 1 and 18 have a perfect full score in each year of the sampled 
period which are included in both SDIAAOIFI and SDIGeneral. However, since annual 
report of IBs was the only tool to obtain SARs of these IBs, this item is tautological and 
does not provide information, which are included only due to being part of AAOIFI 
guidelines. The third highest score belongs to the item 12 which is ‘Statement on the 
endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed’. This item actually is the core 
of the SAR, since it legitimises the IBs’ activities in the sight of customers; therefore, 
even the shortest SARs (e.g. 3-4 sentences long) are observed of consisting of this item. 
However, it is important to note that this item only checks the consent of SB without 
looking for any justification for such consent or expecting an explanation of the 
methodology how SB is convinced of such compliancy.  
Similar to the report title, another technical detail is the period covered by the report 
which has also a high disclosure level throughout years. Another high disclosure score 
is found with item 21, which is the disclosure of name of the chairman. However, when 
it comes to disclosure of names of all members of SB (item 20) or signatures of the 
chairman and members (item 19 and 17), the disclosure level decreases for all the 
sampled years. Item 14, which is ‘Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if 
any) is disclosed’, stays relatively low level of disclosure compared to the other 
AAOIFI standards required items, 1-18.  
In this item, we checked whether there is any disclosure for the violations even if the 
income generated from such transaction is disposed to charitable causes. Although most 
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of the banks disclose the fact that they disposed impure income to charitable causes, 
they do not disclose the existence of violation of Shari’ah in the report. We believe, in 
terms of rhetoric, this is an important distinction. Furthermore, for those who disclose 
the violation of Shari’ah in relation to this particular item, the nature of violation is 
mostly omitted and contented within the disclosure of violation only.  
Another point to note is the progress over time. It is evident that in general, there is a 
refinement in the reports from one year to the other in relation to the AAOIFI items. 
However, we cannot observe such a positive change in non-AAOIFI items with some 
exceptions such as item 19 and 27. Considering that the latter items indicate pro-activity 
beyond voluntary disclosure and transparency, it seems that IBs are not necessarily 
prepared to act in a pro-active manner in disclosing the expected items in their SARs. 
3.4.2. Analysis of Qualitative Data from SARs 
Although statistical findings help us to reflect on the degree Shari’ah scholars pay 
attention to the substantive morality articulated by IME, qualitative analysis of the 
published SARs through textual analysis reveals further details which cannot be 
detected in the statistical analysis. In this section, therefore, we focus on the content of 
SARs to show how Shari’ah scholars might be contented with approval of Shari’ah 
compliancy without substantiating it through any disclosure, and the concerns and the 
warnings of Shari’ah scholars raised in SARs are being ignored by the top-level 
management, which evidences the lost legitimacy and lost negotiating power of 
Shari’ah scholars and the hegemony of the market system in shaping their decision-
making process. 
SAR published by Shari’ah board of Affin Islamic Bank of Malaysia in 2008, for 
example, shows that how Shari’ah committee expects stakeholders to have trust in their 
judgement without disclosing any details of how the operations in Affin Islamic Bank 
were conducted. The following paragraph was the content of whole SAR in 2008: 
We, DR. HAILANI MUJI TAHIR and DR. MD. KHALIL RUSLAN, two of the 
members of the Shariah Committee of AFFIN Islamic Bank Berhad, do hereby confirm 
on behalf of the Shariah Committee, that in our opinion, the operation of the Bank for 
the financial year ended 31 December 2008 have been conducted in conformity with 
the Shariah principles.  
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Although Malaysian Islamic banks have increased the level of information disclosed 
after 2008 as evidenced in this empirical research, such a short report of Affin Islamic 
Bank was not an exception in Malaysia during 2007 and 2008. Such reports imply that 
the trust on Shari’ah scholars’ supervision of IBs does not stem, in most of the cases, 
from substantiated knowledge communicated through SARs or other channels but 
directly trusting on the existing of a SB and their approval of the operations. Thus, 
Shari’ah scholars have been using their position imposing themselves on the 
stakeholders by use of Shari’ah hegemony, while working towards enhancing the 
shareholders’ interest under the hegemony of market mechanism. In other words, they 
work within the institutional logics of market system as represented by IBs and expect 
stakeholders to have trust in the outcomes and process of IBs as part of market system, 
by definition, due to being a Shari’ah scholar. 
In terms of the influence of Shari’ah scholars in affecting the everyday operations of 
IBs, the content of SARs of Bank Al-Khair from Bahrain evidences the lack of power 
of Shari’ah scholars, at least for some IBs. It is not common to see that Shari’ah 
scholars warns management in terms of the lack of Shari’ah compliancy publicly, such 
as through SARs. However, SB of Bank Al-Khair disclosed the lack of Shari’ah 
compliancy of a project, namely Taj Mall project in their SAR in 2010. However, the 
SARs of the following years suggests that the management did not exit from the project 
as soon as possible, but the bank increased its involvement in other non-Shari’ah 
compliant projects (such as: Open Silicon and Logistics & Warehousing) along with 
the continued Taj Mall project. This was mainly due to the fact that they did not submit 
the projects to the approval of the SB in advance, but non-Shari’ah compliancy issues 
later revealed by the SB. The following is the excerpt of the related section from the 
SARs of Bank Al-Khair between 2010-2014 (the emphasis in the quotations are added): 
2010: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the 
year ended 31 December 2010 are in compliance with the rules and principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah, except the investment in Taj Mall project which the Shari’ah Board 
advised in a previous resolution to exit as soon as possible. 
2011: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the 
year ended 31 December 2011 are in compliance with the rules and principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah, except the investment in Taj Mall project which the Shari’ah Board 
advised in a previous resolution to exit as soon as possible. 
2012: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the 
year ended 31 December 2012 are in compliance with the rules and principles of 
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Islamic Shari’ah, except for the investment in Taj Mall which the Shari’ah Board 
advised in a previous resolution to exit as soon as possible. 
2013: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the 
year ended 31 December 2013 are in compliance with the rules and principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah except part of the investment in Taj Mall project, Open Silicon and 
The Independent For Logistics & Warehousing which were not submitted to the 
Shari’ah Board for approval before its execution, and appear later to be having 
explicitly non-Shari’ah Compliance issues. 
2014: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the 
year ended 31 December 2014 are in compliance with the rules and principles of 
Shari’ah except part of the investment in Taj Mall project, Open Silicon and 
Logistics & Warehousing which were not submitted to the Shari’ah Board for 
approval before its execution, and appear later to be having explicitly non-Shari’ah 
Compliance issues. 
As it is clear from the above excerpts and examples, top-level management does not 
always act in line with the advice of SB. Considering that the non-Shari’ah compliant 
projects have increased in later years, this attitude is not due to the constraint of one 
particular project but approach of the management towards SB in general, namely they 
impose market conditions on the Shari’ah scholars and expect from them Shari’ah 
legitimacy in return for a place in their SB. As discussed in the following chapters, due 
to Shari’ah scholars’ legitimacy is being drawn from their affiliation with a particular 
SB, they do not have negotiation power beyond giving advice. Since the top-
management at IBs are aware of the attractiveness of SB posts among Shari’ah 
scholars, fatwa shopping, fatwa re-positioning (Ullah et al., 2016), Shari’ah arbitrage 
(El-Gamal, 2007) facilitates the process imposing the market requirements and 
institutional logics of the bank on the Shari’ah scholars as conditions. 
In summing; these qualitative analyses show the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in 
modern IBs as we will further evaluate in later chapters. In other words, the mere 
existence and approval of IB instruments and transaction by SB without substantiating 
with evidence can sustain the ‘Islamic’ identity of an IB, while their role of supervision 
does not have a significant impact on the everyday practice of an IB, at least in some 
IBs. 
3.4.3. Results of Econometrics Analysis 
After presenting and discussing the statistical findings in relation to the disclosure 
scores and obtained qualitative data from SARs, this section focuses on the findings in 
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relation to the determinants of disclosure level established for SDIGeneral index and 
SDIAAOIFI index in the previous section by using system-GMM analysis. 
The pairwise correlation matrix of independent variables, as depicted in Table 3.11, 
suggests, in general, a low correlation among the pair of variables and there is no perfect 
multicollinearity among them. The result in Table 3.11, therefore, shows that we can 
conduct our system-GMM analysis with these variables. Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 
presents the results for two models where we consider SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI as 
dependent variables, respectively.  
3.4.3.1. Discussion of Results of SDIGeneral 
Tables 3.12 and Table 3.13 display the system-GMM test results. As the tables indicate, 
the number of observation is decreased to 179 from 305 in both models. This decrease 
is related to the internal process of system-GMM calculations which uses lagged values 
of variables, and therefore decreases the number of observations utilised. As for the 
independent variables, lag of dependent variable and popularity of Shari’ah scholars 
are significant variables in both models. The influence of previous year’s report on the 
present year is clear since accumulation of knowledge and experience affects the later 
periods. However, while lag of dependent variable is significant at 10% for General 
index, it is significant at 5% significance level for AAOIFI index. As for the popularity 
of Shari’ah scholars, it is significant at 10% significance level in both models. 
Significance of popularity of Shari’ah scholars in both models suggests that sitting on 
multiple chairs positively influence the preparation of Shari’ah annual reports. This 
result suggests that if a SB is composed of Shari’ah scholars who have positions in 
multiple boards, level of disclosure in SAR increases, especially in terms of providing 
details. This might be due to the exposure to different reporting and disclosure styles in 
different boards. In other words, there might be a knowledge transfer from one 
institution to another where a Shari’ah scholar has a chair in both. Another explanation 
for the significance of this variable might be due to the prestigious status of these 
Shari’ah scholars who, in line with their reputation and experience, wants to issue 
quality reports with high disclosure level. This finding is also consistent with the 
finding of El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) who argued that exposure of reputable 
Shari’ah scholars to modern banking and disclosure structures might help to produce 
higher level of disclosure. Considering that the measure of popularity in this study is 
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occupying a high number of chairs in multiple IFIs, in terms of policy making, 
placement of Shari’ah scholars in multiple chairs might be promoted to increase the 
level of disclosure.  
Since the coefficient of lag of dependent variable for AAOIFI index (0.416) is almost 
twice as much as lag of dependent variable of General index (0.285), we can argue that 
while previous reports have a positive impact on the current year’s report in both 
models, this positive influence is more evident in the AAOIFI index score. As for the 
popularity of Shari’ah scholars, both coefficients are close to each other (0.070 for 
General index and 0.094 for AAOIFI index). 
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Table 3.11: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
 



































No of Members 1.00                 
Leverage 0.05 1.00                
Ind. Auditor 0.04 0.04 1.00               
Internal SAD 0.15 0.25 -0.24 1.00              
Size 0.36 0.41 -0.13 0.25 1.00             
ROA 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.29 1.00            
AgeOfShariah -0.02 0.27 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.24 1.00           
CPI -0.04 -0.39 -0.29 0.05 0.10 -0.17 -0.21 1.00          
GDPGrowth 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.30 0.32 0.11 0.09 1.00         
RegQuality 0.03 -0.40 -0.36 0.06 0.00 -0.26 -0.33 0.89 0.01 1.00        
VandA -0.19 -0.30 -0.06 -0.36 -0.33 -0.29 -0.27 0.56 -0.28 0.57 1.00       
IsCountryAAOIFI -0.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.23 -0.05 0.20 0.42 -0.03 0.23 -0.11 -0.51 1.00      
PopularitySB -0.02 -0.39 -0.40 0.16 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 0.35 -0.17 0.32 0.16 0.06 1.00     
CrisisDummy 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.25 -0.10 0.17 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.00 1.00    
Av. Education -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.24 0.07 0.09 1.00   
Board Size 0.24 -0.12 -0.07 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.27 -0.08 0.03 -0.11 -0.20 0.28 0.22 0.01 -0.23 1.00  
CEO Duality 0.23 -0.10 0.16 0.11 -0.21 -0.13 0.01 -0.04 -0.27 0.08 0.01 -0.14 0.16 -0.09 -0.16 0.11 1.00 
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Table 3.12: System GMM Test Results for SDIGeneral 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust Std. error t P>|t| 
SDIGeneral (Lag1)*** 0.285 0.168 1.700 0.100 
RegularityQuality 0.003 0.002 1.610 0.118 
VoiceandAccountability 0.000 0.002 -0.150 0.883 
CPI -0.040 0.032 -1.240 0.224 
IsCountryAAOIFI -0.099 0.093 -1.060 0.296 
GDPGrowth -0.020 0.236 -0.080 0.934 
CEODuality -0.076 0.133 -0.570 0.572 
LogSize -0.029 0.044 -0.660 0.515 
Leverage -0.058 0.161 -0.360 0.720 
ROA -0.452 0.398 -1.130 0.265 
IndependentAuditor 0.026 0.026 0.990 0.330 
InternalSAD** 0.216 0.098 2.200 0.035 
CrisisDummy -0.009 0.020 -0.450 0.653 
AgeofShariah 0.004 0.003 1.400 0.171 
NoofMembers -0.005 0.025 -0.180 0.855 
AverageEducation 0.072 0.048 1.500 0.143 
Popularity*** 0.070 0.036 1.960 0.058 
BoardSize 0.016 0.016 1.050 0.304 
Constant 0.036 0.381 0.100 0.924 
     
No of Obs. 179    
No of Groups 33    
No of Instruments 28    
     
AR(1) 0.048    
AR(2) 0.380    
Hansen Test (p-val)**** 0.276    
Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; **** Since robust standard errors were utilised, we only 
report Hansen test result 
Existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department is the third and last significant 
variable for the first model. The findings show that having a dedicated Shari’ah 
auditing department in the bank also affects the level of disclosure and suggests that 
IBs with an internal Shari’ah auditing department disclose more (with an amount of 
0.167) compared to the IBs without such department in terms of SDIGeneral score while 
existence of internal Shari’ah auditing department is insignificant in terms of level of 
disclosure in SDIAAOIFI score. Positive impact of the existence of internal Shari’ah 
auditing department may stem from providing necessary information and reports to the 
SB for revision and helping them to compile more comprehensive annual reports. 
Considering the fact that SDIGeneral contains detailed information over the AAOIFI 
guidelines, existence of such department might facilitate the flow of information to 
fulfil the expectation of such comprehensive index. This result is also consistent with 
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the empirical findings of the literature regarding the positive influence of an internal 
auditing department (Gordon and Smith, 1992; Schneider and Wilner, 1990). 
Furthermore, this finding suggests that regulatory authorities at the state level or 
independent institutions such as AAOIFI should pay more attention to establishment of 
internal Shari’ah auditing departments to increase the level of disclosure.  
Table 3.13: System GMM Test Results for SDIAAOIFI 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust Std. error t P>|t| 
SDIAAOIFI (Lag1)** 0.416 0.187 2.220 0.034 
RegularityQuality** 0.007 0.003 2.490 0.018 
VoiceandAccountability -0.005 0.003 -1.470 0.150 
CPI -0.026 0.043 -0.620 0.541 
IsCountryAAOIFI*** -0.209 0.117 -1.790 0.083 
GDPGrowth -0.327 0.324 -1.010 0.319 
CEODuality -0.216 0.162 -1.340 0.191 
LogSize -0.073 0.064 -1.140 0.262 
Leverage -0.046 0.228 -0.200 0.840 
ROA -0.407 0.504 -0.810 0.425 
IndependentAuditor 0.020 0.034 0.610 0.549 
InternalSAD 0.069 0.171 0.400 0.691 
CrisisDummy -0.012 0.034 -0.340 0.736 
AgeofShariah*** 0.009 0.005 1.840 0.074 
NoofMembers 0.021 0.041 0.510 0.613 
AverageEducation 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.998 
Popularity*** 0.094 0.052 1.790 0.083 
BoardSize -0.005 0.020 -0.270 0.790 
Constant 0.900 0.664 1.360 0.185 
     
No of Obs. 179    
No of Groups 33    
No of Instruments 28    
     
AR(1) 0.122    
AR(2) 0.169    
Hansen Test (p-val)**** 0.338    
Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; **** Since robust standard errors were utilised, we only 
report Hansen test result. 
3.4.3.2. Discussion of Results of SDIAAOIFI 
As it can be seen in Table 3.13, there are three independent variables unique to the 
second model, namely Regularity Quality, isCountryAAOIFI and AgeofShariah 
variables. RegularityQuality has a small positive impact with a coefficient of 0.007, 
which suggests that regularity quality of a country increases the level of disclosure 
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according to AAOIFI standards, which is meaningful since AAOIFI standards for SARs 
are also part of regularity framework. This result is also consistent with the literature in 
which regulatory quality has a positive impact on disclosure level (Ernstberger and 
Grüning, 2013; Leuz et al., 2003). This suggests that to improve the transparency and 
level of disclosure at IBs in line with the governance standards of AAOIFI, it is also 
important to consider country level factors such as regulatory quality and strive to 
develop them further at country level.  
Adoption of AAOIFI standards at the country level is also significant in the second 
model as it is expected. However, the sign of the coefficient is expected to be positive 
suggesting that IBs in countries adopted AAOIFI guidelines receive a higher score of 
SDIAAOIFI compared to the other countries, as El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) 
suggested, since a formal adoption of AAOIFI standards at country level creates a 
regulatory pressure to comply with the AAOIFI standards at bank level. The sign of the 
coefficient, however, is negative. Although at first sight, this seems contradictory, when 
we examine Table 3.7, the reason becomes more obvious. Out of four countries adopted 
AAOIFI governance standards, while Bahrain and Jordan have a high level of 
disclosure (0.83 and 0.81, respectively), Sudan and Qatar perform quite poor (0.55 and 
0.47, respectively). On the other hand, counties such as the UAE, South Africa, 
Lebanon, UK and Malaysia perform very well and above 65% despite not adopting 
AAOIFI standards at country level. This shows that adoption of AAOIFI governance 
standards at country level does not yield the same result in all cases as Bahrain and 
Qatar, both adopting the standards and being neighbour countries, produce very 
different outcomes in terms of disclosure level. This requires further analysis of country 
or bank level determinants. As mentioned earlier, one such reason might be Shari’ah 
scholars employed at IBs and their personal influence in SARs as all three IBs in Qatar 
have the same chairman in SBs.    
As for the ageofShariah variable, it is significant at 10% significance level with a 
coefficient of 0.009. This indicates that as the IB gets more experience in Shari’ah 
compliancy, it fulfils the guidelines of AAOIFI more. This finding is consistent with 
Cormier et al. (2005) and Hossain and Hammami (2009).  
In providing a brief conclusion, Table 3.14 summarises the results of hypotheses testing 
process by presenting the results together.  
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Table 3.14: Summarising the Results through Hypotheses 
Hypothesis SDIGeneral SDIAAOIFI 
H1: There is a positive relationship between regularity quality of the 
country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
     Rejected 
Failed to 
Reject** 
H2: There is a positive relationship between voice and accountability of 
the country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H3: There is a positive relationship between corruption index score of 
the country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H4: The level of disclosure of SAR is expected to be higher in IBs located 
in countries which adopts AAOIFI standards than in countries that do 




H5: There is a positive relationship between GDP growth of the country 
and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected 
Rejected 








H8: There is a positive relationship between leverage of IB and level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected 
Rejected 
H9: The level of disclosure of SAR is predicted to be higher in IBs 




H10: There is a positive relationship between existence of internal 




H11: SAR of IBs after the crisis are more likely to disclose more 
information than pre-crisis period. 
Rejected 
Rejected 





H13: There is a positive relationship between size of SSB and level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected 
Rejected 
H14: There is a positive relationship between average level of education 
of SB members and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected 
Rejected 
H15: There is a positive relationship between popularity of SSB and level 













Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.0 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The previous chapter aimed at constituting a model of ICG system, which essentialises 
an extended stakeholding model with its unique knowledge base, that is Islamic 
ontology. However, it acknowledges the divergence in the practice of IBs from the 
identified ideal or aspirational model. Building on the theoretical model presented in 
Chapter 2, the empirical attempt in this essay explored and examined the level of 
disclosure in SARs of 41 IBs from 15 countries throughout an eight-year period and the 
factors affecting the level of disclosure. In addition, to assess the influence of AAOIFI 
standards for SAR related disclosure, we constructed two indices, one is completely 
based on AAOIFI standards (SDIAAOIFI), while the second index (SDIGeneral) has 16 
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additional items to explore as to whether SARs disclose any further information through 
pro-active behaviour beyond the AAOIFI standards to provide transparency with the 
objective of identifying voluntary disclosure in line with IME expectations. 
Based on the scores of SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI, we can argue that SDIAAOIFI scores are 
considerably higher than SDIGeneral, which suggests that published guidelines of 
AAOIFI standards regarding SARs are influential in the preparation of the reports 
regardless of the commitment of the country to AAOIFI standards. Especially, detailed 
analysis of SARs shows that most of the SBs use the template provided by AAOIFI 
close to mimicry level. Also, for both indices, the results demonstrate that there is a 
gradual increment in disclosure practice year on year within the sampled period. 
Nevertheless, this is not valid for some IBs, since there are some examples where the 
level of disclosure decreases. As for the SDIGeneral score, in general it has scored lesser 
level of disclosure compared to the SDIAAOIFI. This result suggests that going beyond 
the general statements to inform stakeholders about the activities and Shari’ah 
compliancy issues of IBs with the aim of providing transparency as an articulation of 
IME in Islamic finance sector is highly neglected. Thus, it seems that there are some 
positive developments in voluntary disclosure in the sense of complying with AAOIFI 
standards for SAR; however, as discussed above, ‘substantive morality’ related 
expectations in IB industry are not fulfilled in disclosure practice either. Hence, the 
recent debate focusing on ‘form vs. substance’ indicating that IBs have focused on form 
compliance and neglected the substantive morality in their operations seems to be 
relevant for disclosure practices as well. As the discussion on ICG indicates, IBs need 
to operate within ICG in order to have consistency between their Shari’ah complaint 
operations and their governance structure, which may help to overcome the observed 
problems relating to the lack of substantive morality. Since this study aimed at 
essentialising such a comprehensive understanding of governance in IBs, we developed 
SDIGeneral beyond the compliancy or form oriented nature of AAOIFI standards as 
expressed in SDIAAOIFI. However, the scores for SDIGeneral compared to SDIAAOIFI are 
indication of the mentioned neglect on substance related issues despite the fact that 




It should be noted that the findings of this empirical analysis based on the disclosure 
analysis of SAR is not only a matter of difference between two sets of indices one being 
more detailed than the other, but a symptom of a serious paradigm shift. This paradigm 
shift refers to a shift from the initial imagination of Islamic morality-based 
understanding of Islamic economics and finance by the founding fathers towards a 
form-oriented everyday practice of IBs through the negative screening process applied 
by the SBs. Disclosure level in SARs, in this regard, should be considered as a symptom 
of this problem and could be treated only through the implementation of IPE theoretical 
structural framework at the CG level, which means adoption of an ICG system as 
constituted by the substance of IME within IPE structure. 
As for the content analysis, SARs revealed two pieces of information. In 
communicating with the shareholders, SBs of some IBs, particularly in Malaysia, 
contented with only approval of Shari’ah compliancy rather than disclosing any further 
details. This indicates that some SBs expect from shareholders to have a full trust in 
their decisions. Considering that such limited disclosure practice do not have a negative 
impact on ‘Islamic’ identity of respective IBs, we can argue that they succeed in holding 
the Islamic identity by mere existence of a SB. Secondly, the example of Bank Al-Khair 
from Bahrain, for example, reveals that the advice of a SB on the operation of an IB 
might have very limited impact on the everyday operations. This is an important matter 
in terms of considering that Islamic economics movement in its origin aimed creating 
an alternative authenticated through Islamic ontology. 
In terms of factors affecting the level of disclosure, we can conclude that lag of 
dependent variable and popularity of Shari’ah scholars are two significant variables for 
both SDIGeneral and SDIAAOIFI. While existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing 
department has some explanatory power for SDIGeneral, it disappears in the case of 
SDIAAOIFI. On the other hand, we observe three new factors influential in SDIAAOIFI 
score: adoption of AAOIFI standards at the country level, regulatory quality of country 
and age of Shari’ah compliancy which might indicate that these three variables are 
particularly deterministic in terms of complying with AAOIFI standards for SARs.  
These results indicate that disclosure of SB members in their annual reports by itself 
does not contain adequate details to convince stakeholders to Shari’ah compliancy of 
the institution. However, their explicit approval for Shari’ah compliancy of the 
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institution in these reports without disclosing details of their analysis seems a sufficient 
condition for the stakeholders considering the high growth rate of the Islamic banking 
sector during the last decades. Therefore, it is necessary to explore ifta (issuing a ruling) 
institution further in its historical trajectory to reveal how such trust has been gained 
and whether similar conditions are valid for Shari’ah scholars employed in modern 
Islamic banking sector today, which is the topic of the fourth and fifth chapters. 
Before investigating historical trajectory of ifta institution, however, it is necessary to 
analyse relationship between IBs and conventional banks which especially became a 
matter of concern and has revealed itself in everyday practice of IBs after the entrance 
of IBs to the global financial market in which they have to compete with conventional 
banking sector in terms of efficiency and minimisation of cost. Shari’ah scholarship in 
facilitating this process is considered as a new dynamic leading to compromise. We can 
frame the emerged relationship between Islamic banking sector and conventional 
banking sector and the role of Shari’ah scholars in this process within postcolonial 










CHAPTER 4  
EXPLORING INSTITUTIONAL AND PRODUCT EMERGENCE 





4.1. INTRODUCTION  
For a long time, it is believed that modernity as it developed in the West represents a 
single and universal truth towards which each society is expected to converge. The 
consequent modern society that is originated in Europe has its unique structures and 
institutions which distinguishes it from the rest of the world. In the process, the West 
constituted a binary relation with the rest of the World, such as the West/the East, 
rational/irrational, developed/underdeveloped, etc. determined by the modernist 
benchmarks. In order to ensure homogenous development trajectory, the West 
undertook the ‘civilising mission’ in order to transmit structures and institutions of this 
unique paradigm to ‘the other’ to complete their ‘civilising mission’, which was 
facilitated by the emergence of ‘colonialism’ as a strategy. However, this encounter 
between the colonizer (the West) and the colonised (the other) did not always result into 
the expansion of ‘civilising’, as colonial subjects did not always accept ‘the universal 
truth’ presented by the colonial powers.  
Thomas Babington Macaulay contended that in order to bring the Western knowledge 
and the power of reason to colonised subjects, they needed intermediators who look 
similar to colonised subjects but think and act according to the Western principles at the 
same time. Their mission would be to carry the Western knowledge to colonised 
subjects (Young, 1952). Macaulay, in his infamous Minute on Education stated that (as 
cited by Young, 1952: 729): 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us 
and the millions whom we govern, - a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, 
but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may 
leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with 
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terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by 
degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. 
This education program, however, did not result always in conveying ‘knowledge of 
the West’, as it exists in the West: sometimes, it led to generation of emergent hybrid 
structures and institutions which can be marked as ‘in-between’ of this binary encounter 
resulting from the negotiations between the coloniser and the colonised as a form of 
resistance against the domination of the West (Bhabha, 1994). 
These hybrid institutions were inevitable consequences of the observed ‘break’ in the 
imagination of universality of the Western modernity. Consequently, instead of 
accepting the knowledge of the West as ‘the only truth’, colonised subjects adopted it 
according to their own knowledge and culture through an adaption process (Eisenstadt, 
2000). In relation to Muslim societies, such a ‘break’ resulted in the Islamisation of 
knowledge (of the West) in a ‘battle against unbelief’ to revive Islam against the 
hegemony of the global (Tibi, 1995). 
One of these hybrid institutions is Mit Ghamr Saving Bank, a pioneer institution in 
Islamic banking, which was founded in Egypt in 1963. During his graduate study in 
West Germany (as it was known by then), Ahmed Najjar, the founder of Mit Ghamr 
Saving Bank, witnessed the role of local saving banks in the development of West 
Germany after the World War II. He believed that structure of local saving banks could 
be utilised to increase saving rate in Egypt which in return could help to increase rural 
development as the increased deposits could be used to finance small entrepreneurship 
leading to development. With this intention in mind, he contacted local authorities to 
transmit knowledge with the objective of actualising of this Western institution in line 
with local characteristics of Egypt. Since Egypt is a country with Muslim majority 
population, in order to be accepted by rural people, Najjar reconstructed the German 
local saving bank model in accordance with Islamic principles by ensuring Shari’ah 
compliancy including prohibition of interest (Mayer, 1985). Through the formation of 
Mit Ghamr Saving Bank, Najjar aimed to combine a Western institution, namely 
German local saving banks, with Islamic principles such as prohibition of interest and 
profit-loss sharing. As a result of this effort, this institution became an example of 
multiple modernities by forming a financial institution (rural saving bank) through 
reshaping conventional local saving bank from Germany according to Islamic 
principles in the sense that the operations of an institution based on ‘rational ontology’ 
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is re-shaped according to ‘Islamic ontology’ leading to ‘multiple modernities’ as 
contended by Eisenstadt (2000). 
Although experience of Islamic banking started as a local institution in 1963 with the 
objective of facilitating rural development as part of Islamic economics movement, the 
second phase of Islamic banking development set in with the global diffusion  and 
expansion after the 1990s, as private Islamic banks extended their services to 
international markets (Khan, 2009). In order to compete with conventional financial 
institutions at international level, contrary to the local markets, it was inevitable to 
encounter with capitalist hegemony. Due to the entrance of Islamic banking sector to 
international markets which has been dominated by neo-classical principles, another 
colonial process has emerged between capitalist hegemony and Islamic banks (IBs). 
Consequently, a dichotomy between capitalist principles and Islamic principles has 
been formed as rational (conventional banking)/irrational (Islamic banking) binary 
relation. In this colonial process, Islamic banks could be considered as a colonised 
subject by hegemonic power of conventional banks. Hence, in order to be ‘civilised’ or 
to be ‘rational’, Islamic banking sector had to follow capitalist principles alongside 
Shari’ah compliancy process instead of entirely working with the substantive moral 
principles of Islam in its operations and institutional level. This is due to the fact that in 
this process, capitalist principles are believed to be universal and should be accepted 
and implemented by all financial institutions, including Islamic banks. As part of the 
double sword, at the same time, Islamic banks are expected not to cross the borders of 
Islamic law to protect its ‘Islamic’ identity as ensured by the Shari’ah compliancy 
process. 
In competing with conventional banking sector, employees of Islamic banking sector 
(financial innovators, Shari’ah scholars, managers, etc.) are exposed to capitalist 
principles and heavy financial engineering instruments of conventional banks through 
education (such as university education) with the aim of Islamisation of these 
instruments, and, then, adaptation to Islamic banks. As a result of ‘education’ and 
through other channels, ‘interpreters’ have translated ‘opinions’, ‘morals’ and ‘intellect’ 
of capitalist principles into Islamic law to let Islamic banking sector to ‘mimic’ the 
dominant power, namely conventional banking sector to the extent that ‘Islamic 
capitalism’ has been uttered as ‘a paradigm’ regardless of the ontological 
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inconsistencies (such as: Cizakca, 2011). Consequently, the new instruments and 
procedures were developed based on capitalist principles rather than Islamic principles 
with an added filtering mechanism in order to ensure Shari’ah compliancy. In other 
words, mimicking of conventional financial institutions has been accomplished through 
Islamisation of knowledge, in this case, Islamisation of knowledge of conventional 
banking sector. As a result of this mimicry, Islamic banks have converged to its 
conventional counterpart with an increasing pace. In this process, mimicry of Islamic 
banks, consequently, created a recognisable ‘other of conventional banking’, as Bhabha  
(1994: 86) states: 
Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of 
mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must 
continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. 
Although Islamic banks act according to capitalist principles, there is always an excess 
that does not fit to capitalist principles and makes Islamic banks different that is the 
obligation of being Shari’ah compliant. Therefore, this ‘recognizable other’ is also a 
threat for the dominant power, namely conventional banking sector, since “mimicry is 
at once resemblance and menace” (Bhabha, 1994: 86). This is because customers of 
Islamic banks have not only started to enjoy similar conditions with conventional banks 
(such as similar rate of returns and mark-up fees) due to mimicry, but also have the 
privilege of using Shari’ah compliant instruments. Therefore, this mimicry has become 
a ‘menace’ for conventional banks since their customers may be attracted by this excess, 
namely being Shari’ah compliant.  
Following this process, conventional banking sector moved to a new state indicating 
the third phase of Islamic banking development. In this state, conventional banks began 
copying Islamic banking structures and instruments, in particular Shari’ah supervisory 
board unit, by adopting it to its modern framework. Hence, this mimicking entailed 
another hybrid structure, a banking institution, namely Islamic banking, which is 
established in a modern framework and is shaped by positivist ontology, and at the same 
time, through a window, acts according to Islamic law and is bound by Shari’ah 




This chapter, therefore, argues that development of modern Islamic banking sector can 
be divided into three stages:  
(i) first stage starts with establishment of the first Islamic bank as a hybrid institution 
within the multiple modernities framework and extends to the entrance of Islamic 
banking sector into competition at the global scale;  
(ii) second, convergence of Islamic banking institutions to conventional banking and 
finance institutions due to competition at the global scale;  
(iii) lastly, convergence of conventional banking towards Islamic banking through 
copying Islamic banking structure and its instruments and adopting them into its 
modern framework in order to attain customers of Islamic banks and to keep its existing 
ones by instituting Islamic windows. 
In the next section, we discuss the establishment of Islamic banking as an example of 
multiple modernity. The third section presents the convergence process of Islamic banks 
towards conventional financial institutions through mimicry due to the competition in 
international markets. In the fourth section, how this mimicry has led a new hybrid 
institution in the conventional banking is discussed. Finally, we present concluding 
remarks.   
4.2. FROM MODERNITY TO MULTIPLE MODERNITY: 
EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONS    
With the aim of spreading the universal social formation of modernity, hegemonic 
colonising powers travelled to many corners of the world with the objective of 
transmitting the modernist project to every society. However, the goal of imposing 
modernity as one and the only universal guide failed due to various factors including 
the resistance of local power leading to the emergence of ‘post-modernity’ suggesting 
that each ontological existence can lead to develop their own social formation (Euben, 
1997). However, due to the hegemonic domination of Eurocentricity, the experience 
has proven that modern is still produced by reference of various cognitive rationalities 
leading to multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000). In other words, resistance of local 
societies against ‘the universal truth’ of modernity led to the local interpretations of the 
Western modernity. Consequently, instead of accepting the project of the Western 
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modernity as it is, every society, which has been imposed with the principles and 
institutions of modernity, adopted them in many cases according to local characteristics 
of the society leading to multiple modernities through a particular blending process 
(Eisenstadt, 2000). Such a drastically change in the underlying values of the society, as 
a result, led to the long-lasting and fundamental transformations in the society (Portes, 
2010b), as Portes (2010a) argues that in its origin, organic institutions emerges from 
the social formation of the respective societies (as explained in Chapter 2). 
4.2.1. IBF as an Example of Multiple Modernities   
During the 1960s, Muslims’ search for an Islamic identity and strive for establishing 
Islamic institutions in modern world accelerated the adoption process and creation of 
hybrid institutions in the sense of ‘modernising’ Islamic institutions as a product while 
keeping the process as ‘Islamic’ (Warde, 2000). Pioneering example of Islamic banking, 
Mit Ghamr bank, was established in 1963 as a result of such quest through the 
hybridisation of saving banking institution of capitalist financial system with Islamic 
principles (Dar and Presley, 2003) to provide financing for small entrepreneur with the 
objective of capacity development. The theoretical justification for such transformation 
is provided by the ‘Islamisation of knowledge’ movement (Haneef, 2005). Despite 
being a successful experiment in multiple modernities, Mit Ghamr was closed, mostly 
due to the political reasons, as capacity development through civil society initiative 
beyond the power of the Egyptian centre was not allowed (Mayer, 1985). Nevertheless, 
relatively successful prototype of Islamic banking led to the initiation and development 
of Islamic commercial banking as the new institutional formation operating with 
Islamic principles (El-Ashker, 1990).  
Islamic banking institutions have been established as part of an alternative financial 
sector to its conventional counterpart with the aim of operating according to the 
principles of Shari’ah rather than capitalism. The most salient feature of Islamic banks 
is, therefore, to provide Shari’ah compliant products and services, mainly with the 
purpose of fulfilling the demands of Muslim customers in the capitalist financial system 
without contradicting with the principles of Shari’ah. However, since they operate 
under the secular nation states, which cannot provide any legitimacy regarding the 
Shari’ah compliancy, they needed to employ jurist-consults or Shari’ah scholars as 
experts on Islamic law and seek for legitimacy through their approval of the product 
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and services operating in the Islamic banks. Although each Islamic bank might use a 
different strategy (employing a consultancy firm in Shari’ah or having a Shari’ah 
Board division), at the end, each one of them has to seek consent from Shari’ah scholars 
to sell Shari’ah compliant products and services. Shari’ah Board structure in particular 
and Shari’ah governance of Islamic banks in general, hence, aims to monitor and 
investigate the operations to legitimise Islamic banks in the eyes of the stakeholders, 
particularly the customers. Shari’ah governance of Islamic banks can be labelled as “its 
excess, its difference”, as Bhabha (1994: 86). Islamic banks, hence, represents an 
emergent pattern within the multiple modernities framework due to its adherence to a 
modern institution, namely the bank, and aiming to operate such institution with Islamic 
principles to comply with local norms and values. The nature of emergent pattern of IB 
is due to the fact that in their current form they only represent the repetition of banking 
practices with Islamic excess; however, if IBs were to develop new structures, 
instruments and operations in organic manner as argued by Portes (2010a), then the 
nature would have been emergence3 (Asutay, 2012b). Thus, emergent pattern nature fits 
into multiple modernity explanations, while emergence would have been the 
consequence of post-modernity in terms of developing entirely new (non-replicated) 
paradigm as a novel construct(Asutay, 2015b). 
Figure 4.1 depicts the emergence of Islamic banking institution as a result of 
Islamisation of knowledge process. Islamization of ‘meaning and institution of 
everyday life’ constructed based on positivist ontology through a filtering process of 
fiqh (Islamic law), resulted into a negotiated, hybrid institution. The religo-cultural 
interpretation of Islam in a rational manner by adopting the norms and institutions of 
modern reality locates Islamic finance in multiple modernities; as it is no longer 
attached to the emergence of Islamic moral economy, which is part of postmodern due 





                                                 
3 Further discussion on emergence and emergent pattern distinction can be found in the literature such 
as: Harper and Lewis (2012); Martin & Sunley (2012); Harper and Endres (2012). 
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Source: Asutay (2009) 
Although Islamic banking sector has started as local banking and has been striving with 
the political problems due to the secular nature of the modern nation-states, it has 
expanded all over the world, especially during the last decades as a result of the 
faciliatory force of the globalisation (Imam and Kpodar, 2010). Due to the entrance of 
Islamic banks to the competition with conventional banking sector in the global 
financial markets, Islamic banks have been pressurised with the hegemony of 
conventional banking to run with capitalist principles in the everyday practice which 
resulted in a convergence towards capitalist principles, while striving to keep ‘Islamic’ 
identity intact, which we discuss in the following section in detail. 
4.3. MIMICRY OF ISLAMIC BANKING: GLOBALISATION OF 
ISLAMIC BANKING AND ITS CONVERGENCE TOWARDS 
CONVENTIONAL BANKING 
Compared to the early stages of Islamic banks, we observe a convergence towards 
prioritising principles of capitalism internalised through Shari’ah compliancy process 
in product design and everyday practice of these institutions during the last decades 
rather than essentialising Islamic moral economy objectives (Asutay, 2012a). The most 
influential reason in this observed convergence is the increased competition between 
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Islamic banks and their conventional counterparts especially after the 1990s due to 
internationalisation of Islamic banks in entering into the world markets (Warde, 2000). 
As a result of entering into competition with the conventional banking sector, 
neoclassical principles and concepts such as ‘efficiency’, ‘low transaction cost’, ‘profit 
maximisation’ and ‘shareholder corporate governance model’ have gained dominance 
in the operation and diffusion of Islamic banking institutions for keeping pace with 
conventional banking due to the competition process, which has been in contrast with 
the initial imaginary and authenticated moral economy of Islamic aspirational position 
aiming to create alternative institutions with their authenticated working mechanisms 
and objectives (El-Gamal, 2006; Asutay, 2007; 2012a). In other words, while Islamic 
moral economy aims at creating a particular paradigm through its own worldview by 
considering Islamic banks as an instrument of that paradigm (referring to post-modern), 
Islamic banks have found refuge in neo-classical operational principles plus the form 
compliancy according to Shari’ah (Asutay, 2007; 2012a). 
Considering the form compliancy of product and services as sufficient condition for 
‘Islamic’ identity, fiqh or codified Islamic law-based filtering process of Islamisation of 
knowledge produced efficient, low transaction-cost products and services for Islamic 
banks as an outcome of the mimicking process. In other words, conventional products 
are subjected to Shari’ah filtering mechanism to ensure their form-based compliancy. 
This convergence suggests that morality of capitalism and principles and values of 
conventional banking have become more dominant in Islamic banking sector instead of 
substantive morality of Islam. This paradox in current times leads to the distinction 
between ‘Shari’ah compliant Islamic finance’ vs ‘Islam based Islamic finance’ (Asutay, 
2012a).  
It is important to note that this study does not claim that all the products and services 
of Islamic banks have been mimicking conventional banking and have been conflicting 
with the objectives of Shari’ah. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, Islamic banking 
sector has emerged based on Islamic principles with an imagination to establish an 
alternative sector to conventional banking by representing an emergence science rather 
than emergent pattern (Asutay, 2012b). However, product innovation processes of last 
decades show that high utilisation of certain instruments such as organised tawarruq, 
an Islamic financial instrument for meeting the short-term liquidity need, with the 
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objective of providing competitive products in the banking industry resulted in the 
prioritisation of efficient products and services with minimum transaction-cost over 
fulfilment of the objectives of Shari’ah (Khnifer, 2010).  
Although Shari’ah scholars cannot or do not prevent this convergence, they still need 
to reconcile the products and services of Islamic banking sector with Islamic law 
through the compliancy process to keep the ‘Islamic’ identity intact. In the next section, 
hence, we explore ‘organised tawarruq’ utilised by Islamic banks as an instrument for 
solving short-term liquidity problem faced by Islamic banks, with the intention of 
revealing the justification of this instrument in terms of fiqh or Islamic law. The reason 
of selection of this instrument is twofold; firstly, it constitutes the backbone of Islamic 
banks’ liquidity and underlying mechanism of many recently developed products and 
services which requires liquidity facilitation (Khnifer, 2010). Secondly, International 
Council of Fiqh Academy (ICFA), an independent and international forum of Shari’ah 
scholars declared that it is impermissible according to Shari’ah in its 19th session in 
2009, yet it is heavily used in Islamic banking sector (Msatfa, 2011). A scrutiny of 
organised tawarruq reveals that two methods of reconciliation are employed in terms 
of justification: (i) transformation of exception into the norm and (ii) delusional 
maslahah.  
The following sections discuss two reconciliation methods of Shari’ah scholars in order 
to mimic conventional products while justifying them on the ground of Islamic law. 
Considering the widespread usage and constituting the backbone of Islamic banking 
sector, organised tawarruq seems to be the most appropriate innovation for this 
purpose. However, before exploring these two methods, we first explain the classical 
and organised tawarruq.  
4.3.1. Classical and Organised Tawarruq: A Case Study  
Classical tawarruq is employed with the objective of obtaining cash money, especially 
for short-term needs within Islamic financing activity. In this financial transaction, 
firstly, mutawarriq or seeker of cash purchases a commodity from a seller on deferred 
payment. In the next step,  mutawarriq sells this commodity in the market on cash for 
a lower price to a third party (Dusuki, 2010). It is important to note that since 
mutawarriq engage in these separate transactions personally, it is required to have a 
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certain degree of involvement with the market to achieve the intended goal, namely 
liquidity. Such an involvement promotes a certain degree of embeddedness with the 
surroundings, which makes a distinction with its organised counterpart as it is applied 
in the modern Islamic banking sector. 
Although utilisation of classical tawarruq has been a topic of debate by jurists due to 
its substance which is considered as an interest-like instrument despite its form-
compliancy, organised tawarruq was constructed in a more controversial structure to 
increase the efficiency and decrease the transaction cost to attain liquidity, as it is 
depicted in Figure 4.2.  
The most important difference between classical and organised tawarruq is the removal 
of mustawriq’s or seeker of cash involvement in the process and transferring 
intermediary steps to Islamic bank. In order to construct such an efficient and low-
transaction cost instrument, an exception, which is the delegation system, is 
transformed into a norm. In other words, delegation of engaging in a contract (buying 
and selling of the same product) to other agents is institutionalized, which should be 
carried out by the individual himself under normal circumstances. Therefore, Islamic 
bank as an institution of market system acts as a proxy to achieve customer’s goal 
without any direct involvement of the customer with the market except Islamic banks.  
Figure 4.2 depicts the working mechanism of organized tawarruq as it is implemented 
in Islamic banks: 
Figure 4.2: Working Mechanism of Organised Tawarruq 
 
Source: Ghazali (2014: 70)  
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Al-Suwailem (2009) points out there are three differences between classical and 
organized tawarruq as follows: 
(i) While the original seller does not play any role in the final transaction in classical 
version of tawarruq, in organised tawarruq, original seller which is Islamic bank, 
plays an intermediator role between the customer and brokers in LME;  
(ii) While the customer obtains the cash from the final buyer in the case of classical 
tawarruq, in organized tawarruq, the customer acquires the cash from the original 
seller which is Islamic bank; 
(iii) While the original seller which is Islamic bank might have a pre-agreement with 
the final buyer with the objective of evading fluctuation of the price, in classical 
tawarruq, this is not the case.   
In the next section, we explore how ‘transformation of exception into norm’ is utilised 
to construct organised tawarruq as an instrument in IBs. 
4.3.2. Transformation of Exception into Norm 
We argue that to reconcile Islamic law or fiqh with the products and services that have 
been engineered based on the capitalist principles such as efficiency and low transaction 
cost as a result of mimicking behaviour of Islamic banks, ‘transformation of exception 
into norm’ is utilised as a facilitator. In particular, first two items of the differences 
between classical and organized tawarruq stated by Al-Suwailem (2009) show how 
Islamic banks acts as an intermediary in this process to decrease additional transaction 
costs with the intention of making the product more efficient in compliance with the 
capitalist principles.  
By ‘exception’ in the case of organised tawarruq, we refer to the delegation (wakalah) 
system, where transformation of exception into norm is realised through the 
institutionalisation of ‘delegation of an activity to another agent’. This is considered as 
an exception since under normal circumstances, the activity should be carried out by 
the individual; but due to the pursuit of efficiency and low transaction cost, such 
institutionalisation is deemed necessary. In other words, such institutionalisation has 
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emerged to achieve the most efficient application of means to a given end, in this case 
seeking liquidity.  
In classical tawarruq which is considered as permissible by ICFA, mutawarriq buys 
and sells the product himself to obtain cash, and hence, he has to involve with the 
market in person to achieve his intended goal, which promotes submergence with the 
surroundings. However, by institutionalising the delegation in Islamic bank, all the 
responsibility of buying a commodity with instalment and to find a buyer to sell that 
commodity on cash basis is handled by an Islamic bank. This implies that all the 
interaction in the market is replaced by exchange of commodities without any 
involvement of the customer. Therefore, Islamic bank as an institution of market system 
acts as a proxy to achieve customer’s goal without any direct involvement of the 
customer with his or her surroundings. It is also important to note that Islamic banks 
use LME base metals as an asset, since they meet all the required criteria for a 
commodity related transactions to be Shari’ah compliant, which helps to realise the 
organised tawarruq process efficiently and with minimum transaction cost (Fahmy et 
al., 2008). This process, however, does not produce any consequence in real economy 
in terms of responding to a demand or contributing to production other than providing 
liquidity demand of the customer through fictitious transactions. Hence, from the 
perspective of customer, organised tawarruq is no different than having an interest-
based loan. However, latter is a direct interest-bearing contract, while the former is a 
buy and sell transaction conducted within minutes through agency of an Islamic bank; 
this indicates a difference in the form and not in the substance. ‘Transformation of 
exception into norm’, hence, has played a facilitator role to comply with necessities of 
modern life and fulfilling the form of Islamic law. We can particularly observe high 
utilisation of this method of compliance in contemporary practice of Islamic banking 
and finance, especially considering the central role that organised tawarruq plays in 
these institutions for many years (Khan, 2009). For example, the financial report of 
Bank Negara states that 22.4% of financing by Shari’ah contracts is composed of 
tawarruq as of 2016 and application of tawarruq contract has increased in value by 
104% from 2014-2016 (Bank Negara, 2017). This in itself is an indication of how 
organised tawarruq is becoming a ‘norm’ in the operations of financing in IBs, which 
is an evidence of the enormity of the problem in terms of convergence towards 
‘capitalist norms’ of debt-based financing. 
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Furthermore, organised tawarruq as an instrument is constructed as an exception within 
the Islamic law as well, since it is ruled as impermissible by ICFA. Hence, as a legal 
device, it could be justified to be employed in exceptional cases where there is no 
alternative but organized tawarruq to solve the observed liquidity problem, especially 
as a short-term solution. However, it is a fact that sometimes such ‘exceptional’ 
instruments become the ‘norm’ in Islamic banks. In evidencing this, a member of the 
Shari’ah Advisory Board of Bank Negara Malaysia, or the central bank of Malaysia, 
states that the Islamic finance instruments, which derived through maslahah (or 
necessity) continued to be employed even after there is no need for it anymore 
(interview conducted by Hassan, 2012: 361): 
Some people say we are liberal. I will say that, before any decision is made, there 
is a thorough study of the particular issue. We might prefer certain views to others 
and, in certain circumstances, the bank can go for the exception but the bank is 
given a time limit for that. However, sometimes the exception has become the 
default. 
Thus, as the statement from this particular Shari’ah scholar indicates, ‘exception’ as a 
rule in Shari’ah has become default in Islamic finance and its operation with the 
blessing of the Shari’ah scholars. 
Organised tawarruq, as an essential financial instrument of the Islamic banking sector, 
therefore, is constructed and utilised extensively through the implementation of 
transformation of exception into norm with a double process. In the first step, a 
legitimate but exceptional action, namely delegation, utilised as a norm to construct the 
organised tawarruq. In the second step, this exceptional product which is considered as 
impermissible by ICFA elevated from the status of exception to the backbone of the 
sector by turning an exception into norm.    
It is important to note that in particular after the unfavourable ruling of ICFA on 
organised tawarruq, justifying it on the grounds of Islamic law has become a point of 
concern as well. While some Shari’ah scholars acknowledge problematic nature of this 
constructed product by limiting its usage to extreme necessity and offering alternative 
products under normal circumstances (Ahmed and Aleshaikh, 2014), there are scholars 
who might be considered as embedded into the banking and finance sector, justifying 
its implementation based on maslahah principle (Islamic Finance Resource, 2009). We 
argue, however, such a justification of maslahah is not compatible with its original 
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meaning and even contradicts with its intended goal, which is why it should be 
considered as a ‘delusional’ maslahah.  
Some jurists have utilised delusional maslahah in case of a necessity which requires 
extraordinary precautions to ensure so-called benefits of people where these 
precautions cannot be extracted from the two main sources, namely the Quran and 
Sunnah. Such a state of necessity is similar to a state of exception as defined by Schmitt 
(2005: 6). We argue, therefore, the jurist who applies delusional maslahah decides an 
exception in the Islamic law. This state is considered as an exception since appealing 
delusional maslahah means suspending the verses of the Qur’an and the sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad, which are the cornerstones of the Islamic law. Schmitt (2005: 5) 
states that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. Hence, by issuing a fatwa 
based on delusional maslahah, jurist becomes ‘sovereign’. Furthermore, in reality, jurist 
does not issue this fatwa by his own will, rather it is the enforcement of the capitalist 
market system which leads the jurist to issue such a fatwa based on delusional 
maslahah. Consequently, we can argue that it is the capitalism and its unceasing 
demand rather than the Shari’ah scholars, remains sovereign over Islamic law in such 
state of exception. 
In order to explore the rationale behind ‘delusional’ maslahah, in the next section, we 
explore the emergence of the concept of maslahah and explain why justification of 
organised tawarruq through maslahah should be considered as delusional maslahah.    
4.3.3. Delusional Maslahah 
In order to comprehend the concept of ‘delusional maslaha’ and its position within the 
Islamic legal theory (uşul al-fiqh), we need to, first, discuss the emergence of concept 
of maslahah and its development within the framework of legal theory. Islamic legal 
theory has appeared by the end of the 8th century in its elementary form and reached its 
maturity by the beginning of the tenth century (Hallaq, 1999: 2). The aim of the Islamic 
legal theory was to reach new legal norms for unexampled situations or to rationalise 
existing cases by specialising in methods of interpretation and reasoning (Hallaq, 2009: 
177–78). In Islamic legal theory, almost all school of thoughts (madhab) are agreed 
upon four core sources through which law might be derived: the Qur’an, Sunnah (the 
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma’ (consensus) and qiyas or analogy. 
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Additionally, there are subsidiary legal principles which are not agreed upon by all 
schools of thoughts yet utilised in legal theory. Ulama or the Islamic scholars employed 
these principles to deal with changing conditions in the society and for the cases which 
application of qiyas may lead unwanted consequences due to several reasons. Juristic 
preference or istihsan regard for the public interest or istislah, and custom or ‘urf might 
be considered as the most important and widely used principles. Even though we can 
trace the rulings based on maslahah (public good), as one of these subsidiary legal 
principles, as far back to the 8th and 9th century, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali 
(1058-1111) is the first scholar who defined the maslahah in a tangible manner (Opwis, 
2005).  
4.3.3.1. Maslahah in pre-modern period 
According to Opwis (2005), jurists followed four different models to utilize maslahah 
principle in the process of ruling during the middle period of Islam. First model is 
proposed by the Shafi’i jurists al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), who 
identified maslahah with suitability (munasaba) and employed it to detect ratio legis 
(‘illa) of scriptural ruling. By this process, they employed concept of maslahah in the 
frame of legal analogy. Shihab al-Din Ahmad b. Idris al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285), a Maliki 
jurist, formulated the second model. Following al-Ghazali, al-Qarafi used maslaha 
principle within the legal analogy. In addition, al-Qarafi went one step further by 
applying the concept of maslahah as a means to extend the law through legal precepts 
(qawa'id). By doing so, he justified precepts such as eliminating pretexts to illegal ends 
(sadd al-dhara'i). As a result of the extension proposed by al-Qarafi, validity of a ruling 
depends on its compliance with maslahah which in return declare maslahah as an 
independent standard. A third model was introduced by the Hanbali jurist Najm al-Din 
al-Tufi (d. 716/1316), who utilized the concept of maslahah in a different manner by 
rejecting his predecessors’ method. He acknowledged maslahah as an independent 
criterion in deriving rulings rather than as a part of legal analogy. He defended a theory 
in which bringing maslahah or averting harm equalized with the purpose of law. 
Therefore, a ruling that attains maslahah or avoids harm should take precedence over a 
contradictory ruling; even if this ruling is based on the scripture. However, he excluded 
acts of worship from this method. The last model of maslahah is represented by Maliki 
jurist Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Musa al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388), who argued that bringing 
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maslahah and avoiding harm at the level of necessities (dharuriyah), conveniences 
(hajiyah), and embellishment (tahsiniyah) is a universal source of the law. This implies 
that maslahah could be employed in a situation where it does not have any textual 
evidence based on the suitability of maslahah with the law. As a result of acceptance of 
maslahah as a universal source, al-Shaitibi prioritises the maslahah unless there is a 
contradiction with the epistemological sources of Islam, namely the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. Therefore, by limiting the domain of maslahah, he followed a different method 
as compared to al-Tufi (Opwis, 2005). As it is clear from the historical trajectory of 
maslahah, although its utilisation has been expanded throughout time, it is bounded by 
the scriptural text with the exception of al-Tufi. However, this exception, in modern 
period, started to become the norm in the process of seeking response to the emerging 
problems of the Muslim societies in modern period. 
4.3.3.2. Maslahah in modern period 
With the birth of the modernity, offering solutions within one school of thought became 
inadequate to respond social change. Consequently, jurists have started to issue rulings 
for new cases based on different schools of thoughts and, sometime combining different 
school of thought in one ruling. As a method, this is called talfiq and is devoid of a 
consistent internal methodology to issue a fatwa or ruling, and, it is employed to 
respond to an emerging case (when the need arises) in the sphere of Islamic law based 
on various schools of thoughts. Although utilisation of talfiq is not unique to the modern 
period (Ibrahim, 2015), we can claim that it is the abundant usage of this technique that 
separates it from the pre-modern period. However, even this method became 
insufficient to answer the emerging conflicts between the modern social formation and 
demands of modern values and Islamic law. In responding to this, some ulema argued 
that since the traditional legal system not efficiently responding to the demand of the 
modern period, they proposed reform in legal theory, and procured a new method to 
handle arising problems of modernity, namely maslahah or public interest (Hallaq, 
1999). 
Hallaq (1999) categorizes main reformist movements into two groups: ‘religious 
utilitarianism’ and ‘religious liberalism’. Both reformist groups aim to restructure legal 
theory in order to respond to the needs of modern world and changing society in the 
limits of basic values of Islam. However, they use substantially different methods. The 
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religious utilitarian, as argued by Hallaq (1999), employs public interest (maslahah) 
and expand its limits to the point that maslahah occupies a central position in their legal 
theory. They considerably manipulated the concept of maslahah to fit into the modern 
period. On the other hand, the religious liberalists dispose of the principles of the 
traditional legal theory and propose a new hermeneutic to adopt modern world (Hallaq, 
1999). For the present study, we are only concerned with the first group of reformist 
movement, namely religious utilitarianism4.  
Muhammad Abduh (1849 – 11 July 1905), being the first religious reformer in the 
modern period in the Muslim world, may be considered as the founding father of both 
reformist groups. Among the religious utilitarianists, Rashid Rida (1865-22 August 
1935) is the first follower of Muhammad Abduh. The theory of maslaha developed by 
al-Tufi (1271-1316) and al-Shatibi (1320-1388) constitutes the core of Rida’s doctrine. 
He totally rejects the traditional legal theory and adhere to the concepts of necessity 
and interest which traditionally has a limited use. In his legal theory, human need, 
interest and necessity have priority over any revealed text in case of a contradiction 
(Hallaq, 1999: 219). Following Rida, many jurists advocated the priority of maslahah 
in legal theory, ‘Abd al-Wahhab Khallif, ‘Allal al-Fasi, Hasan Turabi to name a few. In 
these reformist movements, particularly al-Tufi’s effect can easily be noticed. In 
classical period, jurist used maslahah principle in the boundaries of the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah with the exception of al-Tufi. In contradiction, modern times witnessed a 
paradigm shift; instead of mainstream understanding of maslahah principle some 
modern jurists interpret maslahah in a Tufian manner.  
We may argue that popularity of al-Tufi’s ideas regarding maslahah in modern period 
is due to the publication of Jamaleddin al-Qasimi (1866-1914), namely Majmu’ Resail 
fi Usulil Fiqh (1906). In the very same year, Rashid Reza, another reformist jurist, used 
his journal, al-Manar, as a medium to disseminate opinion of al-Tufi with the help of 
al-Qasimi’s footnotes (Kayadibi, 2007). Reintroduction of Tufi’s approach to the 
maslahah by these reformist scholars led to the birth of a new method for the solution 
of modern problems, which became popular during last decades, particularly in the area 
of Islamic finance. This method is employed to respond to the modern problems of 
Muslim individuals, which none of the schools of thoughts issued a fatwa as a practical 
                                                 
4 For a detailed study of religious utilitarianism and religious liberalism, see: Hallaq (1997:214 -253). 
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solution. The most important feature of this method is that it can be contrary to the 
verses of the Qur’an or the hadith, sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Nonetheless, as 
long as jurists consider this solution as ‘maslahah’ for public, it is considered as a valid 
ruling. Following Ramadan al-Bouti (2005: 208), we may call this kind of maslahah as 
delusional maslahah (maslahah mutawahham) due to its contradictions with the verses 
of the Qur’an or the hadith. Some jurists have utilised delusional maslahah in case of 
a necessity, which requires extraordinary precautions to ensure the so-called benefits of 
people where these precautions cannot be extracted from the two main sources, namely 
the Quran and Sunnah. We can easily notice the effects of this in the religo-legal 
interpretation of Islamic norms in relation to Islamic banking.  
Based on the discussion presented, this study argues that ruling on permissibility of 
organised tawarruq ruled by some Shari’ah scholars in the field of Islamic banking is 
on the basis of ‘delusional maslahah’, since according to the ruling of ICFA and 
AAOIFI, it contradicts with the scriptural sources. Nevertheless, in a Tufian manner, 
despite such conflict, some Shari’ah scholars approved its everyday implementation, 
even defended it as an efficient tool. In order to substantiate our claim that organised 
tawarruq is justified on the ground of delusional maslahah rather than a legitimate 
maslahah according to the Shari’ah, in the following sections, we present the ruling of 
ICFA, AAOIFI and members of SBs and we will, then, assess the rulings. 
4.3.3.3. Ruling of ICFA and AAOIFI on organized tawarruq 
In responding to the controversial nature of tawarruq, ICFA in Mecca in its 19th Circle 
in 2009 ruled that the new form of tawarruq, namely the organized tawarruq, is 
prohibited unlike traditional form, which is called classical tawarruq and ruled as 
permissible in 1998, in the 15th Circle. Khan (2009) suggests that although AAOIFI’s 
Shari’ah Standard 30 on tawarruq may lead to impression that it is allowed to use 
tawarruq as an instrument in Islamic banking, by imposing strict conditions, it comes 
to same conclusion with ICFA. While ICFA specifies what cannot be done, AAOIFI’s 
Shari’ah Standard 30 states what ‘should’ be done in order to use it as a financing 
method. Hence, both judgement complement each other, rather than contradicting.  
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In ‘The Resolution of the Islamic Fiqh Academy Regarding Tawarruq as It Is Currently 
Being Practiced by Banks’, jurists at the ICFA stated the following three reasons for 
prohibition (Al-Suwailem, 2009): 
(i) The commitment of proxy to sell the commodity to another buyer makes this 
instrument similar to ‘inah transaction which prohibited; 
(ii) In practice, the violation of fulfilment of ownership transfer leads to invalid sale 
transactions since one cannot sell a commodity without taking the possession of 
that commodity first according to Islamic law; 
(iii) As it is discussed earlier, organised tawarruq is missing important 
characteristics of classical tawarruq which was ruled as permissible by ICFA. 
Especially, while classical tawarruq involves real market transaction whose 
outcome is not predetermined, in organised tawarruq, it is ‘organised’ by 
Islamic bank to have a predetermined outcome which is certain.  
As it is stated in this rationale for the prohibition of organised tawarruq, this engineered 
and constructed instrument is considered similar to the already prohibited instruments 
by fiqh. Furthermore, it directly contradicts with the principles of Islamic law and its 
end goal since it is quite similar to the interest-based loan transactions of conventional 
banks. Nevertheless, there are Shari’ah scholars who strive to justify organised 
tawarruq despite such essential concerns.  
4.3.3.4. Rulings of SB members on organized tawarruq 
ICFA’s ruling on prohibition of organized tawarruq has deeply affected Islamic 
financial industry, which was aiming to expand the use of this facilitatory financial 
instrument. As a response to prohibition of organized tawarruq by ICFA, as reported 
by Khnifer (2010), a group of Shari’ah Board members stood up and rejected 
prohibition, as they appealed to the principle of (delusional) maslahah to legitimise the 
use of organised tawarruq. They advocated utilisation of organised tawarruq due to its 
position of providing short-term liquidity as a backbone of the Islamic financial 
institutions, and suggested that it should be permissible based on social usefulness or 
social needs of the ummah (Khnifer, 2010). In an interview with Reuters (Islamic 
Finance Resource, 2009), one of the leading Shari’ah scholars defended the use of 
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organised tawarruq on the basis of lower transaction costs, as he argued that carrying 
out the process of selling the assets through a bank helps to minimise the transaction 
cost. He also stated that “How can Sharia allow something which is burdensome on a 
person … and not allow something which is organised and well done, and this man who 
is in dire need for cash will not suffer a lot”. On the other hand, due to the controversial 
nature of organised tawarruq, some Islamic banks started to avoid organised tawarruq 
in countries such as Saudi Arabia (Parker, 2009) or using it without advertising, while 
Malaysia has not shunned away from extensively using it. 
4.3.3.5. Assessment of the ruling 
As explained, ICFA ruled the prohibition of organized tawarruq in 2009. However, 
instead of disallowing it directly, AAOIFI set stringent conditions for tawarruq, which 
must be fulfilled by the Islamic banks to be accounted as permissible. As Khan (2009) 
argues, in practice, some of these standards (such as articles 4/5, 4/7, 4/8, 4/9 and 4/10 
of Standard 30) are not fulfilled by Islamic banks, which make organised tawarruq as 
it is implemented in practice impermissible.  
Islamic banks are, in essence, capable of conducting a particular type of tawarruq, 
which complies with all the conditions of AAOIFI, but it would be unfeasible for the 
Islamic banks to utilise such an instrument due to the inefficiency of the instrument 
stemming from the increased transaction costs. At this point, some Shari’ah board 
members appealed to maslahah principle and defend the position that lower transaction 
cost and efficiency by means of organised tawarruq should be considered as a maslahah 
or public good despite the fact that there are other alternatives of organised tawarruq 
which fit all the conditions of AAOIFI and are not announced impermissible by ICFA, 
albeit not as efficient as organised tawarruq and riskier, such as salam (Khan 2009). It 
should be noted that salam is a contract in which the payment of the money is made in 
advance and the products are delivered in a later date according to certain conditions. 
We can easily trace the effect of this way of reasoning in other instruments of Islamic 
banking sector as well. Since hegemonic nature of the capitalist economy favours the 
risk-free instruments, such as interest-based loan, it enforces Islamic banks to employ 
instruments which are the least risky. If the least risky instruments cannot be engineered 
within the boundaries of Shari’ah, delusional maslahah becomes instrumental in 
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constructing instruments with such features. This implies that engineering for such a 
low risk instrument is not due to the absence of other alternatives, but rather capitalist 
economic system rules out other alternatives to be utilised due to its efficiency paradigm 
and enforces Islamic banks and Shari’ah scholars to engineer products, which fit to the 
nature of the capitalism. In substantiating its hegemonic nature in not allowing any 
other practice beyond its own in the economic and financial sphere, it subjugates its 
own operational system on the Shari’ah-determined Islamic financial instruments 
whereby ‘new forms’ of Islamic financial instruments are generated.  
Since financial function of organized tawarruq is similar to interest-based borrowing 
transaction (Siddiqi, 2006), which is the corner stone of capitalist economic system, 
Islamic banks, under financial pressure and competition, feel that they have to utilise 
organised tawarruq. As a consequence, in responding to the ‘needs’ of Islamic banks, 
as a facilitation function, Shari’ah scholars feel obliged to announce it legitimate based 
on maslahah even if it is not in the boundaries of Islamic law. Thus, the sources of the 
motivation to use organised tawarruq are necessitated by the capitalist operation of the 
system rather than an Islamic moral economy which essentialises asset-based financing 
or embeddedness. Therefore, we argue that Shari’ah scholars’ justification for 
organized tawarruq through maslahah principle suggesting that it is for public good 
due to the low transaction cost is an example of ‘delusional maslahah’ and hence devoid 
of Islamic norms on the matter. 
As a result, Shari’ah scholars managed to keep ‘Islamic’ identity of Islamic banks 
through such controversial methods despite mimicking conventional banking sector. 
Resulting outcome is a recognisable ‘other’. However, “mimicry is at once resemblance 
and menace” (Bhabha, 1994: 86). This recognizable ‘other’, therefore, also constitute a 
threat for the conventional banking sector since customers of Islamic banks have started 
to enjoy similar conditions with conventional banks and privilege of using Shari’ah 
compliant instruments. Therefore, this mimicry has become a ‘menace’ for 
conventional banking too, since its customers may be attracted by this excess, namely 
being Shari’ah compliant.  
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4.4. REVERSE MIMICRY: CONVENTIONAL BANKING ADOPTING 
ISLAMIC FINANCE OPERATIONS 
Mimicry of Islamic banks to the conventional banking sector produced a recognisable 
‘other’, as we discussed in the previous sections, which resulted in both ‘resemblance’ 
and ‘menace’. This menace led conventional financial institutions to a new state. In this 
new state, conventional banking started copying Islamic banking structures and 
instruments, especially Shari’ah board unit, and adopted it to its modern framework 
through establishing Islamic windows. Resulting outcome has been a banking 
institution which is established in a modern framework and shaped by positivist 
ontology, and at the same time, through a window acts according to Islamic law and is 
bound by Shari’ah scholars’ rulings to meet the requirements of Islamic finance 
principles instead of insisting on ‘enlightenment’s reason’ for window operations. In 
other words, the pragmatist expansion of the legal sphere of rational law in the secular 
systems developed an inclusionary strategy (as opposed to earlier modernity position) 
in the form of co-optation by providing the re-interpretation of Islam in a rational 
manner by adopting the norms of non-modern reality of Islam generating multiple 
modernities. 
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Figure 4.3, hence, depicts the process of reverse mimicking of conventional banks. As 
can be seen, Islamic banking structure, which has emerged as a result of a negotiation 
process between the positivist ontology and Islamic principles, is reproduced within the 
non-Muslim legal system (such as European legal system) through co-opting fiqh 
process. Resulting outcome is another hybrid institution which aims at benefiting from 
the ‘excess’ of the recognisable ‘other’, namely Islamic banks.  
The conventional banks with Islamic windows, hence, through inclusion of Shari’ah 
compliant products and services within the non-Muslim legal system strive to eliminate 
the thread emerging from the recognisable ‘other’. Through co-optation process, 
Shari’ah complaint financing is made available in a structure (namely, conventional 
banking), which is a product of an institutional logic derived from Enlightenment’s 
positivist notion of rationality and operating on neo-classical notion of efficiency 
resulting into reverse mimicry with additional transaction costs. This is due to the fact 
that initial conventional product is Islamised through Shari’ah compliancy in a 
‘mimicking’ process with ‘excess’ in the form of additional transaction costs while the 
converted or mimicked product is co-opted in the initial setting namely in the 
conventional banks through reverse mimicry whereby a circle is completed. 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter explores the emergence and development of Islamic banking sector within 
postcolonial discourse with the objective of explaining the reasons of the observed 
convergence of Islamic banking with the conventional banking through negotiating the 
nature of its operations.  
In doing so, this paper explored the progress of Islamic banks in three stages. First stage 
is composed of emergence of Islamic banking sector as a hybrid institution with the 
objective of offering an alternative banking sector to conventional banking through 
prioritising profit-loss sharing instruments and adhering to Islamic principles. We 
consider such institution as hybrid, since it is an outcome of a negotiation process 
between a modern institution, namely European saving bank and Islamic principles. 
However, the consequence of Islamic banking sector as a hybrid institution - rather than 
an authentic institution based on ontological and epistemological sources of Islam – 
results in “renounce[ing] the dream of ambition of rediscovering any kind of ‘lost’ 
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cultural purity” (Hall et al., 1992: 310) implying that the divergence or ‘losing its 
cultural purity’ between the realities of Islamic finance and the aspiration of Islamic 
moral economy will prevent the emergence of its authentic and aspired form in the 
future. 
As an outcome of losing the imagination of constructing Islamic financial institutions 
based on aspirations of Islamic economics and entering into competition with 
conventional banks at the global scale, Islamic banking sector entered into second stage. 
In this stage, we observe a hegemonic relationship between underlying principles of 
conventional banking sector and Islamic banking sector due to the competition in which 
hegemony of capitalist principles in market system suppressed Islamic principles to the 
extent that Islamic banks started to adhere the form of Islamic law mostly rather than 
aiming to fulfil the objectives of Shari’ah. A clear mimicry of conventional banks is 
evident at this stage. However, “mimicry repeats rather than re-present” (Bhabha, 1994: 
88), but representation is what Islamic banks should do in fulfilling the objectives of 
Shari’ah, not repeating. Resulting outcome is, therefore, a recognisable ‘other’ due to 
the convergence of Islamic banks towards conventional banks. However, it also means 
the loss of authentic identity and hope for an alternative sector.  
In the third and last stage, we witness a reverse mimicry. Due to the ‘menace’, as a 
result of the first mimicry, conventional banks were afraid of losing their existing 
customers to the recognisable ‘other’ since these Islamic banks could provide almost 
everything conventional banks can do with an excess, namely Shari’ah compliancy of 
the operations. In this stage, therefore, we observe another hybrid institution which aims 
to benefit from the ‘excess’ of the recognisable ‘other’. The outcome of this reverse 
mimicry is, therefore, a banking institution with an Islamic window which is shaped by 
positivist ontology, and at the same time is bound by Shari’ah scholars’ rulings. 
As the discussion so far indicates, both Islamic banking and conventional banking has 
utilised a pragmatist approach to be successful in their respective sectors. Although 
such an approach might bring growth in Islamic banking sector, it lacks the adherence 
to the initial goals of Islamic economics and finance which aimed at establishing an 
alternative sector based on Islamic ontological and epistemological sources within 
financial system rather than just mimicking the conventional sector. In this regard, 
unexpected high growth rate of Islamic banking sector during the last decades cannot 
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justify the convergence towards conventional banking sector. However, indications 
demonstrate that there is not a real search or movement for other forms of banking in 
compliance with Islamic substantive morality beyond ‘lamenting’ as many papers have 
done.   
It is expected that Shari’ah scholars serving in the SBs of IBs should be able to hinder 
the convergence, as they ensure the Shari’ah compliancy, yet the reality proves 
otherwise. In order to reveal the reasons behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars 
to prevent the observed convergence, in the next two chapters, we investigate the role 
and status of Shari’ah scholars in the society through exploring the ifta institution in its 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 3, we explored and examined the level of disclosure by Shari’ah Boards 
(SBs) in their annual reports, or SAR, and factors affecting it. The analysis revealed 
that the level of disclosure in detailed aspects of Shari’ah compliancy is limited in 
comparison to AAOIFI based expectations. Although level of disclosure increases when 
we limit our disclosure index to AAOIFI guidelines for SAR, the expected information 
according to these guidelines are mostly general statements claiming only that 
‘everything is according to Shari’ah’ without further justification. SB members, 
therefore, expect from stakeholders to trust in their monitoring, controlling and 
supervision processes in relation to the Shari’ah compliancy without disclosing the 
details of these processes.  
We can, hence, argue that legitimacy of products and services provided by an IB in the 
eyes of stakeholders is not achieved through detailed disclosure to prove Shari’ah 
compliancy of IB, but rather achieved through a general consent of SB members on 
Shari’ah compliancy of operations in IB, as somehow stakeholders do not have much 
expectations in terms of detailed disclosure beyond trust. We can even claim that by 
mere existence of a SB division in an IB could be enough to substantiate ‘Islamicity’ of 
IB since most of the stakeholder might not bother to read Shariah annual reports. It 
seems that IB stakeholders being “socially and politically conservative, seeking 
individual piety and social mores built around traditionalist compliance with fiqh, and 
looks to social and political improvements mainly as a result of that” (Vogel and Hayes 
1998: 27, footnote), they leave everything to the presence of a SB in expressing their 
trust in the operations of IBs. In other words, it seems that existence of a SB and/or 
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their general approval for Shari’ah compliancy is sufficient condition for being 
considered as an ‘Islamic’ institution in the eyes of stakeholders.  
Indeed, considering the fact that a jurist-consult or mufti extracts his ruling by 
interpreting the religious text and, therefore, his ruling has the effect of a direct 
authorisation, such position of stakeholders is not unusual in the historical context of 
ifta institution. However, it is important to note that the role and status of a mufti as an 
individual in pre-modern context are different than the role and status of SB as a 
division in IBs. Hence, approaching to ifta institution (institution of act of giving fatwa 
or legal opinion) in a de-historicised manner would lead to miscontextualise the role 
and status of members of the SB in modern IB sector (Caeiro, 2006).  
In order to explore such transformation within ifta institution, this chapter aims to 
critically explore the emergence of ifta institution in Muslim societies with the intention 
of tracing back the historical roots of SB division of IBs to reveal the transformation it 
has been through since the pre-modern period by particularly emphasising the role and 
status of muftis (jurist-consults) as part of the governance structure in the society and 
as a source of legitimacy for elite-ruling class. By revealing such transformation points, 
we aim to show the reasons behind the failure of Shari’ah scholars in SBs to prevent 
the convergence of IBs towards conventional banks and to fulfil the objectives of 
Shari’ah in these IBs. 
In this chapter, we explore the role and status of jurist-consults within the pre-modern 
context, particularly first five centuries after the emergence of Islam. Since being a 
jurist-consult, by definition requires a deep knowledge of Shari’ah as a requirement of 
being a mujtahid, we do not discuss these scholars’ knowledge of Shari’ah. Our focus 
of attention, hence, is to explore the embeddedness of jurist-consults into the society 
during pre-modern period and outcome of such embeddedness in terms of their role and 
status in the society and influence of this embeddedness on legal rulings. In the 
following sections, therefore, we will discuss embeddedness as a concept and critically 
evaluate the consequences of the embeddedness of jurist-consults in the legal sphere. 
Then, we will analyse how embeddedness as a process elevated the positions of jurist-
consult as civil leaders in the society and bestowed upon them a negotiation power with 
the ruling authority. 
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5.2. IFTA INSTITUTION AND ITS OPERATION: CONCEPTUAL 
DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY 
Ifta denotes clarifying God’s law for a problematic legal case (nawazil) based on some 
textual legal evidence (Al-Ashqar, 1976: 9). Issuer of a fatwa, or legal opinion. namely 
mufti, derives the source of opinion in forming fatwa from the major source of law in 
Islam: (i) Qur’an and (ii) the Sunnah, namely Prophet Muhammad’s traditions, sayings, 
actions and tacit approvals, and (iii) through consensus (ijma), namely agreement of the 
creative jurists, the mujtahits on a legal matter as well as (iv) utilising legal reasoning 
or qiyas (Hallaq, 1999). Other methods of deriving a ruling includes istihsan (juristic 
preference), istislah (public interest), istishab (presumption of continuity), and ‘urf 
(customary precedent) (Abdalla, 2011). 
As it is defined by prominent scholars of Islam such as Imam Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi 
al-Maliki (1228-1285) and al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292-1350), a mufti is analogous 
to that of a translator of the speech of God or is one who essentially signs on behalf of 
God (Al-Ashqar. 1976: 18). However, it is important to note that rulings of a mufti, 
namely his fatwa is not binding in itself and mustefti (the one who seeks fatwa) is free 
to reject a particular fatwa and favouring another fatwa issued by a qualified mufti 
(Masud et al., 1996). Ifta as an institution, therefore, is directly related to the mufti, 
mustefti (the one who seeks fatwa) and decision process of the mufti. 
We can trace the history of ifta institution back to Prophet Muhammad, as he was being 
the first mufti (Hallaq, 1999). In addition, historical records suggest that His 
companions and disciples had also issued fatwas in his lifetime and later (Nurbain, 
1996). During the sultanate period in Islam, namely after the rightly guided caliphs’ 
period5, ifta institution became more institutionalised having muftis as legal consultants 
for legal officers such as judges and governors ( Masud et al., 1996, 9), while Abbasid 
caliphs tried to exploit this institutionalisation to control muftis which was unsuccessful 
thanks to the resistance of independent muftis (Abdalla, 2011). 
                                                 
5 The Rightly Guided Caliphs were first four immediate successors of Prophet Mohammad, namely Abu 
Bakr (632–634 AD), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644 AD), Uthman ibn Affan (644–656 AD) and Ali ibn 
Abi Talib (656–661 AD). 
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It is important to note that ifta institution emerged as a civil society based movement 
responding to everyday questions of people by ulema (Islamic scholars), as learnt 
scholars with deep understanding and knowledge in Shari’ah, especially where an 
‘intimate familiarity’ with everydayness of life was desired (Crone, 2004: 43). 
Such intimate relationship with the everyday people along with immersed knowledge 
of Shari’ah helped these scholars to understand everyday practice of life. However, it 
“is the degree of perfection of his way of life” which bring him “reputation” (Winter, 
2009: 21) to be a respected scholar. Moreover, they were independent from the 
governance structures of ruling authority (Goitein, 1960; Cohen, 1970), which is also 
an essential feature for acting as a bridge between the ruler and the ruled as a 
representative of the ruled against the ruler (Hallaq, 2005).   
In evidencing the independence of the Shari’ah scholars, historical account identifies 
that the past Shari’ah scholars were mostly ‘private scholars’ in the sense of being 
independent who sustained themselves through trade or other means of income 
generation instead of working for and/or under the rulers and the ruling class (Cohen, 
1970; Hallaq, 2005; Bligh-Abramski, 1992). These Shari’ah scholars “were not a 
distinct class, but a category of persons overlapping other classes and social divisions 
permeating the whole society” (Lapidus, 1984: 108). However, in the pursuit of 
legitimacy, governments of dynasties such as Umayyad and Abbasids strove to co-opt 
them within the legal system, or to negotiate with them as civil leaders of the society to 
attain legitimacy through their approval to strengthen their authority (Tsafrir, 1998; 
Bligh-Abramski, 1992).  
This need for legitimacy of governments arose as a result of paradigm shift in the 
political authority in the post-rightly guided khalifah period; as during the rightly 
guided khalifah period, there was no barrier between the ruling authority and everyday 
Muslims due to the fact that ruling authority was directly embedded in the everyday life 
of the people. In addition, khalifah in the period in question were also considered as 
authority in legal matters. However, in the sultanate period, a ruling class was formed 
which led to the separation of ruling authority and the rest of the people. Hallaq (2005: 
180) explains this paradigm shift in stating that:  
Whereas the caliph ‘Umar I, for instance, led a life that many Arabs of his social class 
enjoyed, and mixed with his fellow believers as one of them, Umayyad caliphs lived in 
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palaces, wielded coercive powers, and gradually but increasingly distanced themselves 
from the people they ruled. 
We can term this paradigm shift as ‘lack of embeddedness into the society’ after the 
rightly guided khalifah period ended, whereas ‘Umar the First had known the Muslim 
society and its members through living among them and Muslims knew him as well 
implying that the ‘governance system’ had been ‘an organic entity’. This direct 
embeddedness had changed during the ‘sultanate state’ first emerged with the Umayyad 
dynasty resulting into a gap that had emerged between the Umayyad caliphs and people 
they ruled. This gap or disembeddedness had been maintained by the following 
dynasties proceeding the Umayyad period; and, hence, the emerged governance system 
in disconnectedness with people had shaped the political culture and administrative 
practice. Since, “it was one of the salient features of the pre-modem Islamic body-
politic that it lacked systematic control over the infrastructures of the civil populations 
it ruled” and, as a result of such gap between ruler and ruled, “the government was in 
dire need of legitimization which they found in the circles of the legal profession” 
(Hallaq, 2009: 130). With the help of ulema who directly or indirectly approved the 
government, ruling class could attain – and indeed attained – legitimacy in the eyes of 
people, which helped a sustained authority whereby Shari’ah scholarship became 
instrumental within the administrative structure (Hallaq, 2009). However, thanks to the 
power of legists attained by the support of people and their independence, rulers could 
not interfere with legal rulings (with some exceptions which strictly protested by 
Shari’ah scholars) (Hallaq, 2005). This relationship lasted in many dynasties, which 
had been ruled by Shari’ah-based law until the emergence of modernity and adoption 
of Western secular law system instead of Shari’ah.  
After the emergence of modernity, majority of ulama continued as private scholars 
similar to the early periods of Islamic law, since there was no necessity for legitimacy 
of Shari’ah anymore in newly constructed secular nation-states, even, in specific cases 
such as Turkey and some of the North African countries, inclusion of ulema into the 
state-related matters was avoided, as society and politics in these countries were shaped 
in line with French modernism project since the late 19th century (Daver, 1988; Ruedy, 
1996) and “the elimination of Islamic sources of power and legitimacy was seen as 
essential for strengthening political authority” of secular nation-state (Azak, 2010: 9). 
142 
 
The following section hence focuses on the nature of embeddedness. In order to 
substantiate embeddedness of these scholars and how it influenced their legal and non-
legal affairs, we first explain the concept of embeddedness and explore the nature of 
jurist-consults’ embeddedness. Then, we show how such embeddedness influenced 
their evaluation of judicial cases. In order to substantiate this point, books of legal 
opinion of jurists-consults are examined with the intention of revealing how these 
scholars; (i) incorporated the realities of society into the decision process of law 
making; (ii) used legal tools to find a solution/cure for the emerging problems; (iii) and 
considered the outcomes of their rulings for the society before issuing any legal 
decision. After investigating the embeddedness of these prominent scholars in the early 
period of Islam and its impact on legal process, we explore the relationship between 
ruling authority and scholars and ruling class’ strive for legitimacy through these 
scholars 
5.3. EMBEDDEDNESS AS A CONCEPT  
Following Polanyi’s seminal work, The Great Transformation (GT) (1957), 
embeddedness as a concept became popular, especially in economic sociology, despite 
the fact that the term was not at the centre of his book (Beckert, 2007). Due to the 
ambiguities of the concept with its usage in GT, several research strands in explaining 
modern capitalism appeared in the literature in relation to embeddedness, such as 
‘always embedded markets’, ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘entanglement’, referring to 
different levels and natures of embeddedness (Krippner and Alvarez, 2007). In 
reflecting on the emergence and transformation of embeddedness, Granovetter’s (1985) 
critics of ‘undersociolised view of neoclassical economics’, and ‘oversociolised view 
of Parsonian sociologists’ towards individual, resulted in a different meaning of 
embeddedness, as Granovetter (1985) re-defined embeddedness as a structural 
relationship among networks beyond the mentioned attributes and nature. In his 
attempt, instead of adopting the macro analysis of Polanyi, Granovetter (1985) focused 
on micro and meso-level relations among organisations, and defined such relationships 
as embeddedness (Krippner and Alvarez, 2007). Although, structural embeddedness 
articulated by Granovetter has led to another research field which is mostly investigated 
through organisational relationships, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) expanded the 
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dimensions of embeddedness by suggesting three further embeddedness dimensions, 
namely political, cultural, and cognitive embeddedness. 
The similarity of all these different interpretations of embeddedness, and various 
research strands, is that they all analyse the impact of different dimensions of 
embeddedness of social actors in economic actions. In order to provide a better 
understanding, Table 5.1 summarises various dimensions of embeddedness and 
provides short definitions (Marx, 2004: 65). 
As evidenced from the definition column, studies related to embeddedness mostly focus 
on social actors and their economic action rather than using it in a wider sense, such as 
examining its impact on all actions. However, as Beckert (2003: 769) suggested, 
embeddedness “points to the indissoluble connection of the actor with his or her social 
surrounding”. Therefore, all the dimensions of embeddedness, which focus on the 
relation of social actors and economic actions, constitute one part of embeddedness, 
since the connection of actors with his/her social surrounding is not limited to an 
economic activity.  
Table 5.1: Studies on the Dimensions of Embeddedness 
Dimension Definition 
Relational  
Relational embeddedness refers to the quality of the relationship and 
highlights the effects of cohesive ties between social actors on their 
economic actions 
Structural  
Structural embeddedness captures the impact of the structure of 
relations around social actors on their economic actions 
Positional  
Positional embeddedness captures the impact of the position social 
actors occupy in the overall structure of the network on their 
economic actions  
Cognitive 
Cognitive embeddedness refers to the ways in which common mental 
models or a shared vision among social actors impact their economic 
actions 
Cultural  
Cultural embeddedness captures the impact of ideologies of markets, 
industry cultures and management logics on the actions of the social 
actors  
Political  
Political embeddedness refers to the impact of power struggles and 
sanctioning mechanisms on the economic actions of the social actors 
Source: Marx (2004:65) 
In this chapter, in order to encompass, both economic and non-economic, relationships 
between social actors and their surroundings, namely society, we prefer to use 
embeddedness in a wider meaning, and use the definition of embeddedness as Beckert 
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(2003: 769) defined: “indissoluble connection of the actor with his or her social 
surrounding”. 
Since we cannot imagine an individual who is completely isolated from his/her 
surroundings, we, therefore, cannot claim the existence of a disembedded individual. 
However, embeddedness of individuals varies across time and space, and therefore we 
can speak of degrees of embeddedness (Lillte and Leach, 1999). In other words, every 
society has its own unique social formation based on its ontological existence, which 
leads to different degrees and ways to articulate the connection of social actors with 
their surroundings. For example, in terms of Muslims and their relationships with their 
surroundings in pre-modern period, we understand that ethical principles of Islam 
encouraged individuals to have direct engagement with their surroundings as part of 
articulating religious norms in everyday practice leading to a moral economy. On the 
other hand, market societies in modern times offer a different kind of embeddedness, 
in which social actors may engage with their surroundings efficiently through markets. 
In such a facilitation, with the help of agencies of the market, manageable intermediary 
steps enabled, for example, at an expense of a fee. In this regard, following sections 
will explore relationship of Shari’ah scholars with their surroundings during the early 
periods of Islam. 
5.3.1. Embeddedness of Legists in Pre-Modern Period 
There are two major factors in embeddedness of jurist-consults into the society, namely 
environment of education and their profession after the formal period of their education. 
A salient feature of Islamic scholars in the early periods of Islam was that they received 
religious education in the institutions established by civil society6 such as circles of 
prominent scholars (such as companions of the Prophet Mohammad and those who 
came after them) at the mosques (Makdisi, 1979) without any interference of ruling 
authority. In other words, learning environment of religious knowledge was part of 
everyday life of people. Furthermore, unlike higher education in Europe, ijaza 
(certificate) system in Muslim world was completely individualistic, namely between 
master and student, hence, there was no need for a religious or governmental approval 
to earn a certificate beside the master (Makdisi, 1970). These features of education 
                                                 





enabled ulama to be submerged into the society and become independent from ruling 
authority and other elite classes which enabled them intellectual independence.  
After completing their education and obtaining ijaza, ulama, mostly, continued to be 
independent of ruling class or other elite classes financially by supporting themselves 
through various occupations. Cohen (1970) analysed the occupations of 4,200 
jurisprudents and traditionalist in the first 470 years of Islam. Based on his extensive 
research through biographies and other literature sources, he concluded that Muslim 
scholars in the first five centuries came from all layers of the society whereas majority 
was merchants and craftsmen. He further suggested that dynamic structure of Islamic 
law stems from such a proliferated and embedded relationship of Muslim scholars and 
society instead of emanating from a particular stratum of the society. The findings of 
Cohen’s (1970) study implies that jurist-consults’ direct relationship with society 
continued after their formal education through their professions to support themselves 
along with their role as Islamic scholars. Furthermore, having state-independent income 
for living expenses provided financial independence for those scholars, which, along 
with intellectual independence, is an important factor to resist any dominancy from the 
rulers and ruling class and strengthening their negotiation power against them. Such 
independence is an articulation of ikhtiyar or free-will axiom as explained in Chapter 2 
which is crucial in realising the objectives of Shari’ah in the society. 
However, with the establishment of Nizamiya Madrasa (Nizamiya School) in 11th 
century at the time of Seljuqs, religious educational institutions delved into close 
relationship with rulers (Levy, 1928). Especially during the Ottoman period, madrasa 
system followed a specific curriculum and mainly educated people with the intention 
of graduating qualified people to employ in governmental structure after the 16 th 
century (Atçil, 2010). These transformational changes, eventually, led to decrease in 
intellectual and financial independence of scholars. It is important to note that although 
majority of scholars had an embedded relationship with the society due to the 
aforementioned reasons during and after their education, this study does not generalise 
embeddedness of ulama to encompass all of them, neither does it argue that 
embeddedness of each ulama articulated in their legal rulings in a similar manner. As 
considering broad range of time period and geographies Muslims have been residing, 
such claim would be impossible. Zahiris, a historical school of Islamic thought, for 
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example, represented an extreme point, which deviated from the mainstream legal 
tradition by rejecting the principle of analogy (Makdisi, 1979) by “advocacy of literal 
meaning” (Melchert, 1997, 4:179). In addition, scholars such as al-Tufi at another 
extreme, who, in some cases, nullified the scriptural texts to prioritise maslahah of the 
people (Kayadibi, 2007). These two positions indicate a wide range of diversified legal 
opinions in the history of Islamic legal tradition during pre-modern period.  
We can, however, argue that majority of the jurist-consults, or muftis especially who 
succeed to be a civil leader in their local community, managed to keep their relationship 
with the society in an embedded manner and such embeddedness were reflected in their 
legal and non-legal affairs. Indeed, disappearance of Zahiri school of thought 
(Melchert, 1997) and absence of the followers of Tufian maslahah approach until the 
modern times (Opwis, 2005) suggest that these school of thoughts did not represent the 
mainstream approach of ulama and did not find a room in the society.  
5.4. IMPACT OF EMBEDDEDNESS ON LEGAL SPHERE 
Embeddedness of jurist-consults influences their decision-making process in issuing a 
fatwa (legal ruling). Having an embedded relationship might result in fatwas with three 
important features:  
(i) integration of realities of the sphere being embedded into decision process 
(integration),  
(ii) responding to the problems of the sphere with a solution within the boundaries of 
Islamic law (solution), and  
(iii) consideration of the short-term and long-term outcomes of the fatwas in the 
decision process (anticipation).  
As a result, along with ‘form’, an embedded jurist-consult considers the ‘substance’ as 
well and uses available sources in legal theory such as custom (‘urf), juristic preference 
(istihsan), preventing the harm (sedd-i zera’i), legal devices and public interest 
(maslahah) to achieve the most suitable outcomes.7  
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, since not every jurist-consult is equipped with such a perspective and ability, there are 
differences in the ruling and impact on the society. 
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In this section, hence, we present three areas of articulation of embeddedness of jurist-
consults into the society in legal sphere: 
(i) integration of realities of the society into decision process;  
(ii) responding to the problems of the society with a solution within the boundaries of 
Islamic law;  
(iii) consideration of the short-term and long-term outcomes of the fatwas for the 
society in the decision process. 
These are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
5.4.1. Integration of Realities of the Society into Decision Process 
Udovitch (1970) surveyed the Islamic law books in Hanefite school of thought to show 
that Islamic law or fiqh is not a theoretical branch of science which does not consider 
the everyday practice of people. On the contrary, he claims, it was shaped by the 
practice of people in the society. Islamic law, therefore, is not a theoretical intellectual 
product with a solid basis. However, jurist-consults or muftis emerged from the society, 
were trained within the society and had professions as any individual in the society 
which helped them to have strong ties with various strata of local community. One of 
the articulations of such a relationship is to issue fatwas (legal rulings) in accordance 
with the realities of the society. Actually, without making reference to the everyday 
practice of people, namely custom as one of the sources in ijtihad, it is impossible to 
provide a dynamic Islamic law, which could be implemented through centuries and in 
vast geographies (Shabana, 2010).  
It is important to note that ‘man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social 
relationships’ according to historical and anthropological researches (Polanyi, 1957: 
46), which makes economic activities such as partnerships as part of the everyday 
practice of people. In order to show that jurist-consults in pre-modern context had 
knowledge of different spheres of everyday practice of people such as establishing 
partnerships and other affairs of individuals, we utilise the following example of 
validation of partnership agreement between a craftsman and a stall-owner through 
utilisation of juristic preference (istihsan) due to the continuous use of such partnership 
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agreements among the people without any disapproval in the Muslim societies 
(Udovitch, 1970). However, according to analogy (qiyas) as a method, such agreement 
should have been ruled as invalid. The nature and content of this contract is as follows: 
“A stall- owner offers the use of his stall to an artisan on the condition that the latter do 
all the work while sharing his profits equally with the stall-owner” (Udovitch, 1970: 
117). Furthermore, Udovitch (1970: 117) lists the reasons why such a partnership could 
not be ruled as valid according to the analogy:  
By analogy, this arrangement should be invalid on a number of grounds. The investment 
of the stall-owner consists of intangible property (viz., the use of his stall), and 
intangible property by itself is not suitable for investment in a partnership. The 
arrangement cannot be valid as a hire contract, since the sum that would correspond to 
the wage — not specified. Nor could it qualify as a valid lease contract, since the sum 
that would correspond to the rent is also unknown. In spite of the considerable 
theoretical objections to its practice this particular from of partnership nevertheless 
declared valid by the Hanafite jurists. 
Explanation of reasons of utilization of juristic preference in this ruling is also important 
for us to demonstrate how jurists evaluate cases, and consider the custom in the process 
as well as consequences of the fatwa in the society (Udovitch, 1970: 117–18): 
By exercising juristic preference (istihsan), he [i.e.,Shaibani] permitted this 
arrangement because of its continuous use in the affairs of men without any 
disapproving voice being raised against it. Objecting to transactions which are in 
common use among the people is in itself a type offense. In order to avoid this offense, 
this contract is permissible. For there is no explicit text nullifying it, and the people 
have a need for this contract. For example, if an artisan arrives in a certain town, its 
inhabitants would not know him and would not entrust him with their merchandise. 
They would, however, entrust their merchandise to the stall-owner, whom they do 
know. As a rule, the stall-owner would not gratuitously provide the likes of this service 
to the artisan. The validation of this contract achieves the desired ends of all parties 
concerned. The artisan receives compensation for his labor; the people derive the 
benefits of his services; and the stall owner receives compensation for the use of his 
stall. The contract is permissible. The stall-owner is entitled to a share of the profit 
because he has taken the artisan into his stall and given him some help with his 
merchandise. He may perhaps help in some aspect of the work, as for example, a tailor 
who accepts cloth, oversees its cutting, and then hands the material over for completion 
of the tailoring to another on the basis of half profit. For these reasons, the stall-owner 
is entitled to a share of the profit. 
Moreover, jurist-consults do not directly transfer other rulings from other places or other 
times since every place and every time has its own custom; instead they reinterpret them 
according to local practice. Hence, Islamic law may have different implementation in 
terms of ruling even within the same school of thought according to the place and time 
which provides its dynamic nature (Shabana, 2010). As the above fatwa depicts, jurists 
take the everyday practice of people into account in their rulings and even consider 
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ruling against the everyday practice as a type of offense. In literature, we can find further 
examples to substantiate this point where dynamic nature of Islamic law and the role of 
custom in Islamic law-making is discussed (Libson, 1997; Gerber, 1999; Masud, 2009; 
Shabana, 2010). Such considerations, we argue, are only possible through the 
embeddedness of jurist-consults into the society. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
note that everyday practice of people should be compatible with the core principles of 
Islamic law in order to be integrated which is why many customs were disapproved by 
jurist-consults since the time of Prophet Mohammad (El-Awa, 1973). 
5.4.2. Finding Solutions/Cures to the Emerging Problems in Everydayness 
Since being integrated into the realities of the society or embeddedness is crucial to 
attain law-making, in occasions scholars needs to appeal to legal tools such as custom 
or juristic preference in responding to a judgement for a practical issue. In other words, 
in everyday practice of people, there might be issues which could not be responded 
within the proper limits of a school of thought. In such cases, a problem arises due to 
the gap between the practice of people and the theoretical framework of law-making of 
a school of thought. In such cases, jurist-consults utilised ‘exits’ (makharij) to provide 
‘remedies for those who sought them’ which is known as legal devices (hiyal) (Horii, 
2002: 312) among other methods such as takhayyur (selection) and talfiq 
(amalgamation) (Hallaq, 2009). In this section, we provide an example to show that 
how jurist-consults find solutions to the problems of people emerging from theoretical 
framework of a school of thought and strive not to interrupt everyday practice as long 
as it does not contradict with the core values and principles of Islamic law. 
For example, as an Islamic commercial principle, sale of unripe fruit on a tree is 
impermissible due to the inherent uncertainty of such a sale contract (Hamoudi, 2008). 
Therefore, even if there is a demand for unripe fruits, such a sale transaction would be 
void. Abu Yusuf (738-798), considering such a demand, suggested a solution for this 
voidable contract within the Hanefite school of thought, one of the leading main school 
of thought. His suggested solution is to sell the immature fruits along with the leaves 
of the tree. Since the leaves are considered as good, there is no issue regarding its sale 
contract and immature fruits would be collected along with the leaves as a by-product 
process. In this example, as it can be seen, Abu Yusuf was aware of the need of the 
society and found a solution for the problem within the rules of the Hanefite school of 
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thoughts. As Ibrahim (2015) discusses in his book, Pragmatism in Islamic Law, such a 
pragmatic approach to find solutions of the problem of arising in everyday practice of 
people through legal devices or talfiq, which was not exception, unlike initial norms, 
but the general method, especially after the 11th century.  
5.4.3. Foreseeing Consequences of the Legal Rulings for the Society in 
Short-term and Long-term 
Another aspect of being embedded in the society is the estimating the consequences of 
a given fatwa for the society in the short-term and long-term in the process of ijtihad. 
In particular, two principles in the legal theory were used to justify rulings in this 
approach: maslahah (public interest) and sedd-i zera’i (preventing the harm). Although 
these two principles are interrelated since preventing harm is also for the public interest 
and acting based on public interest might prevent a potential harm for the society, in 
some cases prevention aspect overweight the public interest and vice versa. These two 
principles and other principles in the same category are utilised to follow a 
consequentialist approach in the process of ijtihad and considering macro level 
outcomes as well as micro level outcomes of a fatwa. Below are examples of such 
consequentialist approach at two different levels, namely macro (or global) and micro 
(or local) levels. 
Impermissibility of selling weapons to the enemies is an example of considering the 
outcomes at the global level. In terms of merely considering the form of such a contract, 
namely selling a permissible product to a person or company, such sale contract should 
be valid, since it does not violate any of the ‘terms’ or arkaan (sg. rokn) of the contract. 
However, based on the expected consequences of such a selling agreement, which is 
empowerment of enemy and resulting harm for Muslim population at large, Shari’ah 
scholars prohibited selling lethal weapons to the enemies (Bhala, 2011). This example 
might be considered as a prevention of a general harm from the public, in other words, 
protection of Muslims in general since the empowerment of enemies affects and 
threatens all Muslims. However, scholars have not only considered general impact of 
legal rulings on whole Muslim population but also local implications such as the 
following example.  
151 
 
Second example is about purchase of goods by traders at the outskirts of the town 
resulting in discouraging desert dwellers to reach the market, namely talaqqi al rukban 
(an exploitative commercial arbitrage) ( Khan, 1994). The local traders were motivated 
by paying less than the market value through taking advantage of the dessert dwellers’ 
lack of knowledge about the price prevailing in the market (Saleem, 2012). However, 
such a contract is prohibited by the Prophet who urged the community not to go to meet 
the caravans on the way, which is another example of the consequentialist approach 
pursued by Shari’ah scholars of the time (Saleem, 2012). In justifying the position, it 
was explained that since desert dwellers did not know the actual price prevailing in the 
market, the purchasers would take advantage of such asymmetric information by 
meeting those dessert dwellers outside of the town to buy their produce cheaper than 
market price (Saleem, 2012). Another possible reason might be to eliminate the third-
party involvement in trade, namely between the local people and desert dwellers 
(Saleem, 2012). Furthermore, this prohibition also protects other traders who decided 
to wait the arrivals of the sellers in the market (Saleem, 2012). Although, in terms of 
fulfilling ‘form’, such an agreement should be deemed as legal, however, it is prohibited 
since the resultant agreement is against maslahah of villagers and even the local people 
(Saleem, 2012). The justification of taking a decision based on maslahah in the case of 
villagers is obvious; as instead of selling at a prevailing price in the market, they had to 
sell their produce cheaper and hence they faced loss in producer’s surplus. As for the 
local people, maslahah relates to the opportunity cost for the customers created by the 
traders by denying the goods to come to market and villagers, hence, selling at a cheaper 
price to the traders, which results in loss in consumer surplus, as the villagers would 
have sold their produce in the market at the same price level or cheaper than the traders. 
In a similar way, reprehensibility of selling of grapes to wine producers to prevent a 
potential harm might also be considered under this category. Grape, as a permissible 
produce, is permitted to be sold to anyone. However, as the intention of the wine 
producers in buying grapes is obvious, which is producing an impermissible product, 
namely wine, Imam Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad go beyond the form of the sale 
contract and rule it as reprehensible (makrooh).  
These examples clearly show that in order to prevent a harm or acquisition of public 
good, legists nullify a permissible contract in terms of form or at least deem it as 
reprehensible to draw attention to the resulting potential damage for the society.  
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5.5. JURIST-CONSULTS AS CIVIL LEADERS IN SOCIETY 
Jurist-consults’ deep knowledge in Shari’ah related matters along with their 
submergence into the society and having a direct relationship with their surroundings, 
which also have shaped their process of ijtihad or independent reasoning provided them 
with religious authority over the local people. This religious authority comes along with 
a social authority, since Islam “is the basis of the family, the society and the economy” 
(Winter, 2009: 22). It should, however, be noted that not every jurist-consult has 
qualities to lead people and become their representatives by going beyond executing 
ijtihad and teaching Islamic sciences. Nonetheless, as historical records show that many 
of ulama were accepted as civil leaders and undertook the mission of acting as a bridge 
between the elite class and non-elite class to confront the rulers and other authorities on 
behalf of the community (Hallaq, 2005; Hoexter et al., 2002). These roles and 
responsibilities suggest that, these jurist-consults were beyond the point of fatwa giving 
chair, but also acted as “the guardians and protectors of the disadvantaged, the 
supervisors of charitable trusts, the tax-collectors and the foremen of public works… 
and established themselves as the intercessors between the populace and the rulers” 
(Hallaq, 2005: 183), which constituted their distinctiveness; and this is something 
expected from the contemporary Shari’ah scholars.  
Figure 5.1 summarises how the process of embeddedness of jurist-consults led them to 
be civil leaders of the society. Although embeddedness is a necessary condition to attain 
civil leadership, it is not a sufficient condition.  
An important step to attain civil leadership is to articulate embeddedness in the legal 
sphere to produce a dynamic and practical Islamic law, which requires to follow a 
consequentialist approach. As depicted in Figure 5.1., by following a consequentialist 
approach, we refer to issuing a fatwa without neglecting the requirements of the form 
of the text, but also considering the outcome of possible rulings, and, if necessary, 
judging according to the needs and expectations of society. In other words, it is expected 
that the outcome of such a consequentialist approach in the legal sphere is to integrate 
the realities of the society into the legal sphere, providing remedies for emerging 
problems and considering short-term and long-term consequences of a given fatwa. 













































































After obtaining religious authority, ulama with leadership qualities are embraced as the 
civil leaders of the society who act as a bridge between ruler and ruled as well as among 
the populace. These civil leaders were indispensable for ruling authority in terms of 
attaining legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In order to prove that ruling authority 
is ruling with justice, they had to negotiate with ulama, if they fail to co-opt them. In 
the next section, we analyse the relationship of ulama and the ruling class and how their 
relationship was shaped in the pre-modern period. 
5.6. JURIST-CONSULTS AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY: 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS AND 
LEGAL JURISTS IN PRE-MODERN PERIOD 
This section analyses the observed paradigm shift in the governance structure of 
Muslim populations after the leadership of rightly guided khalifah period where a gap 
emerged between the ruler and ruled and, the role and status of jurist-consults as an 
instrument to ensure legitimacy of the ruling authority by filling this gap.  
As discussed above, there was an evident change in the way ‘rightly guided’ khulafha 
or caliphs were leading the Muslims and the way the sultanate-caliphs did after them, 
starting with the Umayyad caliphs; the main distinction being the ‘lack of 
embeddedness into the society’ in the later periods. The lack of embeddedness into the 
society and resultant gap between the ruler and the ruled raised the issue of legitimacy 
for the ruling authority. Ulama, with their “highly influential position in society” had 
the capacity to provide required legitimacy to the ruling authority (Kamali, 2001; 
Gellner, 1983). This position, in return, helped them to become a bridge between the 
ruling authority and ruled masses and ensured the legitimacy for the ruling authority as 
a consequence of negotiation process between the rulers and ulama as civil leaders 
(Hallaq, 2005).  
In that process, the ruling authority strove to attain legitimacy through ulama in two 
main ways: either integrating them into the legal system of dynasty or attaining their 
support as a result of a negotiation process with local ulama. 
Ulama, unless involved in a trade or other kinds of revenue generating businesses such 
as Abu Hanifa, worked as judges or qadis, relied on ‘royal and government patronage’ 
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in the form of the ‘scholars of palaces and high places’ for their financial well-being, 
which also shows that both parties benefited from this relationship and live in 
cooperation with each other (Hallaq, 2005: 182). However, as it is stated earlier, 
especially during the first five centuries, majority of ulama were self-funded (Cohen, 
1970). Therefore, we argue that negotiating with local figures was the dominant form 
of attaining legitimacy in the eyes of populace.   
In addition to negotiating with ulama, ruling class also strove to integrate them into the 
system, even in some cases attempting to punish them upon their refusal of the offers 
for governmental posts such as qadi position (Hallaq, 2005: 180–81; Awass, 2014) such 
as Abu Hanifa, who despite being one of the most revered scholar or alim, were 
prisoned by the so-called khalif for rejecting to become qadi. Nevertheless, legal system 
worked as independent of ruling authority (despite some exceptional cases), which 
shows the power of ulama against a potential pressure from ruling authority, even if 
they were part of the official governance system (Hallaq, 2005:191; Burak, 2013).  
We argue that the source of such negotiation power, whether working as an official in 
government or acting as a civil leader, stemmed from the embedded nature of ulama 
within the society which made them a source of legitimacy and forced the ruling class 
to negotiate and if necessary, compromise against ulama to attain legitimacy in the eyes 
of people. 
5.7. LATE PRE-MODERN PERIOD: RELATIONSHIP OF JURIST-
CONSULT AND SOCIETY 
Two main sources of mufti’s or ulama’s embeddedness in society, namely intellectual 
and financial independence, had been started to change after the 11th century with the 
establishment of madrasa which is an educational institution for the study of many 
subject areas including but not limited to the religious knowledge (Hefner and Zaman, 
2007). The madrasas were supported by waqfs (endowments) for accommodation and 
living expenses as well as necessary educational environment (Blanchard, 2007). 
Madrasa remained as an important transformational point in terms of the role and status 
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of ulama in the society. Starting with the establishment of Nizamiyah madrasas8, which 
was found by Seljuq vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, in Baghdad, Iraq during the middle of the 
11th century (Blanchard, 2007), education model of scholars had been transformed from 
the circles at the mosques or from master’s houses to the madrasas. These madrasas, 
beside transforming the learning environment of students of knowledge and the future 
ulama, also aimed at producing educated men for the bureaucracy (Blanchard, 2007), 
which would further decrease ulama’s embeddedness into the society. Allowances 
provided by madrasa linked waqfs such as food and accommodation (Makdisi, 1970) 
laid the foundation for isolation of students from the society and submergence into the 
madrasa.  
In terms of profession, thanks to the expansion of Muslim dynasties such as Ottoman 
Empire, muftis and other private scholars had the opportunity to dedicate their full time 
to study and teach Islamic sciences by working in madrasas as professional teachers or 
governmental positions or relying on the patronage of wealthy people (Atçil, 2010) and 
the pious endowments (Awass, 2014). Comparing to the earlier period of Islam and 
considering ulama’s involvement in everyday practice as a merchant or trader, we may 
argue that such a transformation in profession led to a further decrease in their 
embeddedness into the society. Especially after the 16th century when the Ottoman 
Empire expanded its territories to the majority of Sunni Muslim world, the need for 
Islamic scholars graduated from madrasas increased to fill the state-appointed religious 
positions such as jurists and jurist-consults (Atçil, 2010) so that the religious legitimacy 
of the state can be sustained.  
Although these two important changes in muftis’ life do not suggest that they are 
disembedded from society, it certainly suggests that there is a decline in terms of degree 
of embeddedness compared to the earlier periods. Moreover, involvement of political 
figures in madrasa system as financial supporters after the 11th century and being key 
figures for appointment of madrasa teachers as well as for religious positions in 
government such as state-appointed jurists and jurist-consults resulted in a 
heterogeneous nexus between rulers and ulama (Atçil, 2010). However, in terms of 
independence, especially until the 15th century, jurist-consults were mostly managed to 
                                                 
8 Although some authors suggest that there were previous examples of madrasa in 10th century, 
Nizamiyah madrasa is important since it establishes a close relationship between political rulers such as 
Vizier Nizam al-mulk and scholars.   
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stay independent of the ruling authority (Burak, 2013) and were highly respected in 
society and were considered as important figures during and after the late pre-modern 
period (Zaman, 2002). However, the role and status of Islamic scholars have drastically 
changed during modern period with the prevalence of enlightenment philosophy and 
secularisation of the nation-states in the Muslim world. Yet, the emergence of Islamic 
banking institutions marked the beginning of a new period for Islamic scholars amid 
their vanished presence in the formal lives in the Muslim world, as we discuss in the 
next chapter.  
5.8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the role and status of jurist-consults during the pre-modern 
period, especially during the first five centuries. While first four khalifah or caliphs 
were embedded into the society as a result of the simplicity of life and lack of ruling 
class as a separate entity from the society, after the rightly guided caliphs’ period, a gap 
had emerged between the ruler and the ruled due to the lack of embeddedness of ruling 
authority into the society. In the pursuit of legitimacy, ruling class utilised the legists or 
Islamic scholars to gain legitimacy and employed them as a bridge between two entities, 
namely the ruler and the ruled. Due to their intellectual and financial freedom, the 
scholars managed to submerge into the society rather than constituting an elite class or 
being part of ruling class. Their religious and social authority over the populace made 
them capable of fulfilling the need of legitimacy of the ruling authority by means of 
their embedded relation with society and prioritising the well-being of the common 
individuals. Having the support of people as their negotiation power, jurist-consults 
managed to defend the social good against any transgression of ruling authority for the 
benefit of themselves at the expense of the populace. However, due to the 
transformations in ifta institutions starting from the 11th century, especially in terms of 
education of muftis and conversion to full-time occupation, muftis started to lose their 
intellectual and financial freedom and, eventually, their level of embeddedness into the 
society has diminished. Especially with the emergence of modernity and its staunchly 
application and rise of nations-states in the Muslim world as secular state, their role and 
status within the society further marginalised. In the next chapter, we explore how 
emergence of Islamic banking institution and its quest for Shari’ah legitimacy provided 
a new role and status to the jurist-consults within the society and institutional 
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framework representing a new transformation, as corporation in the form of banks have 
become the new source of legitimacy for Shari’ah scholars while they provide Islamic 
legitimacy for the operations of Islamic banks. This is despite the fact that fiqh or 
Islamic law does not recognise corporation as an entity, which brings the entire 

































REFLECTING ON THE ROLE OF SHARI’AH SCHOLARS IN 
ISLAMIC FINANCE INDUSTRY: TRANSFORMATION OF IFTA 





This chapter aims to critically explore the transformation of ifta institution (institution 
of act of giving fatwa or legal opinion) in general and the role and status of muftis or 
jurist consults in the Muslim societies during modern period with a special focus on the 
period after the emergence of nation-states in the Muslim majority territories. 
Importance of the rise of nation-states in the current study as a point of transformation 
lies in the emergent secular nature of their governmental structure, and, consequent 
change in the legal system in these states. As a product of the enlightenment, nation-
states have been constructed mainly through secular norms, and are governed by 
rational laws instead of laws derived from revealed knowledge, resulting into man-
made laws replacing laws based on revealed text. Such a shift in governance paradigm 
has directly affected the role and status of jurist-consults and jurists since they are no 
longer considered as a legitimate source of knowledge in the new setting or paradigm; 
as this would directly contradict with the crux of nation-state structure which is a 
product of the modernity.  
With the emergence of Muslim nation-states, the ruling authority in Muslim majority 
states halted the process of seeking legitimacy through religious authorities despite the 
fact that the latter has been a source of legitimacy for centuries for the Muslim dynasties 
of the past. In modern times, in some of the Muslim countries, democracy, as a form of 
governance and method of constituting the ruling authority, therefore, has been used as 
the essential source of providing legitimacy for the ruling class (Buchanan, 2002), 
while in some other modern Muslim countries legitimacy is sought through 
traditional means of patrimonialism. Nevertheless, such a paradigm shift in Muslim 
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societies in which Islam had been playing a central role in the society for centuries, led 
to the complex structures of relationships between the state and ulama or Shari’ah 
scholars. In Turkey, for instance, the Directory of Religious Affairs was established, as 
an undersecretary under Primerminister’s Office, to centralise all religious affairs with 
the objective of attaining control over the religious affairs through a top-down approach 
(Baskan, 2013), while President Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s transformed al-Azhar, 
the traditional leading Islamic learning centre and university, into a state-controlled 
monopoly in religious affairs (Zeghal, 2011). However, even in such cases where the 
religion has been incorporated and even co-opted by the state at the governmental 
structure, Shari’ah scholars have not been permitted to play a decisive role in the 
governance system (Ahmad, 1991; Baskan, 2013; Zeghal, 2011). Attaining legitimacy 
for the modern nation-states, hence, is ensured through non-religious channels, while 
in the pre-modern Muslim dynasties, religion played an essential role in providing the 
required legitimacy by co-opting Shari’ah scholars as the source of such legitimacy or 
through negotiating with them as the civil leaders of the society, as explained in the 
previous chapter in detail.  
In the modern era, the constitutions of Muslim nation-states are based on the principles 
of modernity such as replacing God as the source of knowledge with the outcome of 
Enlightenment philosophy such as rationality and pursuing universal laws extracted by 
human as a top-down construction which has not found complete acceptance among 
the population in some Muslim societies (Hallaq, 2012) leading to tensions in those 
societies. Muftis or jurist-consults, hence, although being dislocated from previous 
prestigious positions in the newly established modern states, have still remained as a 
source of legitimacy and a point of consultation in terms of everyday religious affairs 
among the population by facilitating their role and enjoyed a high status in the society, 
especially at the earlier periods of the paradigm shift (Zaman, 2002).  
Since the law in these nation-states is no longer constituted by religious knowledge 
anymore but secular knowledge, the role of integrating the realities of the society into 
the law, finding solutions to the existing and emerging problems of people and thinking 
short-and-long-term consequences of rules and regulations have been undertaken by 
the governing institutions such as the state and modern judiciary among others. This 
shift, hence, led contraction of the opportunity space available for jurist-consults to 
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conduct their function in the private sphere, since they no longer have the authority to 
change or negotiate the regulations and everyday practices of modern life in most of 
the Muslim nation states (Sutton and Vertigans, 2005).  
Weakening of faith in universal truths of modernity and interrogation of its institutions’ 
validity since the 1960s, however, led to the formation of hybrid institutions which 
combines modernity with local features through multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 
2000). As discussed in Chapter 4, we argue that the emergence and operation of Islamic 
banking sector is an articulation of the multiple modernities framework (Asutay, 2009); 
as Islamic bank (IB) is a product of a combination of banking structure which is a 
product of modernity with the Islamic principles of revealed knowledge of blended with 
the rules and regulation of the state.  
Amid all such developments and the paradigm shift, the emergence of IBs in a secular 
governance structure, however, has posed the question of Islamic legitimacy of these 
institutions. Since these IBs, by definition, have to ensure compliancy with Shari’ah 
principles, they have to provide the necessary evidence for this claim. As a result of 
pursuing Shari’ah legitimacy in our post-modern times in a similar fashion to historical 
times which had aimed to include jurist-consults into the official legal system or 
negotiate with them as civil leaders of local communities to legitimise their authority, 
IBs aimed to employ jurist-consults, especially those specialised in economics and 
finance (fiqh al-muamalat or the law of transactions in the sense of Islamic commercial 
law) to attain legitimacy in the eyes of the stakeholders, particularly, the customers (El-
Gamal, 2006). In terms of operationalising Shari’ah compliancy, IBs have invented 
Shari’ah Board (SB) or Shari’ah Supervisory Board by employing a number of 
Shari’ah scholars. In a later stage, AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions) has provided voluntary level standards for the operation 
of IBs and in some countries central bank regulates these IBs.  
Before delving into discussion, it should be noted that three major transformations have 
taken place in terms of the role and status of Shari’ah scholars between pre-modern 
period and in modern period as practised in IBs, which are discussed as follows: 
Firstly, in the pre-modern period, ulama were submerged into the society whereas 
Shari’ah scholars in SBs submerged into the IBs in particular and IB sector in general 
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more due to the nature of their profession compared to their submergence into the 
society.  
Secondly, in the pre-modern period, Shari’ah scholars attained their ‘civil leader’ status 
through their deep knowledge in Shari’ah, sustaining an exemplary way of life and 
having an embedded relationship with the society, which bestowed upon them 
individually rather than as a class of ‘learned people’, the power to negotiate on behalf 
of people with the elite-ruling class. However, negotiation power of the Shari’ah 
scholars in SBs, compared to the pre-modern period, has lessened, since Shari’ah 
scholars in SBs attain their source of legitimacy by being appointed to a specific SB 
rather than deriving their negotiation power directly from the society. As a result, they 
get their salaries from the banks and financial institutions in whose SB they sit. This 
implies that they do not have the functional independence.  
Thirdly, complexity of the society and everyday practices of people changed drastically 
compared to pre-modern era in the Muslim world implying that roles and cultural 
repertoires have changed alongside expectations from Shari’ah scholars. 
In the next section, we explore how the importance of religious authority of Shari’ah 
scholars has declined due to the emergence of modernity and how they lost their status 
of civil leadership to a certain degree. Following this discussion, we investigate three 
transformations between the pre-modern and modern period in terms of the role and 
status of Shari’ah scholars in detail in understanding the current state of Shari’ah 
scholarship vis-à-vis IBs. By doing so, this paper aims to explore the sources of the 
observed current tension in the operation of IBs in relation to Shari’ah compliance and 
the role and status of Shari’ah scholar, as the latter has become a constant debate in 
Islamic banking related discussions. This debate should be contextualised also in line 




6.2. DECLINE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY 
AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF JURIST-CONSULTS AS CIVIL 
LEADERS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 
Enlightenment movement had a huge impact on everyday life of people by locating 
rationality at the centre of knowledge creation and as a reference point of any action by 
replacing God (Honneth, 1987). Although the enlightenment had emerged in the West, 
its ideas and principles were conveyed to the other parts of the world, including Muslim 
majority lands, with the help of various means, among which the colonisation process 
being the most effective and efficient of them (Tripp, 2006). The West aimed to shape 
the world according to these principles with the intention of raising other people to the 
modern level by emancipating those ‘uncivilised’ people from the chains of traditions 
and irrational beliefs (Scott, 2011; Said, 1979) as modernity claimed ‘the universal 
truth’ expected that all the societies would ultimately converge towards the universal 
truth of modernity in a linear development model. As an outcome of this process,  
“reliance on either revelation or mystical illumination” was considered invalid in this 
paradigm and replaced by “natural faculties of the human mind” (May, 1991: 162).  
The modern period starting with the enlightenment process, therefore, had two 
important consequences for jurist-consults or as they now known as Shari’ah scholars, 
in the Muslim lands: (i) the decline of the importance of their religious authority at the 
governance level due to secularisation of the state; and (ii) losing their role as civil 
leaders (Hallaq, 2012).  
Secularization, as one of the pillars of the enlightenment philosophy and governance 
model of modern nation-states, dislocated the religious figures from governance of the 
state9 (Daver, 1988; Ruedy, 1996). In the pre-modern period, Islam was the way of 
organizing everyday life for both subjects of Islamic dynasties and the elite-ruling class, 
and ulama were important figures in terms of legitimising the governance of ruling 
class thanks to their religious and social authority in the society (Winter, 2009). 
However, due to the secularisation process in the modern period, ruling class is no 
longer need to attain such a legitimacy from ulama anymore (Siam-Heng and Liew, 
                                                 
9 Although secularisation process affected all religions and their relationships with states, this chapter is 
limited to discuss the impact of secularization on religious authority of jurist-consults (muftis) in Muslim 
majority societies due to their relationship with the IFIs. 
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2010). Consequently, the importance of religious authority of jurist-consults has 
declined with the removal of Shari’ah as a way of governance method and mechanism. 
Even though Shari’ah as a governance system no longer plays an important role in 
Muslim secular nation-states, most of the citizens of these countries implicitly 
implement Shari’ah in their everyday practice, especially in relation to worshipping, 
namely their relationship with God, since in Muslim majority societies, Islam “is more 
than a doctrine, more than a private belief or worship. It is also a culture and an 
institutional framework governing all aspects of interpersonal relations” ( Taylor, 1988: 
32; Ardic, 2012). In other words, although knowledge of jurist-consults has no meaning 
at the level of governance of state and in public sphere in contemporary times, and they 
cannot bestow any legitimacy for the ruling class anymore, they are still considered as 
a religious authority and source of legitimacy in personal relationships among the 
members of the society, namely in private sphere. Therefore, although religious 
authority had an important status within the private sphere in the Muslim societies and 
communities, the power of negotiation of Shari’ah scholars with the elite-ruling class 
diminished substantially due to the decline in the importance of their religious authority 
at the governance level. Nevertheless, as civil leaders of the society, it is expected that 
jurist-consults or muftis should have continued to hold the negotiation power with the 
elite-ruling class. As in pre-modern period, the power of negotiation held by the muftis 
was not only due to their authority to legitimise the affairs of elite-ruling class as ulama 
but also due to having support of people and acting on behalf of them as civil leaders.  
This brings us to the second consequence of the emergence of modernity, which is 
disappearance of jurist-consults as civil leaders in many parts of the Muslim societies. 
Although, due to the secularisation, the importance of religious authority of jurist-
consults declined in the public sphere, they kept their religious authority in the private 
sphere (Sikand, 2005; Gupta, 2012). Such a status, of course, brings the power of 
negotiation with the ruling elite class on behalf of the society. In other words, even 
though governance of the state is shaped in line with secular rulings, in order to 
persuade the population for serenity, ruling class still had to negotiate with religious 
scholars as representatives of the people, especially in the early stages of the 




Having stated these, the reforms in the newly emerged nation-states, consciously or 
unconsciously, transformed the status of jurist-consults in the society as civil leaders 
drastically as well. First and foremost, in the modern period, everyday life has not been 
shaped around religion. Consequently, along with the secondary role of religion in this 
transformed social formation, Shari’ah scholars also lost their central position even at 
the private sphere. For example, alphabet and language reforms for Westernisation and 
modernisation purpose in a number of Muslim societies further dislocated ulama from 
a highly respected status in the society. In particular, reforms which resulted in 
replacement of the existing alphabet system with a new, Latinised script, transformed 
literate, educated class as illiterate as in the case of Turkey and Indonesia (Chao, 1968). 
Such a transformation in the language system affected the role and status of jurist-
consults or Shari’ah scholars and rendered them as obsolete in the era of ‘modern’ 
nation-state. As a result, the jurist-consults were mostly limited as a source of 
knowledge in terms of giving advice on the relationship between individuals and God 
solely, rather than acting as a civil leader in the society.     
Consequently, these transformations, particularly in the governance of the state and 
structural reforms in everyday life such as language and education resulted in the 
decline of the importance of religious authority of jurist-consults, which implied 
relinquishing their role as civil leaders in the society. Although such consequences 
prevailed in Muslim societies, there were also  exceptional individuals who kept their 
role and status as civil leaders within the society such as Said Nursi in Turkey (Mardin, 
1989), Mawdudi in Pakistan (Ahmad and Ansari, 1979) and Ahmad Dahlan in 
Indonesia (Clarke and Beyer, 2009), among others. These figures and other examples 
became leaders in their respective societies in the search of an Islamic identity in the 
modern nation states by opposing the enforced and imposed secular modernity which 
has resulted in hybrid institutions of multiple modernities framework in these countries. 
As we explored in Chapter 4, one of the outcome of such quest was the emergence of 
Islamic banking sector and the rising of the importance of religious authority of 
Shari’ah scholars in modern times. However, compared to the pre-modern times, as 
stated earlier, there are three main differences in the role and status of jurist-consults or 
Shari’ah scholars in modern period in relation to IBs. In the following sections, we 
examine each one of these three differences and their impact on the operations of IFIs. 
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6.3. JURIST-CONSULTS AS EMBEDDED AGENTS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Polanyi’s (1957) concept of embeddedness is a 
useful frame to contextualise the role and status of jurist-consults in pre-modern period. 
Considering their intellectual and financial independence along with submergence into 
the society helped us to understand their process of ijtihad and the negotiation power 
vis-à-vis the ruling authority. What was implicit in this debate was the influence of 
religion as an institution, namely morality of Islam in terms of shaping the mindset of 
jurist-consults due to its esteemed and central position within the society (Hallaq, 
2012). In other words, their submergence into the society led them to take maslahah or 
public interest into account in the process of ijtihad, where the definition of public 
interest is derived from the morality of Islam.  
This implicit debate, however, is particularly important for the role and status of jurist-
consults in the modern period due to the transformation of the prevailing institutions in 
the society as well as the social formation of Muslim societies. Regarding our 
discussion of ifta institution and the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in SBs in the 
modern period, we can observe that Shari’ah scholars submerged into the corporate 
culture in the form of IBs, more than the society due to the high influence of corporates 
in the modern period (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Furthermore, the norms and values 
of the capitalist markets have become more influential in terms of shaping their fatwa 
(legal ruling) process compared to the morality of Shari’ah whereby Islamic morality 
has been relegated into instrumentality in rationalising the operations and instruments 
of Islamic banks. This refers to the hegemonic role of capitalism, which shapes the 
behaviour and fatwas of the Shari’ah scholars in IBs.  
It should be noted that hegemonic role of capitalism is well articulated in the literature 
including by Friedland and Alford (1991), who argue that the capitalist market is the 
key institutional order of inter-institutional system of Western societies along with 
bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christianity whereby a market 
system social formation is referred. However, within historical contingency, “modern 
societies have greater emphasis on corporate and state influences and earlier societies 
in general emphasized family and religion to a larger extent” (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008: 108). Since the capitalist market system has expanded beyond the Western 
societies and has also became dominant mechanism of organising the political economy 
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in Muslim societies, we can extend Friedland and Alford’s (1991) argument to the 
Muslim majority societies in seeing the increased importance attached to capitalist 
market system through corporations such as Islamic banks and financial institutions and 
halal markets despite the dilemma that Islamic law or fiqh does not recognise 
corporation as an entity. Thus, historical contingency in modern times resulted in a 
similar trajectory with the West, however, with an extension, namely Islamic 
compliancy. Consequently, capitalism’s hegemonic power has overcome the Islamic 
ontologically constructed meaning of economy, finance and banking by creating new 
versions through hybridity. 
Since historical contingency suggests a shift towards market capitalism in Muslim 
societies with the help of Shari’ah compliancy, the role and status of Shari’ah scholars 
in IBs can be explored in understanding the observed shift through the use the concept 
of ‘institutional logics’, particularly its assumption of embedded agency, since 
contemporary IBs are established with a Western-style modern corporate model with 
an additional claim of Shari’ah compliancy legitimised by SBs under capitalist market 
system. It is important to note that the corresponding institutional form of Shari’ah 
compliancy in market system is SBs, which is the organisational form of individual 
Shari’ah scholars fitting into the corporate nature of market system.  
As mentioned, the observed shift can be explained by institutional logics, which is 
defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 804). As a concept, institutional logics does not 
suggest claiming of the ultimate authority of institutions in terms of shaping individuals 
and organizations in a unidirectional way, rather it acknowledges that individuals and 
organizations are also active in shaping the institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008). Due to such bi-directional relationship, institutional logics establishes a link 
between institutions at macro level and actions of individuals and organisations at micro 
level (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In terms of articulation of such a link between 
macro and micro levels, emergence of the capitalist market system leading to ‘great 
transformation’ in the society might be considered (Polanyi, 1957). While such 
emergence led to transformation of prevalent institutional logics in the society 
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(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), individual and organizational level counter hegemonic 
movements led to the emergence of various institutional logics, Islamic banking sector, 
particularly at its initial period, being one of them, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Regarding our discussion on ifta institution, we can observe that while morality of 
Shari’ah was influential in pre-modern Muslim societies (Hallaq, 2012), after the 
emergence of market system, we witness the high influence of the capitalist market in 
organising the everyday practice of the society. Time, for instance, after the industrial 
age, “became a commodity that could be ‘saved,’ ‘spent,’ or ‘wasted’” which was 
different than the perception of time during the pre-modern periods (Adas, 1990: 242). 
In other words, creation of land, labour and money as fictitious commodities to facilitate 
the market has transformed the meaning of social reality (Polanyi, 1957) by creating 
market based social formation.  
Another important change has been the predomination of instrumental reasoning in the 
modern times, as opposed to the prevalence of substantive morality in terms of 
organising everyday operations of institutions, particularly financial institutions such 
as conventional and Islamic banks. Instrumental reason is a way of thinking, which 
priorities maximum efficiency and the best cost-output ratio to evaluate success of an 
action (Taylor, 1991) and hence suggests performing economy and behaviour in a 
utilitarian sense.  In other words, an individual or organisation guided with instrumental 
reasoning ought to act according to the most efficient economic application of means 
for a given end. Therefore, if a behaviour has a high transaction cost compared to 
another, the behaviour with a lesser transaction cost should be preferred, according to 
instrumental reasoning. Organised tawarruq as discussed in Chapter 4 is, indeed, an 
articulation of this way of reasoning in fatwa process.  
As a result of emergence of the capitalist market order with its own institutional logics 
such as its unique organisation of time, creation of fictitious commodities and 
prioritisation of instrumental reasoning in shaping everyday life of the individuals as 
well as organisations, we can observe the transformation of ifta institutions under the 
influence of this prevalent institutional logics. This is due to embeddedness of Shari’ah 
scholars as individuals and IBs as organisations into the capitalist market system. 
However, as discussed above, Shari’ah scholars as individuals and IBs as organisations 
are not passive agents in this framework, but active agents and influence the 
169 
 
institutional logics as well. In our analysis of IBs, this is evident in the transformation 
of corporate culture which is derived from a positivist ontology having no room for 
revelation in terms of operating business affairs, yet its institutional logics are shaped 
and reproduced due to influence of individuals and organisations. Thus, Shari’ah 
governance framework, SBs, Shari’ah auditing departments etc., are all articulations of 
such influence. In other words, such Shari’ah compliancy institutions regenerate the 
capitalist institutional logics with the blending of Islamic law; and therefore, the 
multiple modernities frame explains the emergence of IBs. 
Nevertheless, embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars in IBs and embeddedness of IBs in 
the capitalist market system influenced ifta process in IBs. Embedded agency 
assumption claims that “the interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals 
and organizations are embedded within prevailing institutional logics” (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008: 103). By ‘prevailing institutional logics’ in the case of IBs, we refer to 
the institutional logics of the capitalist market order. In Chapter 4, through postcolonial 
analysis of IBs, we discussed how IBs have been mimicking conventional banks in 
terms of product and services as well as principles such as prioritising the low 
transaction cost and efficiency over the objectives of Shari’ah, such as equity and 
profit-and-loss sharing and risk sharing, leading to the convergence towards 
conventional banking. We can demonstrate embeddedness of IBs as organisations and 
embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars in SBs as individuals into the capitalist market 
order as reason to such mimicking behaviour. Consequently, while primary norms and 
values of IBs are shaped by embeddedness into the capitalist market because of entrance 
to competition in global financial markets after the 1990s, embeddedness of Shari’ah 
scholars into the capitalist markets prevented them to hinder the convergence of IBs 
towards conventional banks, or at least moderating the outcome of such convergence. 
While active agency of Shari’ah scholars still produce a gap between Islamic vs. 
conventional banking sectors, recent decades witness the closure of this gap rapidly. 
We do not argue that institutional logics of capitalist market system is the only logic in 
IBs since embedded agency assumption acknowledges that actions of individuals are 
shaped by different societal sectors (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Society as the inter-
institutional system allows logics of different societal sectors to be influential in a 
context (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In the context of IBs, therefore, Islam as a 
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religion and its institutional logics is also influential. Existence of Shari’ah scholars by 
itself is an indication of influence of Islam on IBs. Nevertheless, the dominant nature 
of the capitalist market causes religion to have only partial impact on the everyday 
practice of IBs in allowing Shari’ah to facilitate market-based system. In other words, 
rather than having IBs as articulation of morality of Islam and fulfilment of ‘the 
objectives of Shari’ah’ in society, we observe, in majority of the cases, replication of 
conventional banks in everyday operations with the same institutional logics with an 
excess of fulfilment of ‘the form of Shari’ah’ to keep the ‘Islamic’ identity intact in the 
eyes of the stakeholders. Although we do not claim that every Shari’ah scholar in SBs 
has such embeddedness, it is a useful concept to explain part of social failure (see: 
Asutay, 2007b; 2012a) in Islamic banks along with other two explanations, namely 
transformation of source of legitimacy of Shari’ah scholars and complexity of the 
modern period. We, therefore, claim that under the high impact of the capitalist market 
system, some Shari’ah scholars have been influenced by the values and norms of the 
capitalist market system in their fatwa (legal ruling) process in IBs, since these IBs 
themselves have also been shaped by the very same norms and values beyond any other 
factors. This resembles Polanyi’s (1957) explanations as to how the emergence of self-
regulated market system disrupted and overcome the moral economies of the past with 
a distinction that again in Polanyian sense Islamic economics movement emerged to 
disrupt the capitalist hegemony by aiming to rescue land, labour, human and capital 
from commodification.  
In the next section, we present the articulation of embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars 
into the capitalist market order under three main categories corresponding to their pre-
modern processes. 
6.4. EMBEDDEDNESS OF JURIST-CONSULTS INTO THE IBs 
The emergence of IFIs after the 1970s and their need for Shari’ah compliancy has 
resulted in the constitution of a new profession called Shari’ah scholarship in a SB, 
which is a new institution developed in modern times, in IFIs including IBs (Kahf, 
2004). Shari’ah scholars through SBs are needed to provide legitimacy to the 
institutional form, products, instruments, and operations of IBs and IFIs by providing 
Shari’ah compliancy within capitalist economy and secular political culture. It should 
be noted that most of those individuals turned Shari’ah scholars did not have modern 
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economics or finance related education despite dealing with such matters in modern 
manner in IBs and IFIs, while they were educated in Islamic sciences including the 
legal aspect of financial transactions and economic issues. However, emergence of this 
particular field of practice in the form of banking and finance has created opportunity 
spaces for those (modern) jurist-consults with specialism in Islamic sciences to act as 
point of reference for Shari’ah compliancy. 
Since the emergence of this profession was not foreseen beforehand, with the IBs 
starting to proliferate and diffuse, especially after  financial liberalisation and 
financialisation in the 1990s, a shortage of Shari’ah scholars has emerged (Askari et 
al.,  2011; Nathan and Pierce, 2009). In this process, pioneers of Shari’ah scholarship 
in IBs and IFIs, who have by now gained experience in the Islamic banking sector since 
the inception of first Islamic commercial bank in 1975, have also been preferred for the 
SBs in the newly established IBs due to their reputation and the experience they 
developed. This has resulted in individual Shari’ah scholars occupying multiple chairs 
in different institutions (Unal, 2011; van Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). Table 6.1 
demonstrate the result of the network analysis on Shari’ah scholars which clearly 
reveals how chairs in SBs in different IBs and IFIs were occupied by a small number 
of Shari’ah scholars (Unal, 2011). 
Table 6.1: The Top Six Shari’ah Scholars as of 2010 
Rank Name No. of Positions 
1 Sheikh Nedham Yacoubi 78 
2 Shaikh Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah 77 
3  Dr Mohamed Ali Elgari 65 
4  Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee’a 38 
5  Dr Abdulaziz Khalifa Al-Qassar 38 
6  Dr Mohammad Daud Bakar 38 
Source: (Unal, 2011) 
Table 6.2: The Top Six Shari’ah Scholars as of 2017 
Rank Name No. of Positions 
1 Shaikh Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah 81 
2  Dr Mohamed Ali Elgari 76 
3  Sheikh Nedham Yacoubi 69 
4  Dr Abdulaziz Khalifa Al-Qassar 42 
5  Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee’a 38 
6  Dr Mohammad Daud Bakar 32 




As Table 6.1 suggests a small number of Shari’ah scholars, who were actively engaged 
in the sector, occupied the majority of the available positions in SBs and developing 
skills through working in the sector in 2010. Furthermore, after seven years of the initial 
distribution in 2010, we find a similar picture in terms of number of positions top 
scholars occupy. As Table 6.2 depicts the distribution of SB chairs occupied by the 
scholars in 2017, the top six scholars remain the same as in 2010, despite the change in 
the order in comparison to 2017.  
Such a trajectory suggests that these Shari’ah scholars are highly preoccupied with 
Islamic banking sector, which makes them highly aware of the realities of the industry 
but at the same time helps to question the quality of Shari’ah compliancy that can be 
provided as a result of working for such a large number of SBs at once. In other words, 
Shari’ah scholars have learnt the institutional logics of banks and financial institutions 
and found SBs as opportunity spaces for exercising their Islamic knowledge and skills 
in ensuring the efficient running of IBs and IFIs. Since IBs and IFIs work within 
capitalist norms of efficiency plus fiqhi determination of Shari’ah compliancy rather 
than Islamic moral economy, Shari’ah scholars by definition have become familiar and 
specialised on the particularities and demand of capitalist financial systems. This hence 
facilitates the embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars into the capitalist system by 
definition of being embedded into IBs and IFIs through SBs. 
It should be noted that factors such as modern education system promotes the capitalist 
principles, which most of the Shari’ah scholars are exposed during their education 
(White et al., 2008) regardless of their Islamic sciences based education. In addition, 
well-paid salaries of Shari’ah scholarship (Irfan, 2015) also plays an important role to 
facilitate their embeddedness into the capitalist financial system.  
Embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars in IBs helps them to integrate the realities of the 
sector into the fiqhi legal decision process, and, to find solutions to the problems of 
sector-specific issues emerging from capitalist practices resulting into mono-directional 
causality, while keeping the Shari’ah compliancy intact as well as taking the short-term 
and long-term consequences of issued fatwas into account for Islamic banking sector. 
While the pre-modern era scholars contributed to Shari’ah compliancy, they were 
embedded into the society as discussed in the previous chapter. An important 
consequence of being embedded into the Islamic banking sector in the present times is 
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that some Shari’ah scholars have prioritised the market values and capitalist principles 
dominant in the banking sector over objectives of Islamic moral economy resulting in 
furtherance of the social failure of the IBs in a subaltern manner (Asutay, 2007b;  
2012a).  
Based on this exploration, following three subsections presents the examples of the 
impact of embeddedness in Islamic banking sector on the legal or fiqhi decision process. 
It should be noted that although some Shari’ah scholars give their consent on the 
following cases, this does not necessarily mean that they are embedded in Islamic 
banking sector since they may approach these cases from different perspectives such as 
considering them as a temporary solution for the current period while suggesting an 
alternative solution to be implemented in near future or accepting such ruling under 
extreme necessity situations while rejecting widespread implementation. On the other 
hand, rationalisation of such fatwas through maslahah or public interest or claiming 
that these fatwas are valid due to the demands of modern life are articulations of 
intended embeddedness in the IBs and IFIs and hence in capitalist financial system.  
6.4.1. Integration of Realities  
One of the important articulations of embeddedness of a scholar into a field is to 
integrate the realities of that field in the ijtihad process and issuing a fatwa considering 
the given circumstances. Determination of the benchmarks for Shari’ah screening 
criteria for financial transactions is a good example of articulation of embeddedness of 
Shari’ah scholars into the finance sector. 
Ruling of the ICFA, a multilateral organisation, on the permissibility of investment in 
common stocks of companies whose activities do not violate the Shari’ah principles in 
1992 led to the new investment opportunities for Muslim investors (Wilson, 2004). 
Although the ruling of ICFA led to the new opportunities in Islamic finance sector, the 
scholars involved in the ICFA did not go further to delineate the criteria of the 
companies for being considered as Shari’ah compliant. Following that ruling, global 
rating agencies such as Dow Jones and FTSE began to construct Islamic indices in the 
late 1990s. As Islamic index providers, they established certain benchmarks for stock 
markets to determine the Shari’ah compliancy of the stocks with the objective of 
constructing their pool of Islamic indices with the help of Shari’ah scholars employed 
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by these service providers. Although such Shari’ah screening process is widely 
accepted and trusted in the sector, they are mostly approved by Shari’ah scholars at 
firm level rather than by a credible and independent Shari’ah authority such as the 
ICFA or Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) (Mahfooz and Ahmed, 2014). 
Table 6.3: Shari’ah Screens Industry Survey – Quantitative (Financial) Screens 
Eligibility if £ DJIM FTSE S&P  MSCI HSBC Amiri DIB Azzad Meezan 
Liquidity Ratios          
𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
     50%    80% 
𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
  50%    70%    
𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
    70%      
𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
 33%  49%     45%  
𝐶𝐴𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝐿𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑖(𝑡)
          
  Interest Ratios          
𝑇𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
  5%   5%    5% 
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
 33%  33%       
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
  33%  33.33%  33%    
𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
       30%  33% 
𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
       30%   
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
         30% 
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑆𝐼𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐿𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
         30% 
Debt Ratios          
𝑇𝐷𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
  33%  33.33% 30% 33% 30%  40% 
𝑇𝐷𝑖(𝑡)
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑡)
 33%  33%    30% 33%  
Non-Permissible Ratio          
𝑁𝑃𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
  5% 5%      5% 
𝑁𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
      5% 5%   
Source: Derigs and Marzban (2008:290) 
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Table 6.3 presents the quantitative and Table 6.4 depicts the qualitative Shari’ah 
screening criteria employed by various Islamic index providers, respectively (Derigs 
and Marzban, 2008). As it is clear from the differences of the criteria employed by 
different Islamic index providers, there is no consensus on how to decide whether a 
common stock of a company is Shari’ah compliant or not. 
Table 6.4: Shari’ah Screens Industry Survey – Qualitative (Sectorial) Screens 
 DJIM FTSE S&P MSCI HSBC Amiri DIB Azzad Meezan 
Alcoholic Beverages ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Biotechnology(Genetic&Foetus)     ●     
Broadcasting & Entertainment ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Conventional financial services ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Gambling ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Hotels ◘ ● ◘ ●  ● ● ◘  
Insurance ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Meat Production        ◘  
Media Agencies* ◘  ◘  ●   ◘ ● 
Pork-related products ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Restaurants & Bars ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Tobacco ◘ ● ◘ ● ● ● ● ◘ ● 
Trading of Gold & Silver   ◘       
Weapons & Defence ◘ ●  ● ● ● ● ◘  
● core business ◘ any involvement 
*except newspapers 
Source: Derigs and Marzban (2008:289) 
One of the common features of the quantitative Shari’ah screening criteria presented in 
Table 6.3 is the permissibility of inclusion of the companies with 5% or less prohibited 
income, such as interest or riba income. Under the normal circumstances, Shari’ah 
scholars should not allow a company with 5% impermissible income, yet it is a fact that 
such companies are rare since most of the companies currently traded in stock markets, 
even if their line of business is permissible, they invest their surplus money in 
investment tools which earns interest income such as bonds and securities (Usmani, 
2007). The permissiveness of Shari’ah scholars in determining the thresholds for such 
quantitative screening criteria, therefore, show that Shari’ah scholars takes the realities 
of the sector into consideration when they issue a ruling. However, diversity of rulings 
among the Shari’ah scholars signify that the degree of permissiveness or criteria varies 
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from one scholar to another, due to various reasons, the level of embeddedness of a 
scholar being among the reasons.  
Furthermore, the level of flexibility in deciding the permissibility of a line of business 
also varies from one provider to another based on considering different realities of the 
market as well as ijtihad of individual SB. Table 6.4 shows the permissible line of 
businesses according to the index providers, which suggests that there is a wide range 
of opinions in terms of permissibility of some businesses. Although most of the index 
providers do not allow any involvement in prohibited businesses, some index providers 
relax that ruling as well by including mixed companies, too, into their Islamic index. 
Malaysian Security Commission’s Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC), for instance, by 
considering the local realities of Malaysian market and limited universe of investment 
opportunities in local stock market, ruled on permissibility of investment to the 
companies with mixed activities, namely companies whose core business is permissible 
but involved in impermissible businesses through subsidiaries such as hotels serving 
alcohol, if they fulfil certain additional criteria (Najib et al., 2014). Considering the fact 
that 60% of all companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, namely the Malaysian stock 
exchange, are part of mixed company category as of 2013, such relaxation is considered 
as crucial for Muslim investors in Malaysia (Najib et al., 2014).  
The rationale behind such ruling also indicates the level of awareness of Shari’ah 
scholars about the market and their effort to relax the conditions for permissibility of a 
company under the conditions of market realities regardless of the Islamic 
permissibility. Among the rationales of SAC of the Securities Commission, in this 
section, we only list three related items in relation to the embeddedness of Shari’ah 
scholars (Salleh, 2011): 
(i) Considering the situation of mixed companies within the context of ‘umum al-
balwa, or common plight, since impermissible activities of such companies are 
difficult to trace, and permissible and impermissible elements are inseparable; 
(ii) Based on the principle of the preservation of property (which is one of the 
objectives of Shari’ah or maqasid al Shari’ah, large companies with permissible 
core businesses are considered to be important for the strength of Muslim investors 
and not lagging behind the non-Muslim investors; 
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(iii) Based on the Shari’ah maxim: ‘It cannot be denied that change in ruling is caused 
by change in time’, and also referring to the maslahah of the people, SAC suggest 
that, contrary to the traditional views of scholars, under the realities of the time and 
environment, mixed companies should be allowed. 
Besides allowing the inclusion of mixed companies in their Islamic index, SAC also 
did not employ any financial benchmarks until 2013 contrary to the universal index 
providers such as FTSE and Dow Jones. This approach further expanded Islamic 
investment opportunities in Malaysia by virtue of liberal approach in Shari’ah 
screening (Najib et al., 2014). Such differences in Shari’ah screening criteria result in 
non-compliance of a Shari’ah compliant stock in Malaysia under different benchmarks. 
For example, based on SAC’s approved companies on October 26, 2006, Abdul 
Rahman et al. (2010) showed that only 35% of the stocks deemed Shari’ah compliant 
under SAC criteria are found to be Shari’ah compliant according to Down Jones’s 
quantitative screening.  
While ruling of ICFA opens a window for new investment tools, the efficiency of these 
new tools, namely portfolios, depends on the screening criteria set by Shari’ah scholars. 
Since Shari’ah scholars’ approach in determining screening criteria suggest a certain 
level of embeddedness into the market system determined finance sector, this is 
particularly articulated in the rationale provided by SACs. However, further 
embeddedness into financial system through Shari’ah scholars’ facilitation implies 
further disembeddedness from the intended objectives of Shari’ah based financing as 
identified by Islamic moral economy. 
6.4.2. Finding Solutions to the Problems 
Another feature of embedded Shari’ah scholars is to find solutions to the existing 
problems of the entity they are embedded to. As we discussed in the previous chapter, 
Shari’ah scholars in pre-modern period, especially during first five centuries in which 
they had been dominantly submerged into the society, strove for finding solutions to 
the legal problems of the society in which they had lived. In modern times, some 
Shari’ah scholars in SBs, similarly, strive for finding solutions to the problems of 
Islamic banking sector which is mostly related to increasing efficiency of the products 
and services as well as decreasing the transaction cost as imposed by the capitalist 
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market economy. Even if they do not come up with the exact solutions in some cases, 
they strive to justify proposed solutions based on Islamic law through different tools, 
talfiq and maslahah being the most popular of all.   
Considering the competitiveness of IBs with conventional banks in terms of price and 
market, it is important to remove any additional risk and transaction cost which 
conventional banks do not incur while IBs do. Shari’ah scholars, with the intention of 
fulfilling this objective, permitted, for example, the utilisation of organised tawarruq 
which is a modified version of classically implemented tawarruq instrument, as 
explained in detail in Chapter 4. The problem with classical tawarruq implementation 
is the inefficiency of transactions where a customer buys a product on instalments and 
sells it on the market for cash with a lower price with the intention of overcoming his 
or her liquidity shortage. As discussed, although organised tawarruq is ruled as 
impermissible by the ICFA, most of the Shari’ah scholars allow their utilisation in 
Islamic banking operations. The advantage of organised tawarruq is that although it 
uses an intermediary asset in ‘buy and sell contract’ to provide Shari’ah legitimacy, it 
does not require any genuine demand for any asset. Thus, it removes the necessity of a 
genuine commodity as the underlying structure of the transaction and bring it closer to 
the conventional loan transaction thereby, as a consequence, the customer portfolio 
expands. IBs, for instance, cannot use murabahah contract to offer credit for a 
honeymoon of a newly married couple, while through utilisation of organised tawarruq, 
they can provide credit as in conventional sense. Through allowing the utilisation of 
organised tawarruq, therefore, Shari’ah scholars help IBs to overcome the 
inefficiency problem inherent in murabahah or classical tawarruq contracts as well 
as expand the potential customer range by removing the necessity of a genuine 
commodity as part of the contract; however, the question is whether this is the concern 
of substantive morality articulated by IME as opposed to efficient market theorem. 
6.4.3. Considering the Short and Long-Term Consequences 
Taking the consequences of a ruling in the short-term and long-term into account during 
the ijtihad process is an important feature of a Shari’ah scholar. Previous chapter 
demonstrated how Shari’ah scholars in the pre-modern context foresaw and considered 
the consequences of their fatwas for the society and ruled accordingly due to their 
embeddedness into the society. Members of SBs, besides integrating the realities of 
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market system as well as offering solutions to the problems of IBs, also consider, in 
most of the cases, short-term and long-term consequences of their fatwas for Islamic 
banking sector and adjust accordingly.  
One commonly utilised instrument introduced as an outcome of such articulation of 
embeddedness is Profit Equalising Reserves (PER) to adjust profit distribution to 
smooth their returns for deposit accounts in Islamic banks according to the prevailing 
interest based deposit returns with the intention of competition with conventional banks 
(Taktak et al., 2010; Htay and Salman, 2013), while deposit account holders in IBs enter 
into profit-and-loss sharing agreements with their respective IBs over their deposit 
accounts. Figure 6.1 displays how PER works (Alfatakh, 2014). Without PER pool, 
only expenses should be deducted from mudharabah deposit returns before distributing 
the return between IB and depositors, as this should be according to the profit-and-loss 
based share agreement. However, in the short-term, this might lead problems such as 
withdrawal risk (Rajhi and Hassairi, 2012), as the return determined by the business 
cycle can be instable and lower from the fixed income based conventional bank deposit 
accounts. Competitive return rates with conventional banks, and particularly with other 
Islamic banks, therefore, is an important reason for customer preference as evidenced 
by Mohd-Karim (2010). Moreover, stability of return rates is also significant since 
research conducted by Mohd-Karim (2010) reveals that the participants expect a stable 
return with a mean score of 4.03 out of 5 indicating a signal for the Islamic banks to 
provide a stable return. PER, therefore, “was created and approved by the Shari’ah 
scholars with the intention of protecting the banks from withdrawal risk” (Mohd-Karim, 
2010, p. 373) and utilised by almost all IBs currently (Taktak, 2011). In this system, a 
certain amount of return generated from the investments in which deposits are invested 
is reserved in a pool, namely PER pool; if obtained profit is higher than the return 
distributed by conventional banks, the excess is transferred to PER to utilise in periods 
when profit is less than the interest-based market return rate. In less-profitable periods, 
PER pool is utilised to top-up the profit in IB deposit accounting to the market rate so 
that stability in returns can be ensured in a competitive environment. If PER pool is not 
sufficient to equalise, IB transfers certain amount of money from its profit to the 
customer as a gift (hibah) in addition to PER pool. PER system, therefore, is 
instrumental in adjusting profit rate of IBs which might fluctuate due to business cycle 
according to the interest rates prevailing in the market and the resultant conventional 
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banking return (Rajhi and Hassairi, 2012). As a result, utilisation of PER leads 
convergence of profit-loss sharing schema of IBs into conventional saving account, 
while preventing the fluctuations of deposit amounts during business cycles. Although 
PER instrument is not compatible with the definition of mudharabah contract which 
requires sharing of profit and loss directly, Shari’ah scholars allowed its utilisation 
considering the short-term consequences of mudharabah contract for IB sector in the 
sense that IBs may lose out due to competition and low return. Hence, while normally 
PER could not be considered as Shari’ah compliant, due to maslahah and stability, 
Shari’ah scholars deemed it to Shari’ah compliant. In a mudharabah agreement being 
a partnership between depositors and IB, with PER as an additional reserve account as 
practised in Islamic banks, the awareness of both parties of the conditions is crucial, yet 
empirical research suggest that most of the depositors are not aware of such conditions 
of the partnership agreement and not happy with lack of disclosure regarding the 
meaning and mechanism of PER as they behave as rational self-maximising Muslims 
(Mohd-Karim, 2010).    
Figure 6.1: Working Mechanism of PER 
 
 
       




























6.4.4. Reflections on the Three Articulations of Embeddedness 
The three articulations of embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars into the banking and 
finance sector, as explained above, directly indicate the awareness and knowledge of 
Shari’ah scholars about the environment, namely Islamic finance sector, which is the 
necessary condition for conducting ijtihad in that sector so that IB sector’s growth and 
its sustainability can be ensured. However, we do not suggest that such level of 
awareness and knowledge about the subject at hand for issuing a ruling is the source of 
observed convergence towards conventional finance sector. On the contrary, such 
awareness and knowledge is a necessary condition for any Shari’ah scholar to issue a 
ruling in this sector. Rather, it is the internalisation of institutional logics of the capitalist 
market systems by Shari’ah scholars and giving precedence to the principles of the 
capitalist market system over the morality of Shari’ah that facilitate the convergence of 
IBs towards conventional banks. What we refer as embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars 
into the market system in general and banking sector in particular, therefore, is deviation 
of Shari’ah scholars from the traditional fatwas of Shari’ah scholars and rulings of 
credible international institutions such as ICFA based on the justification through 
capitalist principles, even in certain cases against the actual interest or maslahah of 
society. Such level of embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars in SBs facilitates the 
convergence of Islamic banking and finance sector towards conventional banking and 
finance due to essentialising the same banking related operational principles tuned with 
Islamic concerns. However, we acknowledge that there are scholars, albeit very limited 
numbers, with the necessary knowledge level and awareness of the market system who 
strive to continue to implement objectives of the Shari’ah rather than capitalist 
principles in Islamic banking sector. However, there are other important 
transformations affecting the struggle of these Shari’ah scholars adversely which are 
discussed in the following sections.  
6.5. TRANSFORMATION OF SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY OF 
SHARI’AH SCHOLARS 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, ulama were civil leaders of the society during 
pre-modern period, and, hence, ruling authority was in need of approval of these 
scholars to prove to the society that they were ruling justly and according to Shari’ah 
which led to a negotiation process between ulama and the ruling class. The most 
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important underlying source of power to negotiate with the ruling authority was due to 
ulama’s embeddedness into the society and resulting support of people implying that 
ulama drew their legitimacy from the recognition they received from the public. 
Furthermore, this power to negotiate stemmed from their individual relationship with 
the society, not due to any kind of abstract title or membership to a certain class or 
institution. On the other hand, Shari’ah scholars in SBs of IBs are not embedded into 
the society in a similar way as their pre-modern counterparts did, yet they are still 
respected due to their title of being Shari’ah scholar and provide confidence to the 
people in terms of Shari’ah legitimacy by virtue of which they provide Shari’ah 
compliancy to the operations and instruments of IBs. This might be considered as a 
transformation of source of legitimacy. While ruling authority had to negotiate with 
certain individuals as civil leaders and religious authorities of the society to attain 
legitimacy in the eyes of populace, in modern IBs, top level management only needs to 
have a SB composed of individuals selected and employed by an IB without any 
involvement of wider public. In other words, while actual individual scholar per se 
provided the legitimacy to the ruling authority in pre-modern period, it is the ‘abstract’ 
notion of existence of SB as part of the modern governance mechanism that provides 
the legitimacy of IBs. By ‘actual’ individuals, we mean those individuals who were 
known by the people in person, since their way of life played an important role in their 
reputation for being a scholar (Winter, 2009), while ‘abstract’ concept of SB only 
represents a group of knowledgeable people without necessity of referring to any 
particular individual public figure or important scholar. Although it is a fact that some 
IBs employ publicly known figures in SBs with the purpose of gaining trust of 
stakeholders, neither this is the norm, nor it contradicts the fact that existence of SB 
bestows the Shari’ah legitimacy without signifying any ‘concrete’ individual.  
Since the Shari’ah legitimacy in IBs stems from the ‘existence’ of SB, rather than the 
individual scholar’s ‘substantive knowledge, position and relationship with society’, it 
is easier for these institutions to replace a member of SB with another Shari’ah scholar 
in order to reach their organisational objective of ensuring profit maximisation and 
efficiency without attracting any attention whereby fatwa shopping or Shari’ah 
arbitrage is considered as source of concern (El-Gamal, 2007).  
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Achieving legitimacy through the existence of SB in IBs directly affects the power of 
resistance of modern Shari’ah scholars against the top-managements of IBs. In the 
relationship of top-management of IBs with members of SBs, modern Shari’ah scholars 
have a limited ability to resist to power of management, since they could be replaced 
by another Shari’ah scholar in case top-management considers their position as 
‘unattainable’; and hence ‘rent-seeking behaviour’ becomes dominant in the 
behavioural norms of Shari’ah scholars. In other words, they are powerless against the 
pressures from the top-management of commercial IBs compared to the power of 
Shari’ah scholars in pre-modern period against ruling authority. For example, the 
following statement of a Shari’ah research officer of an Islamic bank evidences this 
argument (Ullah, 2012:119):  
In some cases, when the management really insists us not to do something, we become 
lenient because there are only two options in that case; either to quit or to obey. Some 
Shari'a advisors quit in such situations and there have been instances of resignations. 
But some still stay for the Maslihat that if they quit, the management will bring in 
someone else who will be lenient event more. So if a strict Shari’a advisor quits in such 
situations, it gives management the chance for fatwa shopping. 
The main reason behind the lack of the necessary power to resist against the 
implementation and prioritisation of capitalist principles over the maqasid al-Shari’ah 
shaped moral expectation is that the source of their ability to provide legitimacy for IBs 
is the ‘title’ they have that is being Shari’ah scholar of an IB, which is bestowed upon 
by top-management of an IB. In other words, top-management of an IB has the Shari’ah 
arbitrage as long as there is a SB or a form of Shari’ah governance independent of 
individual characteristics of those who compose it. Such a relationship, as a result, 
makes the fatwa shopping an option for the top-management which breaks the 
resistance of Shari’ah scholars against the demands of top-management and has forced 
them to comply with the expectation of the capitalist market system. However, in early 
periods of Muslim ‘governance structure’, private scholars and jurist-consults attained 
their legitimacy through their characteristic features and status in the society as an 
individual, not from their title or rank in the government. As a result, they could not be 
replaced by the Muslim governments easily in case of a conflict. In IBs, on the other 
hand, replacement of a Shari’ah scholar, who pursue the implementation of objectives 
of Shari’ah, with another Shari’ah scholar who inclines to issue legal rulings based on 
the expected outcome and capitalist principles would not affect the legitimacy of IBs 
since most of the customers would not even be aware of such a change.  
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In his autobiography, Shari’ah Scholar’s Mind, Bakar, a leading Shari’ah scholar and 
an academic, mentions a dialogue with a participant after his presentation regarding 
Shari’ah scholarship in IFIs. In Bakar’s words, the participant explains the perception 
of Shari’ah scholarship by customers as follows (Bakar, 2016, 68): 
…the public is aware that any Islamic financial product must be endorsed by a group 
of scholars for it to be ‘halal’. However, they know nothing about the scholars and the 
process that they go through before issuing a Shariah resolution or approval. In short, 
the public expects the Shariah scholars to be more visible, particularly through 
platforms that the public has easy access to. He even stated that Shariah scholars have 
an air of ‘elitism’ around them, to the extent that sometimes the community feels that 
these scholars are not approachable. This is not a good remark indeed.   
In other words, most of the customers in the contemporary times do not evaluate the 
Shari’ah scholars individually and then decide whether he is eligible to provide 
legitimacy for the products and services of a particular IB. Instead, they have trust in 
Shari’ah compliancy, mostly, due to the existence of an SB at that institution which is 
composed of ‘Shari’ah scholars’ since “socially and politically conservative, seeking 
individual piety and social mores built around traditionalist compliance with fiqh, and 
looks to social and political improvements mainly as a result of that” (Vogel and Hayes 
1998: 27, footnote). It can, indeed, be argued whether this is an organic trust or due to 
the imposed traditional Shari’ah hegemony in the Muslim societies embedded from 
early ages in Muslim mindset. 
As the quotation by Ullah (2012:119) disclose the nature of the situation in SBs, 
Shari’ah scholars who want to fulfil objectives of Shari’ah might need to settle down 
with a lesser implementation to prevent the worst case scenario. This demonstrates that 
although private scholars and legists in both pre-modern period (for governments) and 
modern period (for IBs) are utilised as source of legitimacy, the power of resistance of 
modern Shari’ah scholars is limited compared to their pre-modern counterparts.  
Aforementioned conflicts between the top-management and members of SB 
presupposes a Shari’ah scholar who is not embedded into the financial system; 
however, most of the Shari’ah scholars have been embedded by definition of sitting in 
a SB. This is due to the fact that management aims to maximise the profit of IB while 
achieving a minimum level of Shari’ah compliancy to preserve their ‘Islamic’ identity 
of IB at the expense of compromising the realisation of objectives of Shari’ah. 
However, if an IB prioritise the objectives of Shari’ah over the capitalist principles and 
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aims to provide Shari’ah-based products and services or considers that fulfilling the 
objectives of Shari’ah is more profitable for the institution, then, the negotiation 
process becomes completely different. Since the goal of realisation of objective of 
Shari’ah would be shared by both members of SB and top-management, they would 
collaborate to offer products and services accordingly. Nevertheless, even such a shared 
perspective between the management and SB may not result in realising the objectives 
of Shari’ah in such institutions due to the difficulty of anticipating and evaluating the 
objectives of Shari’ah for products and services in the complexity of modern world. In 
the next section, therefore, we examine how complexity of modern world limits the 
fulfilment of the objectives of the Shari’ah by Shari’ah scholars in the absence of a 
collaboration with scholars from other disciplines.   
6.6. COMPLEXITY OF MODERN PERIOD 
Top-level management and their aim of maximising profit is not the only obstacle in 
front of the members of SBs to realise the objectives of Shari’ah in Islamic banking 
sector. Even if Shari’ah scholars are not embedded into the banking sector and sharing 
same ideals with top-level management in terms of fulfilling the objectives of Shari’ah, 
complexity of modern life and interdependency of institutions still makes it rather 
difficult to achieve the moral objectives of Shari’ah or maqasid al-Shari’ah as an 
outcome of the given fatwas which makes the interdisciplinary consultation as a 
necessity condition rather than enhancement.  
In exploring the complexity of society and interdependence of institutions in modern 
times, it should be noted that industrial revolution and emergence of market system has 
had an immense impact on the social formation of the societies by changing the modes 
of productions and their articulation in the political economy of the societies (Polanyi, 
1957). Contrary to the lifestyle and social relations of the pre-modern, lesser-
interdependent and lesser-complex societies, modern period exhibits high complexity 
through urbanisation and increased division of labour in society.  
Financialised economy and the emergence of self-regulated market economy, 
particularly, led to the production of fictitious commodities by commodification process 
and creating a wedge between real economy and financial world and also removing 
normative value system from impacting the economy, hence, resulting into 
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disembeddedness of the economy from the society, which played an essential role in 
the construction of present complicated social formation and social structures (Polanyi, 
1957). In addition to the complexity of economic and social structures of modern 
nation-states, globalisation in the post-industrial society transformed the world into a 
village, building even more complex networks among the countries and individual 
firms around the globe. As a result of such transformation, any decision or action taken 
in one country has consequences on another country, even if they are not neighbours.  
In a historical reflection, it can be seen that life in pre-modern period was simple which 
had rendered an embedded relationship possible between ulama and populace, since 
the size of the population and the structure of society had made the involvement of 
ulama into the society easier (e.g. education method, necessity for religious 
consultation and having a profession to earn living expenses). This simple structure, 
hence, had rendered an environment for ulama to have an embedded relationship, which 
helped them to take the custom of the society and short-term and long-term 
consequences of the legal ruling into account during the process of ijtihad. However, 
the current state of affairs among the individuals in modern societies as well as firms in 
countries of the globalised world requires interdisciplinary studies in order to explore 
the custom of people and estimate the outcomes of decisions and actions to examine 
their compatibility with the objectives of Shari’ah by also endogenising Islamic moral 
economy principles. The complex structure of the modern globalised world, hence, 
does not allow Shari’ah scholars to estimate the outcome of their rulings and level of 
fulfilment in terms of realisation of objectives of Shari’ah unless they collaborate with 
other disciplines. This situation, therefore, leads many Shari’ah scholars to be 
contented with form-based Shari’ah compliance without assessing the substance of the 
legal rulings, as their academic capacity and professional experience enforces upon 
them. In other words, since they do not have such a vast multi-discipline knowledge 
they opt to seek for form-based Shari’ah compliancy. This has led to the current debate 
on the ‘form vs. substance’ or ‘Shari’ah compliant finance vs. Islam based finance’ 
(Asutay, 2012a) indicating their prioritisation of form or intention as a priori as opposed 
to consequentialism. 
Consequently, even though a Shari’ah scholar in a SB, by himself, may desire to follow 
a consequentialist approach to essentialise Islamic norms and engage in negotiation 
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with top-management, necessity of specialisation in disciplines in modern period due 
to the expansion of each discipline obliges such a Shari’ah scholar to involve in the 
interdisciplinary collaboration. In other words, complexity of the modern society makes 
it difficult to issue a legal ruling in compliance with objectives of Shari’ah without 
cooperating with other disciplines such as sociology, economics and cost-benefit 
analysis aiming to measure the social costs and benefits of projects with including all 
stakeholders into consideration as tawhidi axiom, or complementarity and unitary 
nature of Islamic knowledge suggests. However, in realising such a structure, Shari’ah 
scholars are expected to contribute to the development of necessary capacities and 
capabilities with other sectors and disciplines to predict the consequences of their 
approved products and services on the society as well as suitability for the various 
custom of Muslims individuals.  
For example, in pre-modern period, the damage of a product on environment due to the 
air pollution might not be an issue to consider due to the simplicity of the products or 
non-urgency of an environmental issues. However, in today’s sustainable development 
world, depending on the size of the project, it could cause lasting damages both on 
nature and people. Therefore, announcing a project as Shari’ah compliant requires 
evaluation of the hazard level of a project for the society and environment, which cannot 
be completed or assessed individually by Shari’ah scholars alone, yet the outcomes of 
such reports is considered as their responsibility.  
Zamzam Tower is a good example to substantiate this claim further, which is a hotel 
complex located adjacent to the Kaabah in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, which is the holy 
site of Islam since Prophet Abraham and is the geographic direction of prayers in Islam 
and the centre for pilgrimage. However, the heavy modern construction of the buildings 
is having an impact on Kaabah. Since the constructions and transformation is fully 
financed with sukuk (Ahmed, 2004), an Islamic securitisation instrument similar to 
bonds, it provides an example for disembeddedness nature of Islamic finance.  
From a pure capitalist approach, the location of the Zamzam tower is perfect for 
investment, since that location is one of the most valuable location and attracts high-
net-worth pilgrimages. However, building such a luxury hotel and shopping mall next 
to the Kaabah should not be in compliance with the objectives of moral augmented 
Shari’ah, as, by definition, Kaabah is a place of equality such that everyone should be 
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equal and should have equal opportunities in worshipping. Furthermore, due to such 
(mis)development, spirituality as well as the historicity of the area is destructed, which 
implies consequences of the project was not endogenised in the financing decision by 
the Shari’ah scholars who approved the financing for such project, as project 
commodifies the entire umrah and hajj or pilgrimage process in addition to 
undermining equality in the holy site.  
In order to evaluate the impact of such a massive shopping mall and hotel adjacent to 
the most sacred Islamic place on earth for Muslims requires the examination of the 
sociologist and other experts to discover both spiritual and material impact (Sardar, 
2014). Therefore, reports and analysis from other disciplines should guide the decision 
process of Shari’ah scholars in the negotiation process with top-management to come 
closer to fulfilment of the objective of Shari’ah rather than the capitalist principles in 
the process of Shari’ah compliancy, especially in complex projects where 
interdisciplinary collaboration is essential. However, since their legitimacy does not 
come from the society but rather due to their appointments by the IBs into SBs, their 
role is relegated only to ensure compliancy for financial efficiency; and therefore, 
Shari’ah scholars involved in the approval process for sukuk for the development of 
such buildings around Kabaah see the projects as positive business and investment areas 
and as provision of most-needed accommodation regardless of recognising the 
consequences. As efficiency and profit-oriented share-holder governance oriented IBs 
aims to utilise the ‘Shari’ah hegemony’ of Shari’ah scholars to get their financial 
instruments and products receive popular acceptance, as having such scholars on board 
through SB renders positive signals in the form of signifier to the individuals to consider 
the products and instruments of the respective IB as Shari’ah compliant. Hence, rather 
than Shari’ah scholars negotiating with IBs management to ensure form and substance 
compliancy, they submit to the expectations of capitalist system in facilitating Shari’ah 
compliancy. This process is sustained through the Shari’ah arbitrage process, as 
Shari’ah scholars know that they can be replaced if they do not facilitate the process, 
which reveals the importance of a ‘proper regulatory framework’ (El-Gamal, 2007; 
Oseni, 2017). This is also evidenced by the different fatwas given by the same Shari’ah 
scholar on the same issue in different SBs (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). 
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6.7. CONCLUSION  
This chapter investigated the transformation of the role and status of Shari’ah scholars 
from the pre-modern times to modern times and current position of Shari’ah scholars 
as members of SBs in IBs with the intention of exploring the reasons behind the failure 
of Shari’ah scholars in preventing the convergence of IBs towards conventional 
banking sector by giving up the Islamic moral economy expectations. We argue that 
there are three main transformation points in ifta institution leading to such outcome 
which is examined in this chapter by providing various potential explanations of this 
failure for different cases.  
First reason behind the failure is embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars in capitalist 
principles based financial system, which leads to internalisation or endogenisation of 
such principles and giving them priority over the objectives of Shari’ah for the sake of 
efficiency, competition and stability without questioning such objectives. By 
embeddedness and internalisation of capitalist principles, we mean advocating 
capitalist principles on Islamic grounds and interpreting the objectives of Shari’ah in a 
way to converge towards capitalist principles. For those who are not embedded in the 
conventional financial system and strive to realise the objectives of Shari’ah in Islamic 
banking sector, transformation of the source of legitimacy still pose an obstacle. Decline 
of negotiation power of Shari’ah scholars against top-level management compared to 
the negotiation power of the pre-modern scholars against ruling authorities alleviates 
the resistance of Shari’ah scholars in SBs and forces to compromise on the objectives 
of Shari’ah in case of domination. Although this lack of negotiation power might not 
lead to failure of realisation of objectives of Shari’ah if top-level management shares 
the same idealistic Islamic views with SB, complexity of modern world still might lead 
to unwanted outcomes in terms of objectives of Shari’ah. Furthermore, complicated 
nature of products and services in modern times and interconnected structure of 
financial products and services obliges Shari’ah scholars to collaborate with other 
disciplines to reveal the most suitable rulings according to the objectives of Shari’ah. 
Without such interdisciplinary collaborations, contrary to the pre-modern period, it is 
difficult to realise the objectives of Shari’ah in Islamic banking sector even with good 
intentions from both management and Shari’ah governance structures due to difficulty 
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to foresee the short-term and long-term consequences of the products and services as 
well as macro level impacts.  
We argue that these transformations from the pre-modern period to modern period and 
lack of regulations proposed considering these transformation resulted in determination 
of the morality of Shari’ah by capitalist hegemony which leads to social failure of IBs 
in relation to Islamic moral economy aspirations and convergence towards conventional 
banking sector (Asutay, 2007b; 2012a; El-Gamal, 2007). The role of capitalist 
hegemony in social failure of IBs is particularly evident in the process of deciding the 
exception in Islamic law. As we discussed above, in general, Shari’ah scholars utilises 
necessity or maslahah of people to appeal for an exception to adjust according to the 
needs of the sector which is ruled by the principles of capitalist market system. Deciding 
the exception, therefore, is the crucial point in which capitalist hegemony reveals itself. 
That is the reason why Schmitt (2005) advocates that it is the Sovereign who decides 
what ‘the exception’ is and how to act in ‘the state of exception’ (Schmitt, 2005: xii). 
Considering the fact that it is the capitalist hegemony that decides what should be the 
exception and how should be acted, it would not be wrong to claim that it is the 
capitalism who is the Sovereign in the current affairs of Islamic banking sector 



















7.1. CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS: AN ATTEMPT IN 
DISCOURSE AND MEANING MAKING  
In this study, we explored the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in IBs and the reasons 
behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars to prevent the divergence of IBs from its 
foundational objectives, namely Islamic Moral Economy (IME). To achieve this aim, 
in Chapter 2, in constituting Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG), we developed an 
IME framework as the substance of ICG system, which is proposed as the expected 
corporate governance system of IBs and other Islamic corporations. Such an attempt is 
essential to provide an integrated approach to knowledge and practice; because IBs 
claim ‘Islamic’ identity in the form of ‘Shari’ah compliancy’ in their financial 
operations through SBs, they should have their own CG frame to sustain their (Islamic) 
consistency. In other words, since their financing is ensured Islamicity, their governance 
and management structure should also reflect the Islamic identity, which rationalises 
the importance of constructing ICG.  
The IME based framework is utilised to determine whether SBs conduct their 
responsibility of directing, supervising and monitoring Islamic banking operations and 
instruments in line with IME and informing the stakeholders regarding these tasks 
through disclosure in their most important communication channel, namely Shari’ah 
annual report (SAR). Our analysis of SARs of 41 IBs from 15 countries over the period 
of 2007-2014 revealed that SBs are away from fulfilling the expectations of AAOIFI 
let alone IME framework regarding the disclosure practice. As the empirical analysis 
and findings in Chapter 3 demonstrate, their disclosure is mostly limited to the general 
statements to disclose the consent of SBs in Shari’ah compliance of product and 
services of IBs without elaborating the process in detail and the efforts they put forward 
to provide Shari’ah compliance. Based on such disclosure practice, we argued that it is 
not the detailed disclosure of SBs in terms of Shari’ah compliance that keeps the 
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‘Islamic’ identity of IBs intact but more importantly, the very existence of Shari’ah 
scholars in IBs as part of Shari’ah governance division, and their general approval on 
the Shari’ah compliance that provides an ‘Islamic’ identity to the IBs. In supporting 
this, as evidenced in the classical legal opinion books of Shari’ah scholars, being 
content with a general approval of a Shari’ah scholars or a short response without 
detailed explanation was also the practice of the pre-modern period as well. However, 
the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in society and against the ruling authority during 
the pre-modern period and their role and status in modern IBs against the top-level 
management in the contemporary times are significantly different. To understand the 
role and status of Shari’ah scholars in modern IBs, first, we had to explore the 
emergence and development of Islamic banking structure within multiple modernities 
framework with the help of postcolonial concepts of hybridity, mimicry, menace and 
reverse mimicry.  
As it is discussed in Chapter 4, the emergence of Islamic banking as a modern institution 
with the initial aspirations of IME went through different phases until the contemporary 
commercial and competitive oriented Islamic banking structure has emerged. 
Especially after the 1990s with internationalisation phase of Islamic banking, with the 
entrance of IBs into competition with conventional banks, we witnessed the 
convergence of products and services of IBs towards their conventional counterparts 
filtered through a fiqhi mechanism to make them Shari’ah compliant. This process, 
consequently, took IBs further away from the initial aspirations being an alternative and 
Islamically authenticated ‘financing institution’. Although even the initial IB was also 
established as a hybrid institution as result of a mixture of conventional saving bank 
model with Islamic principles as in the case of Mith Ghamr example, the aspirations of 
IME were more evident compared to the contemporary shareholder value-oriented 
Islamic banking model. Thus, Chapter 4 demonstrates the process through which IBs 
have gone through the process of convergence from having the claims of being 
alternative to hybridity and now mimicry approaching towards mirroring phase 
resulting into giving up IME claims and relegating the Islamic identity of IB and its 
governance to only financial compliance under the market pressure. 
After analysing the emergence and development of modern Islamic banking 
institutions, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we explore and compare the role and status of 
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Shari’ah scholars during the pre-modern period and contemporary times, respectively. 
Such an exploration and comparison is important in revealing the nature of 
transformation in ifta institution from pre-modern period to modern period. In this 
study, we located three main transformations regarding the role and status of Shari’ah 
scholars:  
Firstly, in the pre-modern period, Shari’ah scholars were submerged into the society 
whereas Shari’ah scholars in modern SBs submerged into the Islamic banking sector 
more due to the nature of their profession compared to their submergence into the 
society. Behind such transformation, there also lies the influence of capitalist ideology 
in education, urbanisation and city structure and other institutions of modernity in the 
sense of modernity as a way of life and project and social formation, which hinder 
submergence of Shari’ah scholars into the society. In other words, some Shari’ah 
scholars in SBs have become embedded into the modern financial system and 
internalised the rules and principles of capitalism as a result of the process they have 
gone through in a modern society (particularly education system). We can observe 
traces of such embeddedness in the fatwa-giving process of such scholars who 
essentialise the principles of capitalism such as efficiency, low-transaction cost and 
shareholder value to justify their rulings and prioritise them in the case of a 
contradiction between Islamic law and these principles. This, as explained in Chapter 
4, can be evidenced by, for example, through the practice of organised tawarruq in IBs 
despite the resolution of the ICFA. 
Secondly, in the pre-modern period, Shari’ah scholars attained their ‘civil leader’ status 
through their deep knowledge in Shari’ah, sustaining an exemplary way of life and 
having an embedded relationship with the society, which bestowed upon them the 
power to negotiate on behalf of people with the elite-ruling class individually rather 
than as a class of ‘learned people’. In other words, in the pre-modern period, jurist-
consults attained their status individually, which could not be replaced by another 
scholar easily. Therefore, replacing these local leaders was not a viable option with the 
intention of increasing negotiation power of ruling authority. However, negotiation 
power of the Shari’ah scholars in SBs, compared to the pre-modern period, has 
lessened, since Shari’ah scholars in SBs attain their source of legitimacy by being 
appointed to a specific SB and by being paid by the respective IB rather than deriving 
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their negotiation power directly from the society. In other words, due to change in the 
social formation and social structure, leading to new social contract beyond the 
influence of Shari’ah scholars, they have lost the negotiating power and therefore they 
have become exogenous ‘variables’ and ‘unit’ within the existing governance system 
including in IBs. This asymmetricity, hence, leads to inadequate negotiation power of 
members of SBs with top-level managements in IBs. Unlike pre-modern periods, as 
explained, members of SBs attain their legitimacy to direct, monitor and supervise the 
operations of the IB institution by being appointed by the board of directors of an IB as 
a member of SB, and by being salaried by a respective IB, not due to his or her role and 
status in the society. This situation makes members of SBs replaceable without any 
disruption, even maybe without any notice of any stakeholders. This is because 
customers usually do not seek information regarding members of SBs, since for them, 
the existence of a SB is sufficient condition for Shari’ah compliance of an IFI. 
Consequently, this transformation in the source of legitimacy of jurist-consults as well 
as the lack of awareness about the composition of SBs by the demand side in the modern 
IBs diminishes the negotiation power of members of SB with top-level management 
and prevents the articulation of the claims for Islamic authenticity in a robust manner.  
Thirdly, the complexity of the society and everyday practices of people changed 
drastically compared to the pre-modern era in the Muslim world. In pre-modern period, 
market exchanges and their expected outcomes as well as the transaction structures 
were simpler. Moreover, since “man’s economic action was submerged into the society” 
(Polanyi, 1957: 40), jurist-consults were aware of the content of these exchanges as the 
examples in Chapter 5 also demonstrated. On the other hand, capitalism has produced 
complex and interdependent products and services. Especially due to the globalisation, 
impacts of economics and financial decisions are not limited within a certain border but 
might have synchronised effect in the global markets. Therefore, while foreseeing the 
consequences of legal rulings were easier during the pre-modern period and could be 
undertaken by individual scholars, interdependent and complex nature of modern world 
obliges Shari’ah scholars to work in collaboration with other disciplines such as 
sociology, economics, politics, etc. Thus, while confirmation of a Shari’ah scholar for 
a certain product or service is a necessary condition to fulfil the form of or namely 
compliance with the scriptural text, it is not sufficient condition to achieve objectives 
of the Shari’ah. Realisation of the objectives of the Shari’ah requires collaboration and 
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approval of other disciplines as well developing the capacity to foresee the long-run 
and short-run outcomes of the decisions in the society. This is crucial to attaining 
Islamically required comprehensive and holistic approach that can be developed as an 
articulation of tawhid axiom as suggested by IPE frame and IME substance as opposed 
to the narrow definition of Islamic finance. 
These three main transformations between the pre-modern and modern period suggest 
that a general approval of Shari’ah scholars on Shari’ah compliance of everyday 
operations is not sufficient in modern IBs due to embeddedness in Islamic banking 
sector, lack of negotiation power and complexity of the products and services. 
Consequently, it is expected from Shari’ah scholars in SBs to disclose detailed 
information regarding their process of providing Shari’ah compliance and share with 
the stakeholders their understanding of Shari’ah compliance since such understanding 
might be different from one SB to another due to the variety of interpretations of 
Shari’ah as a result of discussed transformations.  
The implications of the above findings are twofold. Firstly, in terms of level of 
information disclosed in SAR, AAOIFI-based index, namely SDIAAOIFI, has a relatively 
high score in general compared to more demanding, IME-based index, namely 
SDIGeneral. This implies that although there is a lack of IME-based approach to disclose 
detailed information about the operations and practices of IBs in relation to Shari’ah 
governance, AAOIFI governance standards are influential in the preparation process of 
SAR. Furthermore, considering the fact that adoption of AAOIFI governance standards 
by each jurisdiction also has a positive impact in the disclosure level, it is important 
pay attention to the development of AAOIFI governance standards. In other words, in 
order to increase IME-based understanding in IBs, developing AAOIFI governance 
standards in line with IME-based approach might be useful. In addition, it will be 
beneficial to strive to encourage the jurisdictions to adopt AAOIFI governance 
standards in terms of increasing the level of disclosure in IBs. At bank level, the 
existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department and employment of experienced 
and popular Shari’ah scholars are other factors to increase disclosure level.    
Secondly, as stated in Chapter 4, the modern Islamic banking experience can be 
considered as part of the colonisation process, IBs as colonised subjects. As a result, 
there are important transformation points in terms of ifta institution between SB 
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structure as it exists in modern Islamic banking sector and Shari’ah scholarship as it 
existed in pre-modern Muslim societies. In policy making process, such 
transformations should be taken into account to prevent the convergence of IBs towards 
conventional banking sector in terms of the products and services as well as everyday 
operations.  
Building on the findings of this thesis, we have two main arguments: (i) the trap of the 
form-based fiqhi approach which has facilitated the convergence of IBs towards 
conventional banks, and (ii) the necessity of a civil society based regulatory mechanism 
to evaluate the Shari’ah compliance of IBs by going beyond the form-compliancy and 
considering IME or substance approach as well.  
As Hallaq (2012) argues, the central domain of Shari’ah is morality, namely IME which 
is the articulation of axiomatic framework as discussed in Chapter 2. Being constituted 
by the morality of Shari’ah, ICG system demands IBs and Shari’ah scholars in SBs to 
fulfil the articulation of axioms in the everyday operations of IBs by directing, 
supervising and monitoring over such operations. Islam as a religion was one of the 
main institutional logics prevalent in Muslim societies during pre-modern era, and its 
morality was internalised by Shari’ah scholars and theorised by different school of 
thoughts in Islamic law, implemented and protected by Shari’ah scholars thanks to their 
financial and intellectual independence, as discussed in Chapter 5. Shari’ah scholars as 
embedded agents of the society had sustained the relationships among the people in line 
with the morality of Shari’ah and dynamic realities of the society by considering both 
universals of the Shari’ah and particulars of the society. In places where the form of 
Shari’ah would not produce the moral outcome, namely the substance, as it is 
understood by Shari’ah scholars, they appealed to legal methods such as istihsan, legal 
devices or custom to adjust the form to the moral nature of the Shari’ah, without going 
beyond the borders of scriptural text. The benchmark of the legal reasoning process of 
Shari’ah scholars, however, was not the will of people or ruling authority but the 
morality of the Shari’ah, since it was determining all the secondary domains. 
Prevalence of the morality of Shari’ah in the everyday practice of people, submergence 
of Shari’ah scholars into the society and their financial and intellectual independence 
played a facilitator role in producing morality, namely IME, as an outcome of the 
process of issuing a legal ruling.  
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It is important to note that this approach does not suggest that the form is insignificant 
and only substance has value. Rather, as Gazzali (1988) emphasised in Revival of the 
Religious Sciences, we point out that there are external (zahir) and internal (batin) 
aspects of behaviours in general and economic and financial behaviours in particular 
such as paying zakat or involving in trade which could be considered as form and 
substance. It should, therefore, be noted that both aspects are important. While abolition 
of form might lead to a Tufian understanding of maslahah or public utility in which 
scriptural texts are interpreted or abrogated according to maslahah understanding of 
contemporary people, abolition of substance might lead to a form-based fiqhi approach 
in which Shari’ah scholars are contended with a legal support from previous scholars 
in terms of legitimising a legal ruling without pondering upon the context and potential 
outcomes in contemporary period. In the current practice of Shari’ah scholars of SBs, 
we observe the latter being the dominant strategy, while the former has been utilised as 
well in cases where the form-based approach has not been sufficient to legitimise a 
certain product or service. However, consideration of both form and substance, 
substance being the morality of Shari’ah, has been the minority practice in the everyday 
practice of IBs.  
The reason behind such a transformation regarding the legal ruling, namely from ‘form 
and substance’ to ‘form-based’ approach, we argue, is the transformation in the 
underlying institutional logics of the society. As discussed in Chapter 6, while the 
prevalent institutional logics in the society was religion during the pre-modern period, 
capitalist market system and state bureaucracy became the dominant intuitional logics 
during the modern era. Consequently, religion or Islam in our case, and Islamic law as 
its articulation in the everyday practice of Muslim individuals and religion-based 
institutions have been reshaped with the principles of capitalism’s dominant 
institutional logics such as efficiency, low-transaction cost and shareholder value 
resulting into a ‘blending’. In other words, using Hallaq’s (2012) terminology, the 
central domain of modern Muslim societies has become capitalist market system and 
state bureaucracy rather than the morality of Shari’ah resulting into hegemonic nature 
of capitalism overcoming Islamic substance. Resulting transformation in the central 
domain, hence, consequently, influenced the ifta process. To comply with the principles 
of capitalism and state bureaucracy, in other words, Shari’ah scholars have been forced 
to utilise a form-based and maslahah oriented approach. Consequently, maslahah is 
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being defined according to the principles of capitalism rather than according to IME 
objectives, in this case. 
Hallaq (2012) gives the concept of corporate juristic personality as an example of such 
change., While Kuran (2012) claims that absence of corporate juristic personality in 
Islamic law along with the stagnant nature of Islamic law has been one of the reasons 
that led to the divergence of Middle East from the West and lagging in terms of 
economic growth, Hallaq (2012: 153) argued that “the corporation and all that it 
represents as a virulent capitalist enterprise is not only amoral and often immoral, it is 
also the epitome of anti-Shar'ism”. Hallaq (2012), therefore, argues that it is the 
morality of Shari’ah rather than any other intrinsic character of Islamic law that cause 
the lack of emergence of corporate juristic personality concept. Nevertheless, as one of 
the crucial concepts of capitalism, the corporate juristic personality has been accepted 
as legitimate in Islamic law after the 1960s and we witnessed the efforts of Shari’ah 
scholars to justify its acceptance based on the historical institutions such as waqf or 
pious trusts and beyt-ul mal or public treasury. It is evident, then, it is the influence of 
changing institutional logics that led to change in understanding of Islamic law as well. 
However, due to the conflicts of such modern concepts and principles with the morality 
of Shari’ah, Shari’ah scholars had to follow a form-based approach by disregarding the 
substance, namely the morality of Shari’ah in some cases to comply with the everyday 
practice of the modern period. 
To further substantiate this argument with an example, acquisition of language might 
be considered. Language acquisition of a child in a society is not as a result of learning 
the grammar rules; rather it is through living in the society the child acquires the 
language and learns how to talk. Although the grammar rules are written in books, they 
are prepared based on the practice rather than vice-versa. In a similar manner, schools 
of thoughts in Islamic law have been developed according to the ‘living experience’ of 
the Prophet and His companions and following generations and are formulated based 
on their practices in line with the morality understanding of the founder of a particular 
school of thought of Shari’ah. The grammar of the Islamic law, in a manner, is morality 
of Shari’ah which was present in the society and internalised by individuals as well as 
Shari’ah scholars and determined the fatwa process. With the emergence of modernity, 
however, the grammar of Muslim societies has been changed drastically. As Hallaq 
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(2012: 3) rightly puts it, “the political, legal, and cultural struggles of today’s Muslims 
stem from a certain measure of dissonance between their moral and cultural aspirations, 
on the one hand, and the moral realities of a modern world, on the other—realities with 
which they must live but that were not of their own making”. They must speak, namely 
regulate everyday practice in the society, with a grammar of which was not of their own 
making, such as the case of capitalist logic determining the operations of IBs with the 
blessings of Shari’ah scholars. This may be the reason behind the close familiarity of 
Islamic financial institutions with conventional financial institutions but at the same 
time, their distance to Islamic values. Although the words belong to Islam such as sukuk, 
mudarabah, musharakah, murabahah, etc., the grammar namely the underlying 
structure of these products, such as efficiency, transaction cost, shareholder value, etc., 
does not belong to Islam but an articulation of capitalist market system and state 
bureaucracy. We argue, therefore, that Shari’ah scholars’ approach in embracing form-
based and maslahah oriented approach is an outcome of the efforts to reconcile Islamic 
law as it has been utilised in IBs with the underlying institutional logics of the capitalist 
market system and state bureaucracy. As we discussed in Chapter 6, due to the 
transformation of ifta institution between the pre-modern period and contemporary 
times, we argue that it is highly unlikely to produce an outcome which is in line with 
IME, despite the existence of Shari’ah scholars as the guardians of objectives of 
Shari’ah.   
In the second argument, therefore, we propose a potential way out, at least a way to 
moderate the outcomes of IBs and IFIs as expressed as ‘social failure’ and bring the 
existing institutions closer to the initial aspirations, namely IME. As outlined above, 
there are three main obstacles of contemporary Shari’ah scholarship to realise the 
objectives of Shari’ah as members of SBs, namely embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars 
in capitalist market systems, lack of negation power relative to the pre-modern period 
and necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration due to the complexity of products and 
services in the modern period. These obstacles make the approval of SBs on Shari’ah 
compliance of IBs without elaborating and substantiating the compliance as unreliable. 
Although there are solutions proposed to increase the independence of Shari’ah 
scholars and making Shari’ah governance more effective, such as the creation of 
national or central SBs in Malaysia and some other countries, they are still within the 
institutional logics of the capitalist market system or state bureaucracy. Central SBs at 
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the national level, for instance, to supervise and supersede the firm level SBs is an 
articulation of state bureaucracy and efforts to centralise Shari’ah governance further 
in ensuring the hegemony of capitalism’s institutional logics.  
As an alternative solution, this study suggests a civil society based regulatory 
mechanism to evaluate Shari’ah compliance of the products and services of IBs. This 
regulatory mechanism does not substitute but complements the role of SBs. This 
regularity system should go beyond the binary opposition of halal/haram or 
permissible/impermissible and implement a fuzzy logic approach towards IME. In 
other words, rather than solely deciding whether a certain product is halal or haram, 
this mechanism should go beyond that and aim to decide to what degree a certain 
product or service is compatible with IME in different dimensions such as environment, 
employee-employer relationship, production process, etc. by endogenising morality 
through positive screening along with form oriented negative screening.  The labelling 
such as ‘suitable for vegetarians’ or ‘fair trade’, for instance, are examples of binary 
dichotomies whereas energy efficiency rating of houses on a scale of 1-100 is an 
example of the fuzzy logic approach. As for IBs, hence, in addition to determining 
whether a product or service is halal (with a binary approach), we can also measure its 
fulfilment of certain dimensions of IME with a fuzzy logic approach to evaluate to what 
degree it is compatible with IME by going beyond the halal/haram dichotomy. For 
example, a product can be deemed halal through fiqhi process, but with fuzzy logic 
approach when it is rated in terms of fulfilling the IME expectations, its substantive 
morality score could be 58%, or 63%, 75% or 100%. Such a rating could give those 
investors seeking pre-dominance of IME in their financial and economic transactions 
an opportunity to go beyond the initial halal sphere to the tahsiniyah or embellishment 
sphere in essentialising aspirations of IME. For this, ICG system, based on extended 
stakeholding understanding, within the tawhidi knowledge system will be essential in 
determining the ‘best practice’ in terms of highest objective level as explained by the 
pendulum between halal (the minimum ‘must) and taqwa or piety (the highest 
beneficence level to reach ihsan). 
Such a regularity mechanism has two superiorities over the existing SB driven Shari’ah 
governance mechanism. Firstly, a civil society-based mechanism would convert the 
negotiation process from top-level management vs. SB into IB vs. stakeholders. This 
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shift would help to solve particularly first two obstacles, namely embeddedness and 
lack of negotiation power. In the first case, the conflict between top-level management 
and SB would be minimum, since both groups are driven with similar institutional 
logics which is expected to produce conformist behaviour of Shari’ah scholars towards 
the expectations of top-level management, which is mostly profit-maximisation 
oriented demands. In the second case, although SB resists the demands of top-level 
management with the objective of realising an IME oriented outcome, due to lack of 
negotiation power, they may settle down with a moderate solution. As we mentioned in 
Chapter 6, these two cases are specific to IBs in which top-level management prioritise 
the profit over the implementation of IME. If the opposite is the case, namely a harmony 
with the top-level management, then SB should be able to implement IME apart from 
the complex cases where interdisciplinary collaboration becomes a necessity. By 
shifting the regularity mechanism for Shari’ah governance partly to the civil society, 
the issue becomes no longer only to get the approval of SB on a certain product or 
service in terms of permissibility but requires going beyond that and convince the civil 
society that Shari’ah compliance is genuine by disclosing the relevant information 
related to the dimensions of IME. Therefore, the Shari’ah compliance is no longer a 
binary decision of halal/haram but also, after it is approved as halal, to what degree it 
is compliant with IME. Utilisation of such a civil society-based mechanism, therefore, 
solves the obstacles of embeddedness of Shari’ah scholars and lack of the negotiation 
power since it is also the stakeholders that IBs must convince rather than Shari’ah 
scholars alone. 
Second superiority mainly solves the third obstacle, which is the complex nature of 
product and services in IBs. As mentioned in Chapter 6, even if embeddedness and lack 
of negotiation power would not be a problem for a Shari’ah scholar regarding the 
realisation of the objectives of Shari’ah, the complexity of the products and services 
and necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration in such cases might lead to an obstacle. 
A civil society-based regularity mechanism would be instrumental in such a case by 
evaluating the product or service in various dimensions of IME such as environmental 
or social impact by using the information provided by the IB. In such mechanism, the 
information provided by IBs would be used as an input to evaluate the degree of 
compliance with IME for the products and services approved by SB as permissible. 
Based on the input, civil society organisations would have the opportunity of providing 
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a score on a scale of 1-100 regarding IME in projects such as ZamZam Tower or other 
sukuk projects. Such a rating process would also have an impact on pricing and 
compensate the cost of fulfilling IME requirements, which will further encourage IBs 
and investors to comply with a higher score of IME. Such encouragement is especially 
important since, in the absence of such a feedback mechanism on a higher compliance 
of IME and compensation in exchange for the efforts of IB, there would not be any 
incentive for an IBs to implement IME. In a similar manner to Gresham law which 
argues that bad money drives out good money; having the same face values, namely 
being ‘halal’ or permissible, IBs with higher compliance of IME would be driven out 
from the market. A fuzzy logic based civil society evaluation mechanism, therefore, 
would provide a unique value for each product or service in line with their score in 
compliance with IME. While Shari’ah compliant products and services with a low IME 
score would find customers who only concerned with the form of Shari’ah, the product 
and services with higher IME scores would be compensated and survived in the market 
as well. It is due to such aspirational expectations that in recent years, a number of 
studies emerged to examine the maqasid al-Shari’ah (the higher objective of Shari’ah 
being the human well-being) performance of IBs (see: Aksak and Asutay, 2015; Asutay 
and Harningtyas, 2015; Mohamada et al., 2016) with the objective of locating the moral 
outcome of IBs through disclosure studies. However, since there is no attempt by IBs 
to disclose such information due to not necessarily conducting such activities, the 
findings of such studies are rather disappointing. Therefore, the solution provided by 
this study would necessitate IBs to conduct Islamic morally acceptable outcomes and 
disclose the necessary information. 
It is important to note that it is not expected that every IB would aim a high score on 
the scale since every range within the scale of 1-100 would have a certain market share. 
However, this mechanism would provide an opportunity to open a niche market for 
those who aim to invest or to do business with IBs which achieve a high score regarding 
IME compliance. After the emergence of such a market, it is also the responsibility of 
civil society to promote and extend the share of stakeholders who aims for a higher 
score. We can term such an effort as endogenisation of IME since the goal is to convince 
people to care about IME and involve with IBs which achieve a higher score.  
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Such a process resembles the process led to the emergence of ‘ethical investing’ or 
‘socially responsible investment’, which represents the market responses to the 
demands emerged from the civil society to have their savings to be invested in ‘ethically 
acceptable and social impact areas’. The successful expansion of such investing areas 
is an indication of the power of the civil society but also indicates the flexibility of 
market system for making additional inroads through market segmentation. In a similar 
manner, such segmentation as explained above through fuzzy logic will serve the 
expectations of ‘further morally inclined Muslim individuals’. Such a power of the civil 
society would undermine the imposed Shari’ah hegemony and further democratise 
Islamic finance. This might also help to overcome the observed ‘Shari’ah arbitrage’ 
(El-Gamal, 2007). It is also important to recall the hisbah (market regulation body 
through examining the moral consequences of market) experiment in the Muslim world 
as per civil society, an articulation of which being ahilik (brotherhood) system in the 
Ottoman Era in the form of guild system can provide authentic examples of developing 
new structures to essentialise Islamic normativeness and substantive morality of Islam. 
This study, however, acknowledges the difficulties and limits of a civil society-based 
regularity mechanism based on fuzzy logic. First and foremost, the disclosure practices 
of IBs regarding the details of the products and services which is required as input to a 
potential IME index is insufficient, as indicated by the maqasid al-Shari’ah 
performance of IBs related studies. Therefore, it requires a strong civil society with the 
required awareness on the topic to pressurise the companies with an affirmed action to 
enhance the level of disclosure. Secondly, dimensions and potential index items should 
have been investigated for IME. Considering that such theoretical studies attract less 
attention, this might be a challenging task to achieve. Nevertheless, studies related to 
the construction of maqasid-index might be a good starting point to develop an IME 
index. Thirdly, such a civil society based regulatory mechanism requires a certain 
degree of awareness on demand side which is necessary to sustain IME compliant 
products and services in the market and compensate their additional expenses to provide 
such product and services. Demand for sustainable products and services, organic food 
and fair trade suggest that such a demand for IME-based products and services is not 
unlikely but required effort to raise awareness.  
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Despite these limitations, however, it is important to strive to realise IME in a 
decentralised manner and maybe with several alternative IME-based rating 
mechanisms to bring the IBs and other financial institutions closer to the initial 
aspirations of IME. This is crucial to provide and sustain a human-centred development 
path by going beyond economic growth obsession so that falah or individual salvation 
could be achieved and ihsan or societal beneficence can be attempted in this world, 
which constitutes the objective of being ‘khalifah’ (being vicegerent) of Allah in this 
world. 
7.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite having conducted a novel research, this study does not go without limitations; 
and therefore, two important limitations can be mentioned. Firstly, the number of 
observation in the empirical part of Chapter 3 was planned to be higher. However, due 
to the language barrier and relatively young age of IBs in the sector have limited the 
number of observation with 305. As for the language barrier, we conducted our analysis 
with SARs published in English and Arabic. This led to exclusion of most of the IBs in 
Indonesia which publish their annual reports in Indonesian’s Bahasa language. As for 
the age of IBs, we could not extend our sample earlier than 2007 since that would result 
excluding many IBs due to the fact that most of them have been established around 
2007 and later. Furthermore, some unpublished online SARs by IBs has further 
decreased the number of observations. 
Second limitation relates to the use of primary data; as collection of primary data 
through interview survey method with the leading Shari’ah scholars in the Islamic 
finance sector industry was considered.  However, due to the difficulty of reaching the 
leading Shari’ah scholars, with the objective of not ‘wasting further time’, the research 
has resigned to the fact of using secondary data and discourse method. As we mentioned 
in Chapter 6, a small number of Shari’ah scholars occupies the majority of the chairs 
in SBs, resulting in high preoccupation with Shari’ah board related issues. This, as a 
result, makes arranging interviews with the leading Shari’ah scholars a challenge. This 
is the reason why we relied on the interviews with Shari’ah scholars conducted by other 
researchers as a secondary source to reflect their positions in the discussions.  
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Based on the research conducted in this thesis, we can move forward by developing this 
research further. Firstly, conducting interviews with established as well as new 
generation Shari’ah scholars can be considered so that the arguments developed in this 
research through secondary material can be debated and substantiated. As this will help 
to reveal the cause of social failure in their respective institutions as we discussed in 
the previous chapter, namely embeddedness, lack of negotiation power and lack of 
collaboration. With a representative sample of Shari’ah scholars, such an interview 
would also reveal the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in Islamic finance and 
banking sector but also it can help to see whether there is any change in the views of 
established and young scholars in relation to the emerging challenges in the sector. 
Second research area is related to the development of IME based index to emasure the 
performance of IBs. In other words, through the exploration of the IME dimensions 
attempt can be made to develop of an index based on IME framework to measure the 
products and services of IFIs with the objective of disclosing to what degree they are 
compatible with IME beyond being ‘halal’ or Shari’ah compliant. It is important to 
note that exploration of dimensions of IME and construction of an index requires 
extensive research and collaboration of multiple disciplines such as Islamic studies, 
sociology, economics, history, anthropology, organisational study, etc. Particularly, it 
requires consulting the published works of earlier generations to investigate pre-modern 
ideas and perspectives. Despite the challenges, such a transdisciplinary work can 
nevertheless, be an achievable goal.  
Lastly, as mentioned in passing, the concept of corporation is a challenging issue for 
fiqh or Islamic law; as corporation is not considered as an entity by fiqh; and therefore, 
among others, such as Kuran (2003, 2004) claims that the lack of corporation is one of 
the main reasons for the underdevelopment in the Muslim world. While this argument 
opens for critical debate on the nature of different political economies and the 
inevitability of corporations, nevertheless, financial corporations in the form of IBs and 
non-financial Islamically oriented corporations as part of the emerging halal industry 
and Shari’ah complaint stocks is a reality in the contemporary Muslim world. Thus, 
pragmatism of Shari’ah scholars can be seen in their treatments of corporations in 
Islamic law, as they approve the products and operations of IBs as corporations, but 
they rule out the idea of imposing zakah on IBs on the ground that fiqh on zakah does 
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not consider corporations as responsible to pay zakah as fiqh on zakah can only be given 
by individuals. Hence, due to the market efficiency and to increase their 
competitiveness, zakah is ruled out in their new injunctions or fatwas as a possibility 
for IBs which in essence can fit into IME’s objective of ihsan or beneficence, as 
corporations has additional eligibility and affordability such as the case with corporate 
tax in addition to personal income tax in the modern tax system. Under such conditions, 
therefore, the SBs’ remit is limited with product approval, while the CG issues are 
excluded from the sphere of Shari’ah scholars let alone shaping the IBs and other 
corporations around ICG. Since shareholder interest can easily be dealt with fiqh, 
Shari’ah scholars have ruled out stakeholder based CG, which, as an attitude and 
strategy, rules out pursuing ICG in IBs and IFIs. As can be seen, there are challenges to 
develop ICG and even shaping the nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
the case of IBs due to the challenges faced in fiqh due to the unresolved issue of 
corporations. Regardless of such a fact, even the standards setting agencies such as 
AAOIFI issues CG and CSR standards and IFSB issues regulations. Given the context 
that both of these organisations have Shari’ah scholars to shape such standards and 
regulations, the denial of such paradoxes can be considered as important reasons of the 
observed convergence and social failures. Therefore, existential issue facing the 
industry is the development of ICG within fiqh; as this study has provided the IME 
based ICG within the theoretical frame of IPE. However, since ICG’s application and 
articulation can only be possible with the provision of fiqh base, it is important that the 
theoretical system proposed in this study should be matched with its fiqhi base so that 
consequentialist oriented process (based on IME) developed in this study can have its 
form or intention base as expressed by fiqh. Therefore, an essential future study in the 
form of methodological study can aims at developing an integrated whole with its IME 
within IPE framework as well as fiqh, as tawhidi knowledge base require 
complementarity between different spheres of knowledge. This will also help to provide 
an embedded CG as well as CSR base for IBs and IFIs as well as other emerging 
corporations in the Muslim world within Islamic ontological determined social 
formation. Despite the paradoxical denial we observe around us by different 
stakeholders as mentioned above, this will remain an important project to shape the 




This research aimed at exploring the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in IBs and the 
reasons behind the lack of ability of Shari’ah scholars to prevent the social failures of 
IBs. In order to achieve this, we explored three main topics in five chapters;  (i) 
examination of supervisory role of SBs through Shari’ah Annual Reports (SARs) 
within IME framework; (ii) investigation of the process of divergence of IBs from 
initial aspirations of IME within postcolonial framework; and (iii) exploration of 
paradigm shifts in ifta institution’s reason d’etre after the Rightly Guided Caliphate 
period with the objective of tracing the roots of SB as a modern ifta institution to reveal 
main reasons behind the inability of Shari’ah scholars in SBs to prevent the divergence. 
In our analysis in four empirical and discursive research-oriented chapters, this research 
has fulfilled its aim and objectives as stated in its research questions in Chapter 1. 
Through empirical and theoretical analysis and utilisation of secondary data, the 
research provided a holistic view of the main question. Furthermore, building on the 
empirical and theoretical research of this research, we offered some policy suggestions 
that can prevent the convergence of IBs towards conventional banks in terms of product 
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